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Abstract 
In this thesis, I investigate several different questions about happiness and 
hedonism in theory and practice and offer several arguments and theories. In 
addition to making progress in these happiness-related areas of inquiry, this 
thesis aims to demonstrate the complexity and variety of happiness-related 
problems and the broad range of real-world problems that considerations of 
happiness can help to resolve. Furthermore, nearly every chapter of this thesis 
demonstrates how interdisciplinary analyses can bring new movement to 
problems that have become insulated within one academic discipline.  
This thesis is divided into two main parts. Chapters 1 through 5 constitute 
Part 1, and Chapters 6 through 8 constitute Part 2.  
Part 1 of this thesis is focused on theory and questions about what we 
should believe. In particular, Part 1 is concerned with Prudential Hedonism, a 
theory of what is good for a person, which claims (roughly) that a 
preponderance of pleasure over pain (sometimes referred to as happiness) is 
what is ultimately good for people.  
After providing a broad overview of hedonism, and especially Prudential 
Hedonism, in Chapter 1, the remainder of Part 1 focuses on one main 
question from philosophical debates about well-being: does the experience 
machine thought experiment give us good reason to believe that internalist 
accounts of Prudential Hedonism are all false? The main conclusion that I 
argue for in Part 1 is that no, the experience machine thought experiment does 
not gives us good reason to believe that internalist accounts of Prudential 
Hedonism are all false. 
Part 2 of this thesis is focused on practice, and particularly on how 
considerations of happiness can inform certain practices and help us to 
understand what we should do in certain circumstances. Unlike Part 1, which 
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has a smooth narrative flow from chapter to chapter, Part 2 contains three 
relatively unrelated chapters, each of which investigates a different question 
without relying on the conclusions of any previous chapters.  
Chapter 6 argues that an optimistic view about scientific and technological 
progress allows for two interesting new theories for the meaning of life 
debate, and discusses what people with certain kinds of belief might want to 
do to achieve true meaning in life. One of these theories posits that causing 
there to be infinite happiness can be a way to achieve a truly meaningful life.  
Chapter 7 demonstrates how considerations of human happiness can 
justify why a particular set of distributive principles are the fairest way to 
apportion the burdens associated with adapting to, and mitigating, the 
potentially devastating effects of rapid climactic change. Based on these 
considerations, Chapter 7 includes fairly specific policy recommendations 
about what governments should do about climate change. 
This thesis also includes a Postscript for Policymakers. Compared to 
Chapters 2 to 7, the Postscript for Policymakers takes a much higher-level 
approach; it seeks to provide general answers to two very broad questions. 
Given its broader scope and different intended audience, the Postscript for 
Policymakers does not include in-depth discussion of all likely objections. The 
two questions addressed in the Postscript for Policymakers are: should 
policymakers use findings from the science of happiness to guide their policy 
decisions, and how can they best do this? The Postscript for Policymakers 
concludes that findings from the science of happiness should be used to guide 
policymaking (with several qualifications), and it provides recommendations 
for how best to do this. 
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Part 1  
Part 1 of this thesis focuses on theory and questions about what we should 
believe. 
In philosophy, the two main theoretical debates about happiness are how 
to define happiness and whether being happy is all, part, or none of what 
makes our lives go well for us. Part 1 of this thesis engages in this second 
debate. The claim that being happy is all of what ultimately makes our lives 
go well for us is most often defended by Prudential Hedonists. Prudential 
Hedonists believe that happiness—usually defined as a preponderance of 
pleasure over pain, and where both pleasure and pain are defined broadly—is 
all of what ultimately makes our lives go well for us. 
Philosophical, and especially popular, writing about happiness is full of 
ambiguity about what the term hedonism actually means. This ambiguity is 
perpetuated by conflicting descriptions in philosophical dictionaries and 
introductory textbooks. Simon Blackburn (2005, p. 161) and Gregory Pence 
(2005, p. 25) both severely limit hedonism by describing it as a specifically 
normative theory—which claims that pursuing our own pleasure should be 
the aim of all our actions—without mentioning any other types of hedonism. 
This normative account of hedonism is better known as Hedonistic Egoism 
and stands opposed to Hedonistic Utilitarianism (Moore 2011), which states 
that the morally good action is the one that is likely to maximise net pleasure 
for everyone (Brink 2006, p. 381). In a similarly misleading way, Vesey and 
Foulkes (1990) take the opposite approach and only discuss Hedonistic 
Utilitarianism and Motivational Hedonism. These omissions are unfortunate 
because it is clear that all of the main versions of normative hedonism rely on 
Prudential Hedonism as a justification. Such narrow descriptions of hedonism 
could lead an uninitiated reader to assume that hedonism is just a normative 
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theory, which is simply not the case. Since the precise meanings of the terms 
hedonism and, particularly, Prudential Hedonism are required to properly 
engage in any debate about whether being happy is all or only part of what 
makes our lives go well for us and since ambiguity about what these terms 
mean is so rife, Chapter 1 of this thesis is an encyclopaedic overview of these 
terms as they are used in philosophy. 
Mentioned in the encyclopaedic overview of Chapter 1, is the experience 
machine objection to hedonism—the most prominent of all objections to 
Prudential Hedonism. The popularity of this particular objection, along with 
the widespread conception that it is successful enough to single-handedly 
render Prudential Hedonism implausible, motivates the focus of the 
remainder of Part 1. 
Chapter 2 explains the experience machine objection to hedonism, and 
includes two formal versions of the objection to capture both its common use 
and its best use in the literature. All of the article-length attempts to refute the 
experience machine objection to hedonism from the last 15 years are then 
reviewed. Most of the articles use several different reasons to argue that the 
experience machine objection to hedonism is not convincing, so these reasons 
are grouped according to the premise of the argument that they attempt to 
refute. Why most of the refutations are misguided, or unlikely to convince 
those who believe that the experience machine objection to hedonism is 
successful, is then explained. The chapter concludes by identifying one 
potentially fruitful refutation of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism. 
Chapter 3 takes on the task of developing this refutation. The attempted 
refutation rests heavily on how philosophical judgements about thought 
experiments are created, and the extent to which they can be affected by 
biases because of this process. So, much of this chapter is spent discussing 
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how our intuitive cognition works and how it can affect our judgements 
about thought experiments. A few philosophers have already argued that the 
status quo bias—an inappropriate preference for things to remain the same—
is to blame for the perceived success of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism. Their arguments are analysed in detail in this chapter. Two of 
these philosophers, Felipe De Brigard (2010) and Basil Smith (2011), have even 
conducted experiments on this question and their methods and results are 
also discussed. Chapter 3 concludes that more empirical experiments are 
required for us to have good reason to believe that the status quo bias is really 
the main cause of the success of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism. 
Chapter 4 responds to Basil Smith’s (2011) charge that empirical surveys 
about experience machine thought experiments cannot actually tell us 
anything useful. Chapter 4 concludes that, while experiments on experience 
machine thought experiments can be set up in ways that make them more or 
less useful, there is no good reason to believe that well-constructed 
experiments on experience machine scenarios are useless. 
Building on the insights from Chapter 4, Chapter 5 discusses several 
experiments on a few novel experience machine scenarios. The results of the 
experiments indicate that status quo bias and other confounding factors are 
very likely to be important causes of the apparent success of the experience 
machine objection to hedonism. The results also demonstrate that the 
experience machine objection to hedonism is not effective if a relatively bias-
free version of the experience machine thought experiment is used. Chapter 5 
concludes with some guidance for how introductory ethics classes should be 
taught in light of the findings in Part 1. 
Taken together, the chapters in Part 1 constitute a background-rich and 
highly-detailed discussion of what we should believe about one particular 
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argument against a specific group of theories—the experience machine 
objection to hedonism.  
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Chapter 1 
Hedonism: An Encyclopaedic Overview 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter provides a broad overview of the term ‘hedonism’ in general and 
of how philosophers use the term ‘Prudential Hedonism’ in particular. After 
Prudential Hedonism is disambiguated from various other hedonisms, its 
history, current major varieties, and main criticisms are discussed. This 
chapter does not attempt to argue for or against any conceptions of hedonism 
or accounts of Prudential Hedonism. Rather, this chapter intends to reflect the 
current shared knowledge about hedonism and Prudential Hedonism to 
provide context for the remainder of Part 1. 
 
1. Introduction1 
The term ‘hedonism’, from the Greek ἡδονή (hēdonē) for pleasure, refers to 
several related theories about what is good for us, how we should behave, 
and what motivates us to behave in the ways that we do. All hedonistic 
theories identify pleasure and pain as the only important elements of 
whatever phenomena they are designed to describe.  If hedonistic theories 
identified pleasure and pain as merely two important elements, instead of the 
only important elements of what they are describing, then they would not be 
nearly as unpopular as they all are. However, the claim that pleasure and 
pain are the only things of ultimate importance is what makes hedonism 
distinctive and philosophically interesting. 
                                                             
1 This chapter provided the basis for Weijers (2011a). 
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Philosophical Hedonists tend to focus on hedonistic theories of value, and 
especially of well-being—the good life for the one living it. As a theory of 
value, hedonism states that all and only pleasure is intrinsically valuable and 
all and only pain is intrinsically dis-valuable. Hedonists usually define 
pleasure and pain broadly, such that both the pleasure of reading a good book 
and the pain of reading a bad thesis are included. Thus, a gentle massage and 
recalling a fond memory are both considered to cause pleasure and stubbing a 
toe and hearing about the death of a loved one are both considered to cause 
pain. With pleasure and pain so defined, hedonism is intuitively appealing as 
a theory about what is valuable for us. Indeed, its appeal is evidenced by the 
fact that nearly all historical and contemporary treatments of well-being 
allocate at least some space to discuss hedonism.  Unfortunately for 
hedonism, these discussions rarely endorse it and some even deplore its focus 
on pleasure.  
This chapter begins by clarifying the different types of hedonistic theories 
and the labels they are often given. Then, hedonism’s ancient origins and its 
subsequent development are reviewed. The majority of this chapter is then 
concerned with describing the important theoretical divisions within 
Prudential Hedonism and discussing the major criticisms of these divisions. 
 
2. Disambiguation 
2.1 Folk Hedonism 
When the term ‘hedonism’ is used in modern literature, or by non-
philosophers in their everyday talk, its meaning is quite different from the 
one it takes when used by philosophers. Non-philosophers tend to think of a 
hedonist as a person who seeks out pleasure for themselves without any 
particular regard for their own future well-being, or for the well-being of 
others. According to non-philosophers, then, a stereotypical hedonist is 
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someone who never misses an opportunity to indulge of the pleasures of sex, 
drugs, and rock ‘n’ roll, even if the indulgences are likely to lead to 
relationship problems, health problems, regrets, or sadness for themselves or 
for others. Philosophers commonly refer to this everyday understanding of 
hedonism as ‘Folk Hedonism’. Folk Hedonism is a rough combination of 
Motivational Hedonism, Hedonistic Egoism, and a reckless lack of foresight. 
 
2.2 Value Hedonism and Prudential Hedonism 
When philosophers discuss hedonism, they are most likely to be referring to 
hedonism about value, and especially the slightly more specific theory, 
hedonism about well-being. Hedonism as a theory about value (best referred 
to as Value Hedonism) holds that all and only pleasure is intrinsically 
valuable and all and only pain is intrinsically dis-valuable, or more simply, 
‚pleasure is the only prudential good and pain is the only prudential bad‛ 
(Moore & Crisp 1996, p. 599). The term ‘intrinsically’ is an important part of 
the definition and is best understood in contrast to the term ‘instrumentally’. 
Something is intrinsically valuable if it is valuable for its own sake. Pleasure is 
thought to be intrinsically valuable because, even if it did not lead to any 
other benefit, it would still be good to experience. Money is an example of an 
instrumental good; its value for us comes from what we can do with it (what 
we can buy with it). The fact that a copious amount of money has no value if 
no one ever sells anything reveals that money lacks intrinsic value. Value 
Hedonism reduces everything of value to pleasure. For example, a Value 
Hedonist would explain the instrumental value of money by describing how 
the things we can buy with money, such as food, shelter, and status-
signifying goods, bring us pleasure or help us to avoid pain. 
Hedonism as a theory about well-being (best referred to as Prudential 
Hedonism) is more specific than Value Hedonism because it stipulates what 
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the value is for. Prudential Hedonism holds that all and only pleasure 
intrinsically makes people’s lives go better for them and that all and only pain 
intrinsically makes their lives go worse for them. Some philosophers replace 
‘people’ with ‘persons and sentient nonpersons’, so as to apply Prudential 
Hedonism more widely. A good example of this comes from Peter Singer’s 
(1990) work on animals and ethics. Singer questions why some humans can 
see the intrinsic disvalue in human pain, but do not also accept that it is bad 
for sentient non-human animals to experience pain. 
When Prudential Hedonists claim that happiness is what they value most, 
they intend happiness to be understood as a preponderance of pleasure over 
pain.2 An important distinction between Prudential Hedonists and Folk 
Hedonists is that Prudential Hedonists usually understand that pursuing 
pleasure and avoiding pain in the very short-term is not always the best 
strategy for achieving the optimal long-term balance of pleasure over pain. 
Prudential Hedonism is an integral part of several derivative types of 
hedonistic theory, all of which have featured prominently in philosophical 
debates of the past. Prudential Hedonism is also an important theory in the 
debate about what well-being consists of, a debate which is generally seen as 
epistemically prior to many other important debates in moral philosophy, 
including how we should live.3 Since a proper understanding of Prudential 
Hedonism is required to understand most other types of hedonism, and 
several other important philosophical debates, the majority of this chapter is 
                                                             
2 Most philosophers allow this understanding of happiness as one of many possible 
conceptions, but Dan Haybron (2001) has argued against it. 
3 For an interesting discussion of why an understanding of what well-being consists in 
needn’t be epistemically prior to the question of how we should live, see Tiberius (2008, part 
1). 
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dedicated to discussing Prudential Hedonism. First, however, the main 
derivative types of hedonism are briefly discussed. 
 
2.3 Motivational Hedonism 
Motivational Hedonism (more commonly referred to by the less descriptive 
label, Psychological Hedonism) is the theory that the desire to encounter 
pleasure and avoid pain guides all of our behaviour. Most philosophical 
accounts of Motivational Hedonism include both conscious and unconscious 
desires for pleasure, but emphasize the latter.4 Epicurus,5 Jeremy Bentham 
(1789), and John Stuart Mill (1861) have all argued for varieties of 
Motivational Hedonism. Bentham used the idea to support his theory of 
Hedonistic Utilitarianism (discussed below). Weak versions of Motivational 
Hedonism hold that the desire to seek pleasure and avoid pain often or 
always has some influence on our behaviour. Weak versions are generally 
considered to be uncontroversially true and not especially useful for 
philosophy.  
Philosophers have been more interested in strong accounts of Motivational 
Hedonism, which hold that all behaviour is governed by the desire to 
encounter pleasure and avoid pain, and only this desire. Strong accounts of 
Motivational Hedonism have been used to support some of the normative 
types of hedonism and to argue against non-hedonistic normative theories.  
                                                             
4 In contrast, psychologists and management theorists have often understood hedonism to 
include the volitional pursuit of please and avoidance of pain but not the unconscious pursuit 
of pleasure and avoidance of pain (which they consider to be an integral part of ‘instinct 
theory’). See for example James (1950, vol. 1, pp. 143–4; vol. 2, pp. 549–59), Murray (1964), 
Porter, Bigley, and Steers (2003), and Vroom (1964). 
5 See for example Diogenes (1925a) and Mitsis (1988). 
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Plato’s Ring of Gyges example, in The Republic (Plato 1974), can be read as 
a notable objection to Motivational Hedonism. Plato’s Socrates is discussing 
with Glaucon how men would react if they were to possess a ring that gave its 
wearer immense powers, including invisibility. Glaucon believes that a strong 
version of Motivational Egoism is true, but Socrates does not. Motivational 
Egoism is the theory that all the actions of each person are guided solely by 
the desire to improve one’s own life.  Since Motivational Hedonism is a sub-
type of Motivational Egoism, it is also brought into doubt by successful 
objections to Motivational Egoism. Glaucon asserts that, emboldened with the 
power provided by the Ring of Gyges, everyone would succumb to the 
inherent and ubiquitous desire to pursue their own ends at the expense of 
others. Socrates disagrees, arguing that good people would be able to 
overcome this desire because of their strong love of justice, fostered through 
philosophising.  
Strong accounts of Motivational Hedonism currently garner very little 
support for similar reasons. There are many examples of seemingly pain-
seeking acts performed out of a sense of duty—from the soldier who jumps 
on a grenade to save his comrades to that time you rescued a trapped dog 
only to be (predictably) bitten in the process. Introspective evidence also 
weighs against strong accounts of Motivational Hedonism; many of the 
decisions we make seem to be based on motives other than seeking pleasure 
and avoiding pain. Given these reasons, most philosophers consider the 
burden of proof to be squarely on the shoulders of anyone wishing to argue 
for a strong account of Motivational Hedonism.6 
 
 
 
                                                             
6 Moore (2011) offers further challenges for motivational hedonism. 
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2.4 Normative Hedonism 
Value Hedonism, occasionally with assistance from Motivational Hedonism, 
has been used to argue for specific theories of right action (theories that 
explain which actions are morally permissible or impermissible and why). 
The theory that happiness should be pursued (that pleasure should be 
pursued and pain should be avoided) is referred to as Normative Hedonism 
and sometimes Ethical Hedonism.  There are two major types of Normative 
Hedonism: Hedonistic Egoism and Hedonistic Utilitarianism. Both types 
commonly use happiness (defined as pleasure minus pain) as the sole 
criterion for determining the moral rightness or wrongness of an action. 
Important variations within each of these two main types specify either the 
actual resulting happiness (after the act) or the predicted resulting happiness 
(before the act) as the moral criterion. Although both major types of 
Normative Hedonism have been accused of being repugnant, Hedonistic 
Egoism is usually considered the most offensive.  
 
2.5 Hedonistic Egoism 
Hedonistic Egoism is the theory that we should, morally speaking, do 
whatever is most in our own best interests. Because it is a form of hedonism, 
Hedonistic Egoism holds that what is most in our own best interests is 
whatever makes us happiest – that is whatever provides us with the most net 
pleasure after pain is subtracted. The most repugnant feature of this theory is 
that one never has to ascribe any value whatsoever to the consequences for 
anyone other than oneself. For example, a Hedonistic Egoist who did not feel 
saddened by theft would be morally required to steal, even from needy 
orphans, if he thought he could get away with it. Would-be defenders of 
Hedonistic Egoism might point out that performing acts of theft, murder, 
treachery and the like would not make them happier overall because of the 
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guilt, the fear of being caught, and the chance of being caught and punished. 
The would-be defenders should surrender, however, if it is pointed out that a 
Hedonistic Egoist is morally obliged by their own theory to pursue an 
unusual kind of practical education—a brief and possibly painful training 
period that reduces their moral emotions of sympathy and guilt. Such an 
education might be achieved by desensitising over-exposure to, and 
performance of, torture of innocents. If Hedonistic Egoists underwent such an 
education, their reduced capacity for sympathy and guilt would allow them 
to take advantage of any opportunities to perform pleasurable, but normally-
guilt-inducing, actions, such as stealing from the poor.  
Hedonistic Egoism is very unpopular amongst philosophers, not just for 
this reason, but also because it suffers from all of the objections that apply to 
Prudential Hedonism (discussed below). 
 
2.6 Hedonistic Utilitarianism 
Hedonistic Utilitarianism is the theory that the right action is the one that 
produces (or is most likely to produce) the greatest net happiness for all 
concerned. Hedonistic Utilitarianism is often considered fairer than 
Hedonistic Egoism because the happiness of everyone involved (everyone 
who is affected or is likely to be affected) is taken into account and given 
equal weight. Hedonistic Utilitarians, then, would advocate not stealing from 
needy orphans because to do so would usually leave the orphan far less 
happy and the (probably better-off) thief only slightly happier (assuming he 
felt no guilt). Despite treating all individuals equally, Hedonistic 
Utilitarianism is still seen as objectionable by some because it assigns no 
intrinsic moral value to justice, friendship, truth, or any of the many other 
goods that are often thought to be irreducibly valuable. For example, a 
Hedonistic Utilitarian would be morally obliged to publicly execute an 
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innocent friend of theirs if doing so was the only way to promote the greatest 
happiness overall. Although unlikely, such a situation might arise if a child 
was murdered in a small town and the lack of suspects was causing large-
scale inter-ethnic violence. Some philosophers would argue that executing an 
innocent friend is immoral precisely because it ignores the intrinsic values of 
justice, friendship, and possibly truth.  
Hedonistic Utilitarianism is rarely endorsed by philosophers, but mainly 
because of its reliance on Prudential Hedonism as opposed to its utilitarian 
element. Non-hedonistic versions of utilitarianism are about as popular as the 
other leading theories of right action, especially when it is the actions of 
institutions that are being considered. 
 
3. The Origins of Hedonism 
3.1 Cārvāka 
Perhaps the earliest written record of hedonism comes from the Cārvāka, an 
Indian philosophical tradition based on the Barhaspatya sutras. The Cārvāka 
persisted for two thousand years (from about 600 BCE). Most notably, the 
Cārvāka advocated skepticism and Hedonistic Egoism—that the right action 
is the one that brings the actor the most net pleasure. The Cārvāka 
acknowledged that some pain often accompanied, or was later caused by, 
sensual pleasure, but that the pleasure was worth it.7  
 
3.2 Aristippus and the Cyrenaics 
The Cyrenaics, founded by Aristippus (c. 435–356 BCE), were also skeptics 
and Hedonistic Egoists (O’Keefe 2005a). Although the paucity of original texts 
                                                             
7 See Chattopadhyaya (1990) and Sarma (2011, pp. 3–13) for more details on the hedonism of 
the Cārvāka. 
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makes it difficult to confidently state all of the justifications for the Cyrenaics’ 
positions, their overall stance is clear enough.8 The Cyrenaics believed 
pleasure was the ultimate good and everyone should pursue all immediate 
pleasures for themselves. They considered bodily pleasures better than 
mental pleasures, presumably because they were more vivid or trustworthy. 
The Cyrenaics also recommended pursuing immediate pleasures and 
avoiding immediate pains with scant or no regard for future consequences. 
Their reasoning for this is even less clear, but is most plausibly linked to their 
skeptical views—perhaps that what we can be most sure of in this uncertain 
existence is our current bodily pleasures.  
 
3.3 Epicurus 
Epicurus (c. 341–271 BCE), founder of Epicureanism, developed a Normative 
Hedonism in stark contrast to that of Aristippus. The Epicureanism of 
Epicurus is also quite the opposite to the common usage of Epicureanism; 
while we might like to go on a luxurious ‘Epicurean’ holiday packed with fine 
dining and moderately excessive wining, Epicurus would warn us that we are 
only setting ourselves up for future pain. For Epicurus, happiness was the 
complete absence of bodily and especially mental pains, including fear of the 
Gods and desires for anything other than the bare necessities of life (Inwood 
& Gerson 1994; Laertius 1925b; Mitsis 1998). Even with only the limited 
excesses of ancient Greece on offer, Epicurus advised his followers to avoid 
towns, and especially marketplaces, in order to limit the resulting desires for 
unnecessary things. Once we experience unnecessary pleasures, such as those 
from sex and rich food, we will then suffer from painful and hard to satisfy 
desires for more and better of the same. No matter how wealthy we might be, 
Epicurus would argue, our desires will eventually outstrip our means and 
                                                             
8 The details presented here are based on Laertius (1925a) and O’Keefe (2002; 2005b). 
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interfere with our ability to live tranquil, happy lives. Epicureanism is 
generally egoistic, in that it encourages everyone to pursue happiness for 
themselves. However, Epicureans would be unlikely to commit any of the 
selfish acts we might expect from non-epicurean egoists because Epicureans 
train themselves to desire only the very basics. And, desiring only the very 
basics gives Epicureans very little reason to do anything to interfere with the 
affairs of others. 
 
3.4 The Oyster example 
With the exception of a brief period discussed below, Hedonism has been 
generally unpopular ever since its ancient beginnings (Crisp 2006a, pp. 619–
620; Feldman 2004, p. 7; Silverstein 2000, p. 279). Although criticisms of the 
ancient forms of hedonism were many and varied, one in particular was 
heavily cited. In Philebus, Plato’s Socrates and one of his many foils, 
Protarchus in this instance, are discussing the role of pleasure in the good life 
(Plato 1937, part ii, p. 353). Socrates asks Protarchus to imagine a life without 
much pleasure but full of the higher cognitive processes, such as knowledge, 
forethought and consciousness and to compare it with a life that is the 
opposite. Socrates describes this opposite life as having perfect pleasure but 
the mental life of an oyster, pointing out that the subject of such a life would 
not be able to appreciate any of the pleasure within it. The harrowing thought 
of living the pleasurable but unthinking life of an oyster causes Protarchus to 
abandon his hedonistic argument. The oyster example can be easily avoided 
by defining pleasure as being a conscious experience, so any sensation that we 
are not consciously aware of (such as the oyster’s ‚pleasure‛)is not pleasure.9 
 
                                                             
9 Roger Crisp (2006a, pp. 630–635) suggests stronger versions of the Oyster example and 
argues that even these stronger versions do not give us reason to reject Hedonism. 
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4. The Development of Hedonism 
4.1 Bentham 
Normative and Motivational Hedonism were both at their most popular 
during the heyday of Empiricism in the 18th and 19th Centuries. Indeed, this is 
the only period during which any kind of hedonism could be considered 
popular at all. During this period, two Hedonistic Utilitarians, Jeremy 
Bentham (1748–1832) and his protégé John Stuart Mill (1806–1873), were 
particularly influential. Their theories are similar in many ways, but provide 
notably distinct definitions of pleasure. 
Bentham (1789) argued for several types of hedonism, including those 
now referred to as Prudential Hedonism, Hedonistic Utilitarianism, and 
Motivational Hedonism. He claimed that happiness was the ultimate good 
and that happiness was pleasure and the absence of pain. He acknowledged 
the hedonistic and egoistic nature of peoples’ motivation, but argued that the 
maximization of collective happiness was the correct criterion for moral 
behaviour. Bentham’s (1789) greatest happiness principle states that actions 
are immoral if they do not appear to maximise the happiness of all the people 
likely to be affected. Only the action that appears to maximise the happiness 
of all the people likely to be affected is the morally right action.  
Bentham devised the greatest happiness principle to justify the legal 
reforms he had proposed (Sweet 2008). He believed that while he could not 
conclusively prove that the principle was the correct criterion for morally 
right action, it should still be accepted because it was both fair and better than 
existing criteria for evaluating actions and legislation. Bentham (1789) thought 
that his Hedonic Calculus could be applied to a situation to see what should, 
morally speaking, be done. Hedonic Calculus is a method of ‘counting’ the 
amount of pleasure and pain that would likely be caused by different actions. 
It required a methodology for measuring pleasure, which in turn required an 
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understanding of the nature of pleasure and specifically what aspects of 
pleasure were valuable for us. 
Bentham’s (1789, pp. 151–154) Hedonic Calculus identifies several aspects 
of pleasure that should be attended to when working out what the most 
pleasurable action will be, including certainty, propinquity, extent, intensity, 
and duration. The Hedonic Calculus also makes use of two future-pleasure-
or-pain-related aspects of actions—fecundity and purity. Certainty refers to 
the likelihood that the pleasure or pain will occur. Propinquity refers to how 
long away (in terms of time) the pleasure or pain is. Fecundity refers to the 
likelihood of the pleasure or pain leading to more of the same sensation. 
Purity refers to the likelihood of the pleasure or pain leading to some of the 
opposite sensation. Extent refers to the number of people the pleasure or pain 
is likely to affect. Intensity refers to the felt strength of the pleasure or pain. 
Finally, duration refers to how long the pleasure or pain are felt for. It should 
be noted that only intensity and duration have intrinsic value for an 
individual. Certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and purity are all 
instrumentally valuable for an individual because they affect the likelihood of 
an individual feeling future pleasure and pain. Extent is also not directly 
valuable for an individual’s well-being because it refers to the likelihood of 
other people experiencing pleasure or pain.  
Bentham’s inclusion of certainty, propinquity, fecundity, and purity in the 
Hedonic Calculus helps to differentiate his hedonism from Folk Hedonism. 
Folk Hedonists rarely consider how likely their actions are to lead to future 
pleasure or pain, focussing instead on the pursuit of immediate pleasure and 
the avoidance of immediate pain. So while Folk Hedonists would be unlikely 
to study for an exam, anyone using Bentham’s Hedonic Calculus would 
consider the future happiness benefits to themselves (and possibly others) of 
passing the exam and then promptly begin studying.  
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Most importantly for Bentham’s Hedonic Calculus, the pleasure from 
different sources is always measured against these criteria in the same way, 
that is to say that no additional value is afforded to pleasures from 
particularly moral, clean, or culturally-sophisticated sources. For example, 
Bentham (1825, p. 206) held that pleasure from the parlour game push-pin 
was just as valuable for us as pleasure from music and poetry.10 Since 
Bentham’s theory of Prudential Hedonism focuses on the quantity of the 
pleasure, rather than the source-derived quality of it, it is best described as a 
type of Quantitative Hedonism.  
 
4.2 Mill 
Bentham’s indifferent stance on the source of pleasures led to others 
disparaging his hedonism as the philosophy of swine. Even Bentham’s 
student, John Stuart Mill, questioned whether we should believe some of the 
consequences of his Quantitative Hedonism. Mill questioned whether a 
satisfied pig leads a better life than a dissatisfied human, or whether a 
satisfied fool leads a better life than a dissatisfied Socrates (Mill 1861, p. 9).11 
Like Bentham, Mill endorsed the varieties of hedonism now referred to as 
Prudential Hedonism, Hedonistic Utilitarianism, and Motivational 
Hedonism. Mill also thought happiness, defined as pleasure and the 
                                                             
10 Bentham is often misquoted on this point, including by John Stuart Mill (1838): ‚He says, 
somewhere in his works, that, ‘quantity of pleasure being equal, push-pin is as good as 
poetry’.‛ What Bentham actually said is: ‚Prejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal 
value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry. If the game of push-pin furnish more 
pleasure, it is more valuable than either.‛ (Bentham 1825, p. 206).  
11 Mill is also often misquoted. He said ‚It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig 
satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are 
of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other 
party to the comparison knows both sides.‛ (Mill 1861, p. 9). 
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avoidance of pain, was the highest good. Where Mill’s hedonism differs from 
Bentham’s is in his understanding of the nature of pleasure. Mill (1861, pp. 8–
11) argued that pleasures could vary in quality, being either higher or lower. 
Mill employed the distinction between higher and lower pleasures in an 
attempt to avoid the criticism that his hedonism was, like Bentham’s, just 
another philosophy of swine (Crisp 2006a, p. 619). Lower pleasures are those 
associated with the body, which we share with other animals, such as 
pleasure from quenching thirst or having sex. Higher pleasures are those 
associated with the mind, which were thought to be unique to humans, such 
as pleasure from listening to opera, acting virtuously, or philosophising. Mill 
(1861, pp. 8–11) justified this distinction by arguing that those who have 
experienced both types of pleasure realise that higher pleasures are much 
more valuable. He dismissed challenges to this claim by asserting that those 
who disagreed lacked either the experience of higher pleasures or the capacity 
for such experiences. For Mill, higher pleasures were not different to lower 
pleasures in mere degree; they were different in kind. Since Mill’s theory of 
Prudential Hedonism focuses on the quality of the pleasure, rather than the 
amount of it, it is best described as a type of Qualitative Hedonism.12 
 
4.3 Moore 
George Edward Moore (1873–1958) was instrumental in bringing hedonism’s 
brief heyday to an end. Moore’s criticisms of hedonism in general, and Mill’s 
hedonism in particular (Moore 1903, chap. 3), were frequently cited as good 
reasons to reject hedonism during his lifetime (e.g. Wild 1927, p. 11). Indeed, 
since Moore, hedonism has been viewed by most philosophers as being an 
initially intuitive and interesting family of theories, but also one that is flawed 
on closer inspection (Crisp 2006a, pp. 619–620). Moore was a pluralist about 
                                                             
12 See Smith and Sosa (1969) and Donner (2006) for more on Mill’s Hedonistic Utilitarianism. 
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value and argued persuasively against the Value Hedonists’ central claim—
that all and only pleasure is the bearer of intrinsic value.13 Moore’s most 
damaging objection against Hedonism was his heap of filth example (1903, p. 
84). Moore himself thought the heap of filth example thoroughly refuted what 
he saw as the only potentially viable form of Value Hedonism—that 
conscious pleasure is the only thing of intrinsic value. Moore used the heap of 
filth example to argue that Value Hedonism is false because pleasure is not 
the only thing of value.  
In the heap of filth example, Moore (1903, p. 84) asks the reader to imagine 
two worlds, one of which is exceedingly beautiful and the other a disgusting 
heap of filth. Moore then instructs the reader to imagine that no one would 
ever experience either world and asks if it is better for the beautiful world to 
exist than the filthy one. Moore (1903, p. 84) assumed that his rational 
contemporaries would agree that it would be better if the beautiful world 
existed, and very few objections were published at the time (Mettrick 1928, 
pp. 389, 397).  Relying on this assumed agreement, Moore infers that the 
beautiful world is more valuable than the heap of filth and, therefore, that 
beauty must be valuable. Moore then concluded that all of the potentially 
viable theories of Value Hedonism (those that value only conscious pleasures) 
must be false because something, namely beauty, is valuable even when no 
conscious pleasure can be derived from it.  
Moore’s heap of filth example has rarely been used to object to Prudential 
Hedonism since the 1970’s because it is not directly relevant to Prudential 
Hedonism (it evaluates worlds and not lives). Moore’s other objections to 
Hedonism also went out of favor around the same time. The demise of these 
arguments was partly due to mounting objections against them,14 but mainly 
                                                             
13 See Shaw (1948, chap. 1) for more detail. 
14 See Blake (1926), Mettrick (1928), and Savery (1934), for example. 
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because arguments more suited to the task had been developed (Crisp 2006a, 
p. 620). Of particular note are the arguments against Hedonistic Utilitarianism 
and especially Prudential Hedonism. These arguments are discussed after the 
contemporary varieties of hedonism are introduced below. 
 
5. Contemporary Varieties of Hedonism 
5.1 The Main Divisions 
Several contemporary varieties of hedonism have been defended, although 
usually by just a handful of philosophers at any one time. Other varieties of 
hedonism are also theoretically available but have received little or no 
discussion. Contemporary varieties of Prudential Hedonism are grouped here 
based on how they define pleasure and pain.15 In addition to providing 
different notions of what pleasure and pain are, contemporary varieties of 
Prudential Hedonism also disagree about which aspect or aspects of pleasure 
are valuable for well-being (and dis-valuable for pain).  
The most well-known disagreement about which aspects of pleasure are 
valuable occurs between Quantitative and Qualitative Hedonists. 
Quantitative Hedonists argue that how valuable pleasure is for well-being 
depends only on the amount of pleasure, and so they are only concerned with 
dimensions of pleasure such as duration and intensity (Frankena 1973, pp. 84–
85). Quantitative Hedonism is often accused of over-valuing animalistic, 
simple, and debauched pleasures.  
Qualitative Hedonists argue that, in addition to the dimensions related to 
the amount of pleasure, one or more dimensions of quality can impact how 
pleasure affects well-being (Sobel 2002, p. 241). The quality dimensions might 
                                                             
15 See Feldman (1997) and Katz (2009) for more detail on different definitions of pleasure in 
philosophy and (to varying extents) the implications for hedonism. 
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be based on how cognitive or ‘animalistic’ the pleasure is (as it was for Mill), 
the moral status of the source of the pleasure, or some other non-amount-
related dimension. Qualitative Hedonism is criticised by some for smuggling 
values other than pleasure into well-being by misleadingly labelling them as 
dimensions of pleasure (Frankena 1973, pp. 84–85). How these qualities are 
chosen for inclusion can also be criticised for being ad hoc because inclusion 
of these dimensions of pleasure is often suggested in response to objections 
that Quantitative Hedonism cannot easily deal with. That is to say, the 
inclusion of these dimensions could be accused of being an exercise in 
plastering over holes, rather than deducing corollary conclusions from 
existing theoretical premises. Quantitative Hedonists would argue that any 
dimension of quality can be better explained in terms of dimensions of 
quantity. For example, they might claim that moral pleasures are no higher in 
quality than immoral pleasures, but that moral pleasures are instrumentally 
more valuable because they are likely to lead to more moments of pleasure or 
fewer moments of pain in the future. 
Hedonists also have differing views about how the value of pleasure 
compares with the value of pain. This is not a practical disagreement about 
how best to measure pleasure and pain, but rather a theoretical disagreement 
about comparative value. An example of such a disagreement is the debate 
about whether pain is worse for us than an equivalent amount of pleasure is 
good for us. The default position in philosophy is that one unit of pleasure 
(sometimes referred to as a Hedon) is equivalent but opposite in value to one 
unit of pain (sometimes referred to as a Dolor) (Feldman 2004, p. 26). Several 
Hedonistic Utilitarians have argued that reduction of pain should be seen as 
more important than increasing pleasure, sometimes for the Epicurean reason 
that pain seems worse for us than an equivalent amount of pleasure is good 
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for us.16 Imagine that a magical genie offered for you to play a game with him. 
The game consists of you flipping a fair coin. If the coin lands on heads, then 
you immediately feel a burst of very intense pleasure and if it lands on tails, 
then you immediately feel a burst of very intense pain. Is it in your best 
interests to play the game? 
Another area of disagreement amongst some Hedonists is whether 
pleasure is entirely internal to a person or if it includes external elements. 
Internalism about pleasure is the thesis that, whatever pleasure is, it is always 
and only inside a person. Externalism about pleasure, on the other hand, is 
the thesis that, pleasure is more than just a state of an individual (i.e. that a 
necessary component of pleasure lies outside of the individual). Externalists 
about pleasure might, for example, describe pleasure as a function that 
mediates between our minds and the environment, such that every instance 
of pleasure has one or more integral environmental components. The vast 
majority of historic and contemporary versions of Prudential Hedonism 
consider pleasure to be an internal mental state.17  
One of the least known disagreements about what aspects of pleasure 
make it valuable is the debate about whether we have to be conscious of 
pleasure for it to be valuable. The dominant position is that pleasure is a 
conscious mental state, or at least that any pleasure a person is not conscious 
of does not intrinsically improve their well-being (Bramble forthcoming). 
Torbjörn Tännsjö (1998, chap. 5), Dan Haybron (2008b), and Eric Schwitzgebel 
                                                             
16 Negative Utilitarianism was inspired by Karl Popper (1952) and coined by Ninian Smart 
(1958, pp. 542–543) as the normative ethical theory that demanded "the least amount of 
avoidable suffering for all" and is usually motivated by the notion that suffering (often 
understood as pain) is much worse than an equivalent amount of happiness (often 
understood as pleasure). It should be noted that Ninian Smart was not a proponent of 
Negative Utilitarianism. 
17 See Sarch (2011) for the most recent discussion of this debate. 
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(2008) provide the strongest arguments for the possibility that some pleasures 
that we are not conscious of may still have prudential value. 
 
5.2 Pleasure as Sensation 
The most common definition of pleasure is that it is a sensation, something 
that we identify through our senses or that we feel. Psychologists claim that 
we have at least ten senses, including the familiar sight, hearing, smell, taste, 
and touch, but also movement, balance, and several sub-senses of touch, 
including heat, cold, pressure, and pain. New senses get added to the list 
when it is understood that some independent physical process underpins 
their functioning.18 The most widely-used examples of pleasurable sensations 
are the pleasures of eating, drinking, listening to music, and having sex (Davis 
1981, p. 312). Use of these examples has done little to help Hedonism avoid its 
debauched reputation. 
It is also commonly recognised that our senses are physical processes that 
usually involve a mental component, such as the tickling feeling when 
someone blows gently on the back of your neck.19 If a sensation is something 
we identify through our sense organs, however, it is not entirely clear how to 
account for abstract pleasures. This is because abstract pleasures, such as a 
feeling of accomplishment for a job well done, do not seem to be experienced 
through any of the senses in the standard lists. Hedonists might attempt to 
resolve this problem by arguing for the existence of an independent pleasure 
sense and by defining sensation as something that we simply feel (regardless 
of whether it has been mediated by sense organs). 
                                                             
18 See Macpherson (2011) for a much more detailed discussion. 
19 Hirsch and Liebert’s (1998) experiments on pain are an excellent demonstration of this. 
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Most Hedonists who describe pleasure as a sensation are Quantitative 
Hedonists and argue that the pleasure from different senses is essentially the 
same (Crisp 2006b, p. 109; e.g. Smuts 2011). Qualitative Hedonists, in 
comparison, could use the framework of the senses to help differentiate 
between qualities of pleasure. For example, a Qualitative Hedonist might 
argue that pleasurable sensations from touch and movement are always lower 
quality than those from the other senses.  
 
5.3 Pleasure as Intrinsically Valuable Experience 
Hedonists have also defined pleasure as ‘intrinsically valuable experience’, 
that is to say any experiences that we find intrinsically valuable either are, or 
include, instances of pleasure (e.g. Smuts 2011). According to this definition, 
the reason that listening to music and eating a fine meal are both intrinsically 
pleasurable is that those experiences include an element of pleasure (along 
with the other elements specific to each activity, such as the experience of the 
texture of the food and the melody of the music). By itself, this definition 
enables Hedonists to make an argument that is close to perfectly circular. 
Defining pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience, and well-being as all 
and only experiences that are intrinsically valuable, allows a Hedonist to all 
but stipulate that Prudential Hedonism is the correct theory of well-being. 
Where defining pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience is not circular is 
in its stipulation that only experiences matter for well-being. Some well-
known objections to this idea are discussed below. 
Another problem with defining pleasure as intrinsically valuable 
experience is that the definition does not tell us very much about what 
pleasure is or how it can be identified. For example, knowing that pleasure is 
intrinsically valuable experience would not help someone to work out if a 
particular experience were intrinsically or just instrumentally valuable. 
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Hedonists have attempted to respond to this problem by explaining how to 
discover whether an experience is intrinsically valuable.  
One method is to ask yourself if you would like the experience to continue 
for its own sake, rather than because of what it might lead to (e.g. Brandt 
1966, pp. 268–269). Wanting an experience to continue for its own sake reveals 
that you find it to be intrinsically valuable. A similar definition of pleasure 
describes it as a feeling that is apprehended as desirable (Sidgwick 1907, p. 
127). Preference Hedonism is a form of Prudential Hedonism that defines 
pleasure in these ways. While Preference Hedonism does represent a coherent 
theory of well-being, defining intrinsically valuable experiences as those you 
want to perpetuate, or understand as desirable, makes the theory quite 
different to traditional hedonistic theories of well-being. Indeed, the fact that 
what a person wants, or considers desirable, is the main criterion for 
something having intrinsic value, makes these kinds of theories more similar 
to preference satisfaction theories of well-being (which have their own 
strengths and weaknesses). The central claim of preference satisfaction 
theories of well-being is that some variant of getting what one wants, or 
should want, under certain conditions is the only thing that intrinsically 
improves one’s well-being. 
Another method of fleshing out the definition of pleasure as intrinsically 
valuable experience is to describe how intrinsically valuable experiences 
actually feel. This method produces accounts of pleasure that are much closer 
to the concept described by traditional Prudential Hedonists but the actual 
description of what all pleasures feel like is often thought to be unconvincing 
in light of the extensive variety of experiences that we generally think of as 
‘pleasures’ (discussed below). 
It has also been argued that what makes an experience intrinsically 
valuable is that you like or enjoy it for its own sake (e.g. Smuts 2011). 
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Hedonists arguing for this definition of pleasure usually take pains to 
position their definition in between the realms of sensation and preference 
satisfaction. They argue that since we can like or enjoy some experiences 
without concurrently wanting them, or feeling any particular sensation, then 
liking is distinct from both sensation and preference satisfaction.20 Liking and 
enjoyment are also difficult terms to define in more detail, but they are 
certainly easier to recognise than the rather opaque ‘intrinsically valuable 
experience’. 
Merely defining pleasure as intrinsically valuable experience and 
intrinsically valuable experiences as those that we like or enjoy still lacks 
enough detail to be very useful for contemplating well-being. A potential 
method for making this theory more useful would be to draw on the cognitive 
sciences to investigate if there is a specific neurological function for liking or 
enjoying. Cognitive science has not reached the point where anything 
definitive can be said about this, but a few neuroscientists have provided 
experimental evidence that liking and wanting (at least in regards to food) are 
neurologically distinct processes in rats and have argued that it should be the 
same for humans (Berridge & Kringelbach 2011, p. 1).21 The same scientists 
have wondered if the same processes govern all of our liking and wanting, 
but this question remains untested and unresolved.  
If these scientists’ wonderings are correct, however, it would provide 
considerable support for the hedonic tone theory of pleasure. The hedonic 
tone theory of pleasure claims that all experiences are given a neurological 
                                                             
20 David Sobel (1999) considers this to be an untenable position, but, as discussed below, if 
scientific support for the hedonic tone theory becomes widespread, theories like Smuts’ might 
be considered much more reasonable. 
21 See Kringelbach & Berridge (2010, pp. 17–19) for a collection of leading cognitive scientists’ 
opinions about whether there is a ‚common currency‛ for all pleasures. 
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tag, or gloss, that indicates whether it is liked or disliked and to what degree. 
The hedonic tone theory has been supported by Broad (1959, pp. 229–231), 
Duncker (1941), and Smuts (2011). Without firm scientific support, however, 
hedonic tone theory cannot convincingly refute the objection that there is no 
coherent and unifying definition of pleasure (discussed below). 
Most Hedonists who describe pleasure as ‘intrinsically valuable 
experience’ believe that pleasure is internal and conscious. Hedonists who 
define pleasure in this way could also be either Quantitative or Qualitative 
Hedonists depending on whether they think that quality is a relevant 
dimension of how intrinsically valuable we find certain experiences.  
 
5.4 Pleasure as Pro-Attitude 
One of the most recent developments in hedonism is the rise of defining 
pleasure as a pro-attitude—a positive psychological stance toward some 
object. Any account of Prudential Hedonism that defines pleasure as a pro-
attitude is referred to as Attitudinal Hedonism because it is a person’s 
attitude that dictates whether anything has intrinsic value. Positive 
psychological stances include approving of something, thinking it is good, 
and being pleased about it. The object of the positive psychological stance 
could be a physical object, such as a painting one is observing, but it could 
also be a belief, such as ‘my country is not at war’, or even a sensation. An 
example of a pro-attitude towards a sensation could be being pleased about 
the fact that the ice cream you are eating tastes so delicious.  
Fred Feldman (2004), the leading proponent of Attitudinal Hedonism, 
argues that the sensation of pleasure has only instrumental value—it only 
brings you value if you also have a positive psychological stance toward that 
sensation. In addition to his basic Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, which is a 
form of Quantitative Hedonism, Feldman (2004) has also developed many 
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variants that are types of Qualitative Hedonism. For example, Desert-
Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism, which reduces the intrinsic value a 
pro-attitude has for a person’s well-being based on the quality of 
deservedness (i.e. on the extent to which the particular object deserves a pro-
attitude or not) (Feldman 1997, part 3; 2004, pp. 120–122). Desert-Adjusted 
Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism might stipulate that sensations of pleasure 
arising from adulterous behaviour do not deserve approval, and so assign 
them no value. 
Defining pleasure as a pro-attitude (while maintaining that all sensations 
of pleasure have no intrinsic value) makes Attitudinal Hedonism importantly 
dissimilar to traditional accounts of Prudential Hedonism. Indeed, defining 
pleasure as a pro-attitude runs the risk of creating a preference satisfaction 
account of well-being because being pleased about something (without 
feeling any pleasure) seems hard to distinguish from having a preference for 
that thing.  
 
6. Contemporary Objections 
6.1 Pleasure is Not the Only Source of Intrinsic Value 
The most common argument against Prudential Hedonism is that pleasure is 
not the only thing that intrinsically contributes to well-being. Living in reality, 
finding meaning in life, producing noteworthy achievements, building and 
maintaining friendships, achieving perfection in certain domains, and living 
in accordance with religious or moral laws are just some of the other things 
thought to intrinsically add value to our lives (Sinnott-Armstrong 2011). 
When presented with these apparently valuable aspects of life, Hedonists 
usually attempt to explain their apparent value in terms of pleasure. A 
Hedonist would argue, for example, that friendship is not valuable in and of 
itself, rather it is valuable to the extent that it brings us pleasure. Furthermore, 
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to answer why we might help a friend even when doing so harms us, a 
Hedonist will argue that the prospect of future pleasure from receiving 
reciprocal favours from our friend, rather than the value of friendship itself, 
should motivate us to help in this way. 
Those who object to Prudential Hedonism on the grounds that pleasure is 
not the only source of intrinsic value use two main strategies. In the first 
strategy, objectors make arguments that some specific value cannot be 
reduced to pleasure. In the second strategy, objectors cite very long lists of 
apparently intrinsically valuable aspects of life and then challenge Hedonists 
with the arduous task of trying to explain how the value of each of them can 
be explained solely by reference to the pursuit of pleasure and the avoidance 
of pain. This second strategy provides good reason to be a pluralist about 
value because the odds seem to be against any monistic theory of value, such 
as Prudential Hedonism. The first strategy, however, has the ability to show 
that Prudential Hedonism is false, rather than being just unlikely to be the 
best theory of well-being. 
The most widely cited argument for pleasure not being the only source of 
intrinsic value is based on Robert Nozick’s experience machine thought 
experiment (Nozick 1974, pp. 42–45).22 Nozick’s experience machine thought 
experiment was designed to show that more than just our experiences matter 
to us because living in reality also matters to us (Feldman 2011). This 
argument has proven to be so convincing that nearly every single recent book 
on ethics that discusses hedonism cavalierly rejects it using only this 
argument or this one and one other (Crisp 2006a, pp. 619–620; Feldman 2004, 
                                                             
22 Although, the most influential, Nozick’s experience machine thought experiment is not the 
first use of such a thought experiment to investigate the good life; Jack Smart, for example, 
used a less vivid depiction of an experience machine to make a similar point a year earlier 
(Smart 1973, pp. 19–22). See Chapter 2 for more detail on this. 
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p. 7; Silverstein 2000, p. 279). This argument will not be discussed in any more 
detail here since it is the topic of the next few chapters. 
Suffice it say for now that even if Nozick’s experience machine thought 
experiment is not as decisive a refutation of Prudential Hedonism as it is often 
thought to be, the wider argument (that living in reality is valuable for our 
well-being) is still problematic for Prudential Hedonists. That our actions 
have real consequences, that our friends are real, and that our experiences are 
genuine seem to matter for most of us regardless of considerations of 
pleasure. Unfortunately, we lack a trusted methodology for discerning if these 
things should matter to us. Perhaps the best method for identifying 
intrinsically valuable aspects of lives is to compare lives that are equal in 
pleasure and all other important ways, except that one aspect of one of the 
lives is improved. Using this methodology, however, seems likely to lead to 
an artificially pluralist conclusion about what has value. This is because any 
increase in a potentially valuable aspect of our lives is likely to be viewed as a 
free bonus. And, most people will probably choose the life with the free 
bonus just in case it has intrinsic value, not necessarily because they think it 
does have intrinsic value.  
 
6.2 Some Pleasure is Not Valuable 
The main traditional line of criticism against Prudential Hedonism is that not 
all pleasure is valuable for well-being, or at least that some pleasures are less 
valuable than others because of non-amount-related factors. Some versions of 
this criticism are much easier for Prudential Hedonists to deal with than 
others depending on where the allegedly dis-valuable aspect of the pleasure 
resides. If the dis-valuable aspect is experienced with the pleasure itself, then 
both Qualitative and Quantitative varieties of Prudential Hedonism have 
sufficient answers to these problems. If, however, the dis-valuable aspect of 
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the pleasure is never experienced, then all types of Prudential Hedonism 
struggle to explain why the allegedly dis-valuable aspect is irrelevant. 
Examples of the easier criticisms to deal with are that Prudential 
Hedonism values, or at least overvalues, perverse and base pleasures. These 
kinds of criticisms tend to have had more sway in the past, and doubtless 
encouraged Mill to develop his Qualitative Hedonism. In response to the 
charge that Prudential Hedonism mistakenly values pleasure from sadistic 
torture, sating hunger, copulating, listening to opera, and philosophising all 
equally, Qualitative Hedonists can simply deny that it does. Since pleasure 
from sadistic torture will normally be experienced as containing the quality of 
sadism (just as the pleasure from listening to good opera is experienced as 
containing the quality of acoustic excellence), the Qualitative Hedonist can 
plausibly claim to be aware of the difference in quality and allocate less value 
to perverse or base pleasures accordingly.  
Prudential Hedonists need not relinquish the Quantitative aspect of their 
theory in order to deal with these criticisms, however. Quantitative 
Hedonists, can simply point out that moral or cultural values are not 
necessarily relevant to well-being because the investigation of well-being aims 
to understand what the good life for the one living it is, and what intrinsically 
makes their life go better for them. A Quantitative Hedonist can simply 
respond that a sadist who gets sadistic pleasure from torturing someone does 
improve their own well-being (assuming that the sadist never feels any 
negative emotions or gets into any other trouble as a result). Similarly, a 
Quantitative Hedonist can argue that if someone genuinely gets a lot of 
pleasure from porcine company and wallowing in the mud, but finds opera 
thoroughly dull, then we have good reason to think that having to live in a 
pig sty would be better for her well-being than having to listen to opera. 
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Much more problematic for both Quantitative and Qualitative Hedonists, 
however, are the more modern versions of the criticism that not all pleasure is 
valuable. The modern versions of this criticism tend to use examples in which 
the dis-valuable aspect of the pleasure is never experienced by the person 
whose well-being is being evaluated. The best example of these modern 
criticisms is the deceived businessman thought experiment devised by Shelly 
Kagan (1998, pp. 34–36).23 This thought experiment is widely thought to show 
that pleasures of a certain kind, namely false pleasures, are worth much less 
than true pleasures.  
Kagan (1998, pp. 34–36) asks us to imagine the life of a very successful 
businessman who takes great pleasure in the respect of his colleagues, amity 
of his friends, and love of his wife and children until the day he dies. Then 
Kagan asks us to compare this life with one of equal length and the same 
amount of pleasure (experienced as coming from exactly the same sources), 
except that in each case the businessman is mistaken about how those around 
him really feel. This second (deceived) businessman experiences just as much 
pleasure from the respect of his colleagues and the love of his family as the 
first businessman. The only difference is that the second businessman has 
many false beliefs. Specifically, the deceived businessman’s colleagues 
actually think he is useless, his wife doesn’t really love him, and his children 
are only nice to him so that he will keep giving them money. Given that the 
deceived businessman never knew of any of these deceptions and his 
experiences were never negatively impacted by these deceptions indirectly, 
which life do you think is better? 
                                                             
23 Kagan’s thought experiment is based on Nagel’s earlier presentation of the idea that being 
deceived is bad for us (Kagan 1994, p. 311; Nagel 1970, pp. 76–78; 1979, pp. 4–7). Kagan’s 
clearest discussion of the deceived businessman thought experiment can be found in his 
Normative Ethics (1998, pp. 34–36). 
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Nearly everyone thinks that the deceived businessman has a worse life. 
This is a problem for Prudential Hedonists because the pleasure is 
quantitatively equal in each life, so they should be equally good for the men 
living them. Qualitative Hedonism does not seem to be able to avoid this 
criticism either because the falsity of the pleasures experienced by the 
deceived businessman is a dimension of the pleasure that he never becomes 
aware of. Theoretically, an externalist and qualitative version of Attitudinal 
Hedonism could include the falsity dimension of an instance of pleasure 
(even if the falsity dimension never impacts the consciousness of the person) 
to attempt to avoid this objection.24 However, the resulting definition of 
pleasure bears little resemblance to what we commonly understand pleasure 
to be and also seems to be ad hoc in its inclusion of the truth dimension but 
not others. Besides, a dedicated Prudential Hedonist of any variety can 
always stubbornly stick to the claim that the lives of the two businessmen are 
of equal value because the deceptions never affect the deceived party’s mental 
states. But this argument will do little to convince the vast majority to take 
Prudential Hedonism more seriously. 
 
6.3 There is No Coherent and Unifying Definition of Pleasure 
Another major line of criticism used against Prudential Hedonists is that they 
have yet to come up with a meaningful definition of pleasure that unifies the 
seemingly disparate array of conceivable pleasures while remaining 
recognisable as pleasure. Some definitions lack sufficient detail to be 
informative about what pleasure actually is, or why it is valuable, and those 
that do offer enough detail to be meaningful are faced with two difficult tasks.  
                                                             
24 As Feldman has done with his Truth-Adjusted Intrinsic Attitudinal Hedonism (2004, pp. 
109–114). 
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The first obstacle for a useful definition of pleasure for hedonism is to 
unify all of the diverse pleasures in a reasonable way. Phenomenologically, 
the pleasure from reading a good book is very different to the pleasure from 
bungee jumping, and both of these pleasures are very different to the pleasure 
of having sex.25 This obstacle is unsurpassable for most versions of 
Quantitative Hedonism because it makes the value gained from different 
pleasures impossible to compare. Not being able to compare different types of 
pleasure results in being unable to discern if a life is better than another in 
most even vaguely realistic cases. Furthermore, its inability to compare lives 
means that Quantitative Hedonism could not be usefully used to guide 
behaviour since it cannot instruct us on which life to aim for. 
Attempts to resolve the problem of unifying the different pleasures while 
remaining within a framework of Quantitative Hedonism, usually involve 
pointing out something that is constant in all of the disparate pleasures and 
defining that particular thing as pleasure. When pleasure is defined as a strict 
sensation, this strategy fails because introspection reveals that no such 
sensation exists.26 Pleasure defined as the experience of liking or as a pro-
attitude does much better at unifying all of the diverse pleasures. However, 
defining pleasure in these ways makes the task of filling in the details of the 
theory a fine balancing act. Liking or having a pro-attitude must be described 
in such a way that they are not solely a sensation or in a way that they would 
best fit in a preference satisfaction theory of well-being instead of a hedonistic 
one. Furthermore, they must perform this balancing act while still describing 
a scientifically plausible and conceptually coherent account of pleasure. Most 
                                                             
25 Usually known as the heterogeneity problem, this objection to Prudential Hedonism has 
been discussed by many philosophers over the years, but most famously by Sidgwick (1907, 
p. 127). 
26 Although Ben Bramble (forthcoming) disputes this widely agreed-upon claim. 
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attempts to define pleasure as liking or pro-attitudes seem to disagree with 
either the folk conception of what pleasure is or any of the plausible scientific 
conceptions of how pleasure functions. 
Most varieties of Qualitative Hedonism do better at dealing with the 
problem of diverse pleasures because they can evaluate different pleasures 
according to their distinct qualities. Qualitative Hedonists still need a 
coherent method for comparing the different pleasures with each other in 
order to be more than just an abstract theory of well-being, however. And, it 
is difficult to construct such a methodology in a way that avoids counter 
examples while still describing a scientifically plausible and conceptually 
coherent account of pleasure. 
The second obstacle is creating a definition of pleasure that retains at least 
some of the core properties of the common understanding of the term 
‘pleasure’. As mentioned, many of the potential adjustments to the main 
definitions of pleasure are useful for avoiding one or more of the many 
objections against Prudential Hedonism. The problem with this strategy is 
that the more adjustments that are made, the more apparent it becomes that 
the definition of pleasure is not recognisable as the pleasure that gave 
Hedonism its distinctive intuitive plausibility in the first place. When an 
instance of pleasure is defined simply as when someone feels good, its 
intrinsic value for well-being is intuitively obvious. However, when the 
definition of pleasure is stretched, so as to more effectively argue that all 
valuable experiences are pleasurable, it becomes much less recognisable as the 
concept of pleasure we use in day-to-day life and its intrinsic value becomes 
much less intuitive. 
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7. The Future of Hedonism 
All things considered, the future of hedonism seems relatively bleak. 
Hedonists should find the considerable number and strength of the 
arguments against Prudential Hedonism’s central principle—that pleasure 
and only pleasure intrinsically contributes positively to well-being, and the 
opposite for pain—daunting, if not overwhelming. Hedonists have been 
creative in their definitions of pleasure so as to avoid these objections, but 
more often than not the accounts they end up defending are seen as not in line 
with traditional hedonistic concept of pleasure, not particularly realistic, or 
both. 
Perhaps the only hope that Hedonists of all types can have for the future is 
that advances in cognitive science lead to a better understanding of how 
pleasure works in the brain and how biases affect our judgements about 
thought experiments.27 If our improved understanding in these areas confirms 
a particular theory about what pleasure is, and also provides reasons to doubt 
some of the widespread judgements about the thought experiments that make 
the vast majority of philosophers reject hedonism, then hedonism might 
experience at least a partial revival. The good news for Hedonists is that at 
least some emerging theories and results from cognitive science do appear to 
support a key aspect of hedonism. Indeed, a few neuroscientists endorse a 
hedonic tone view of pleasure and pain—they think it’s likely that all 
pleasures (and all pains) use the same underlying neural mechanisms 
(Berridge & Kringelbach 2011). 
 
 
 
                                                             
27 A topic that is highly related to evaluating the experience machine objection to hedonism, 
which is the focus of the next few chapters. 
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8. Conclusion 
This chapter disambiguated the term ‘hedonism’ and provided a broad 
overview of Prudential Hedonism, including its history, main variants, and 
the major criticisms directed at it.  The disambiguations in this chapter 
(particularly between Prudential Hedonism and other types of hedonism, and 
between internalist and externalist accounts of hedonism) will help to identify 
the scope of the experience machine objection to hedonism. The experience 
machine objection to hedonism was the only major criticism that was not 
discussed in any detail in this chapter. Instead, this important objection is 
discussed in great detail in the remainder of Part 1 (Chapters 2 to 5). 
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Chapter 2 
The Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism 
 
Chapter Summary 
Prudential Hedonism has been beset by many objections, the strength and 
number of which have led most modern philosophers to believe that it is 
implausible. One objection in particular, however, is nearly always cited 
when a philosopher wants to argue that Prudential Hedonism is 
implausible—the experience machine objection to hedonism. This chapter 
examines this objection in detail. First, the deductive and abductive versions 
of the experience machine objection to hedonism are explained. Then a 
taxonomy of the contemporary attempts to refute the abductive version of the 
experience machine objection to hedonism is created and the contemporary 
responses to each version of the argument are assessed. Consideration of 
responses shows that while the deductive version of the objection is 
implausible, the abductive version is fairly powerful. However, one type of 
response seems promising against the abductive version. This response 
argues that experience machine thought experiments elicit judgments that are 
too biased to be used as evidence for the experience machine objection to 
hedonism. It is argued that only this type of refutation seems likely to 
convince proponents of the abductive version of the experience machine 
objection to hedonism that the objection is much weaker than they believe it 
to be. Finally, it is suggested that more evidence is required before anything 
definitive can be said on the matter. 
 
50 
 
1. Introduction28 
As remarked several times in the literature, so many strong objections have 
been levelled at Prudential Hedonism that most modern philosophers believe 
it to be implausible.29 One objection in particular, however, is nearly always 
cited when a philosopher wants to argue that internalist accounts of 
Prudential Hedonism are implausible—the experience machine objection to 
hedonism (Barber 2011, p. 257). Indeed, virtually everyone who has written 
about Prudential Hedonism since the late 1970s cites the experience machine 
thought experiment as a (and often the) decisive objection against it (Tiberius 
2006, p. 496).30  
In 1957 popular author Ray Bradbury published a short story, The 
Happiness Machine, in his collection of short stories Dandelion Wine. 
Bradbury described the happiness machine as a fantastic contraption that can 
simulate all kinds of wonderful experiences, such as sensing the sights, 
sounds, and tastes of Paris. Despite the apparent appeal of such a machine, 
                                                             
28 This chapter provided the basis for Weijers (2011b). 
29 See for example: Crisp (2006a, pp. 619–620) Feldman (2004, p. 7) Silverstein (2000, p. 279), 
and Weijers (2011a; forthcoming-a). 
30 Examples of authors who have stated or implied that the experience machine thought 
experiment is a knock-down refutation of internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism (or all 
internalist mental state accounts of well-being) are easily found (e.g. Attfield 1987, p. 33; 
Baggini & Fosl 2007, pp. 74–76; Becker 1992, p. 25; Brink 1989, pp. 223–224; Brülde 2007, pp. 
26–29, 33; S. Bok 2010, pp. 24–28; Darwall 1997, pp. 162, 178; Feldman 2002, p. 615; Finnis 
1980, p. 33; 1983, pp. 37–42; Griffin 1986, pp. 9–10; Hausman 2010, p. 329; Haybron 2008a, p. 
21; Hooker 2000, p. 39; Hurka 2011, pp. 68–70; Jollimore 2004, pp. 333–334; Kagan 1998, pp. 
34–36; 2009, p. 253; Kazez 2007, pp. 51–54; Keller 2009, p. 657; Kraut 2007, pp. 124–126; 
Kymlicka 1990, pp. 13–14; Lopez 2007, p. 75; Nozick 1989, pp. 99–117; Railton 1984, pp. 148–
149; Sobel 2002, p. 244; Tiberius 2004; p. 311, n. 4; Tiberius & Hall 2010, pp. 214–215; Thomson 
1987, p. 41; van Wyk 1990, p. 109). 
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Bradbury’s story highlighted the dangers of it, including that the experiences 
the machine creates only give the illusion of true happiness. Perhaps it was 
this intriguing story that led to both Jack Smart and Robert Nozick discussing 
the philosophical implications of such a machine. Indeed, Jack Smart may 
have been the first philosopher to point out that our disinclination to use such 
a machine creates problems for Prudential Hedonism (1973, pp. 19–22). 
Without a doubt, however, it was Robert Nozick’s vivid description of an 
experience machine that popularised the idea amongst philosophers: 
Suppose that there were an experience machine that would give 
you any experience you desired. Superduper 
neuropsychologists could stimulate your brain so that you 
would think and feel you were writing a great novel, or making 
a friend, or reading an interesting book. All the time, you would 
be floating in a tank, with electrodes attached to your brain. 
Should you plug into this machine for life, preprogramming 
your life’s experiences? If you are worried about missing out on 
desirable experiences, we can suppose that business enterprises 
have researched thoroughly the lives of many others. You can 
pick and choose from their large library or smorgasbord of such 
experiences, selecting your life’s experiences for, say, the next 
two years. After two years have passed, you will have ten 
minutes or ten hours out of the tank, to select the experiences of 
your next two years. Of course, while in the tank you won’t 
know that you’re there; you’ll think it’s all actually happening. 
Others can also plug in to have the experiences they want, so 
there’s no need to stay unplugged to serve them. (Ignore 
problems such as who will service the machines if everyone 
plugs in.) Would you plug in? What else can matter to us, other 
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than how our lives feel from the inside? Nor should you refrain 
because of the few moments of distress between the moment 
you’ve decided and the moment you’re plugged. What’s a few 
moments of distress compared to a lifetime of bliss (if that’s 
what you choose), and why feel any distress at all if your 
decision is the best one?  (Nozick 1974, pp. 42–3, his italics) 
 
Although Nozick originally devised the experience machine thought 
experiment to make a point about how animals should be treated, it was 
quickly adopted by anyone who wanted to argue for the falsity of Prudential 
Hedonism (Weijers 2011b). The experience machine thought experiment is 
equally effective against any kind of theory that posits the internal aspects of 
our experiences as the only valuable things in a life, but Prudential Hedonism 
is often singled out because it is the most widely discussed exemplar of this 
type of theory.  
As discussed in Chapter 1, accounts of Prudential Hedonism hold that all 
pleasure and only pleasure intrinsically contributes positively to well-being 
(and the opposite for pain). Internalist mental state theories of well-being hold 
that only the internal aspects of our beliefs, desires, feelings, and other mental 
states intrinsically affect our well-being. Internalist mental state theorists 
about well-being do not dispute that external events, such as winning the 
lottery, can impact our well-being. However, they would argue that winning 
the lottery only affects our well-being instrumentally (and only to the extent 
that it affects the internal aspects of our mental states). For example, 
according to hedonistic variants of internalist mental state theories about 
well-being, winning the lottery is usually a good thing, not because winning 
lots of money is good in and of itself, but because winning lots of money 
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tends to make people feel happier.31 Any use of the term ‘Prudential 
Hedonism’ (or its linguistic derivatives) from here on refers to all hedonistic 
variants of internalist mental state theories about well-being. 
This chapter explains the experience machine objection to hedonism and 
why it has been so influential. A taxonomy of the contemporary attempts to 
refute the experience machine objection to hedonism is also created and the 
responses are evaluated along the way. One particular type of response 
argues that experience machine thought experiments elicit judgments that are 
too biased to be used as evidence for the experience machine objection to 
hedonism. It is argued that this type of refutation seems the most likely to 
convince proponents of the experience machine objection to hedonism that 
the objection is much weaker than they believe it to be. Finally, it is suggested 
that more evidence is required before anything definitive can be said on the 
matter. 
 
2. The Argument 
The vast majority of people who read Nozick’s scenario think that they would 
choose to remain in reality.32 The experience machine objection to hedonism 
relies on this widespread judgment and uses it to infer that there is more to 
the good life for the one living it than how our experiences feel to us on the 
inside. A major strength of the experience machine objection to hedonism is 
how much it concedes to its opponents while still producing a resounding 
verdict against them. A life in an experience machine is not described as just 
slightly more pleasurable than a real life, but rather as a ‚lifetime of bliss‛ in 
which you can receive any and all of the best experiences possible (Nozick 
                                                             
31 At least until they become accustomed to their newfound wealth or squander it and revert 
back to feeling about as happy as they did before their windfall. 
32 Empirical evidence for this claim is provided in Chapter 5. 
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1974, p. 43). The overwhelming influence of the experience machine objection 
to hedonism is doubtless caused by a combination of this great concession to 
proponents of pleasure and the dramatic impact the idea of an experience 
machine tends to have on our imaginations and memories. Furthermore, 
because the lack of direct connection with reality in an experience machine 
life is usually assumed to be the only relevant difference between the two 
options in Nozick’s scenario, most people also infer that living in reality must 
make our lives go better for us regardless of whether it leads to increased 
enjoyment. It deserves to be emphasised that the main justification for both of 
these inferences is the widespread judgement that connecting to an 
experience machine in Nozick’s scenario is a bad idea. 
Proponents of the experience machine objection to hedonism very rarely 
construct it as a formal argument. Indeed, it is often discussed in a page or 
less before it is acknowledged as a complete refutation of Prudential 
Hedonism. Will Kymlicka gives it this treatment:  
Now if pleasure were our greatest good, then we would all 
volunteer to be hooked for life to this machine< But surely very 
few people would volunteer. Far from being the best life we can 
lead, it hardly counts as leading a life at all< The hedonistic 
account of utility is wrong, for the things worth doing and 
having in life are not all reducible to one mental state like 
happiness. (Kymlicka 1990, p. 13) 
 
The loose language many philosophers have used to explain the experience 
machine objection to hedonism has led to two distinct interpretations of it, 
one deductive and the other abductive in structure.33 
                                                             
33 As far as I am aware, only Alex Barber (2011), Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007), and Matthew 
Silverstein (2000) have drawn attention to the distinction between deductive and abductive 
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The deductive version of the experience machine objection to hedonism is 
formalised below.  
DP1.  In terms of the internal aspects of our experiences, an experience 
machine life would be much better than a life in reality. (Stipulated 
in thought experiment) 
DP2.  When instructed to ignore their responsibilities to others, the vast 
majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in 
an experience machine. (Empirical claim) 
DP3.  If when instructed to ignore their responsibilities to others, the vast 
majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in 
an experience machine, then reality matters intrinsically to the vast 
majority of reasonable people 
DC1. Therefore, reality matters intrinsically to the vast majority 
of reasonable people. (Modus ponens DP2, DP3) 
DP4.  If something matters intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable 
people, then that thing has intrinsic prudential value 
DC2. Therefore, reality has intrinsic prudential value. (Modus 
ponens DC1, DP4) 
DP5.  If internalist Prudential Hedonism is true, then the internal aspects 
of pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic prudential 
value (or disvalue) in a life. (Stipulated definition) 
DC3.  Therefore, internalist Prudential Hedonism is false. (Modus 
tollens, DC2, DP5) 
 
                                                                                                                                                                              
versions of the experience machine objection to hedonism, which is surprising given the 
distinction’s importance for evaluating the widely-cited objection. 
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The abductive version of the experience machine objection to hedonism is 
formalised below.  
IP1.  In terms of the internal aspects of our experiences, an experience 
machine life would be much better than a life in reality. (Stipulated 
in thought experiment) 
IP2.  When instructed to ignore their responsibilities to others, the vast 
majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in 
an experience machine. (Empirical claim) 
IP3.  The best explanation for IP2 is that reality matters intrinsically to 
the vast majority of reasonable people 
IP4.  Inference to the best explanation: If a hypothesis is the best 
explanation of an observation, then it is rational to believe that 
hypothesis is true. (Standard methodological premise) 
IC1. Therefore, it is rational to believe that reality matters 
intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable people. 
(Modus ponens IP3, IP4) 
IP5.  The best explanation for reality mattering intrinsically to the vast 
majority of reasonable people is that reality has intrinsic prudential 
value 
IP6.  Inference to the best explanation. (Standard methodological 
premise) 
IC2. Therefore, it is rational to believe that reality has intrinsic 
prudential value. (Modus ponens IP5, IP6) 
IP7.  If internalist Prudential Hedonism is true, then the internal aspects 
of pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic prudential 
value (or disvalue) in a life. (Stipulated definition) 
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IC3.  Therefore, it is rational to believe that internalist Prudential 
Hedonism is false. (Modus tollens, IC2, IP7) 
 
Several points about the arguments should be noted. First, many published 
versions of this objection simply identify hedonism as their target, rather than 
internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism (e.g. Kymlicka 1990, p. 13).34 This 
is probably due to either ignorance of the different accounts of hedonism or 
simplification, perhaps for educational purposes. These simpler presentations 
of the target have likely influenced the philosophers who have argued that 
some variants of hedonism can avoid the experience machine objection 
because they are not traditional internalist accounts of pleasure or 
happiness.35 Since it is not clear that the objection was ever really designed to 
refute anything other than internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism, only 
the responses that attempt to defend internalist versions of hedonism will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
Second, both arguments state that they are based on ‘reality’ mattering to 
people, but should be understood as being based on ‘something other than 
the internal aspects of pleasure and pain’ mattering to people. This later 
phrase is more likely to be true, better supported by the experience machine 
thought experiment, and about as good at giving reason to doubt hedonism. 
However, it is also particularly unwieldy; so to increase readability, ‘reality’ 
will be used instead.  
                                                             
34 As discussed in Chapter 1, internalism about pleasure is the thesis that, whatever pleasure 
is, it is always and only inside a person. Externalism about pleasure, on the other hand, is the 
thesis that, pleasure is more than just a state of an individual (i.e. that a necessary component 
of pleasure lies outside of the individual). 
35 (e.g. Donner 1991; Feldman 2004; Heathwood 2007; Lopez 2007; Sumner 1996). 
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Third, if something ‘matters intrinsically’, then it seems to have intrinsic 
value. If reality matters intrinsically to me, then I believe that reality has value 
qua reality—that reality has value over and above the value of any other 
things that might come from it. 
Finally, the deductive version of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism has a much stronger conclusion than the more nuanced abductive 
version. As would be expected, with this strong conclusion comes a strong 
evidential burden on the premises of the deductive version. The conclusion of 
the abductive version (‘it is rational to believe that internalist Prudential 
Hedonism is false’) is still strong enough to discredit Prudential Hedonism. 
Nevertheless, many philosophers have discussed the experience machine 
objection to hedonism as if it were a deductive refutation of hedonism, 
including Nozick himself (1989, pp. 99–117).  
 
3. The Responses 
Despite Lopez’s claim that the experience machine objection to hedonism has 
‚never *been+ seriously disputed‛ (2007, p. 75), many academics have 
published responses which they consider to be refutations of it. However, the 
fact that different responses continue to be published to this day probably 
supports Lopez’s claim that the experience machine objection to hedonism 
has never been seriously disputed. Furthermore, as we shall see, several of the 
responses only work against the deductive version of the experience machine 
objection to hedonism and so might not qualify as serious disputations. 
Responses to the deductive argument are considered first, followed by the 
responses to the abductive version. This compilation of responses is intended 
to be exhaustive of all the published paper-length attempts to refute the 
experience machine objection to hedonism during the last 15 years and 
59 
 
indicative of all of the types of critical responses to the experience machine 
objection to hedonism to date. 
 
3.1 Responses to the Deductive Version 
The responses discussed in this section are limited to those directed against 
the deductive argument. All of these related responses involve DP4 (repeated 
below for convenience). 
DP4.  If something matters intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable 
people, then that thing has intrinsic prudential value 
 
Harriet Baber (2008) argues that the experience machine objection to 
hedonism is unfair because it presupposes some form of preferentism, or 
desire-satisfaction account of well-being.36 The common thread running 
through all preferentist, or desire-satisfaction accounts of well-being, is the 
principle that having (certain kinds of) our preferences satisfied is the only 
thing that intrinsically improves our well-being. Or, as Baber puts it, 
‚according to *preferentism+ what makes a state of affairs good for a person is 
her desiring it<‛ (Baber 2008, p. 134). 
Baber describes the key premise of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism as follows: ‚If a reasonable and informed subject, i, would choose S 
over S’, then S would contribute more to i’s wellbeing than S’.‛ (Baber 2008, p. 
133, her italics). In Baber’s interpretation of the key premise, we can see that 
reasonable and informed peoples’ choices (i.e. their preferences) dictate what 
contributes to well-being. This move should be considered problematic, but 
                                                             
36 Torbjörn Tännsjö (2007, pp. 94–95) offers a similar response to the deductive version of the 
experience machine objection to hedonism, but he is much more careful to acknowledge that 
the inferential version of the argument is a better interpretation of it and that the inferential 
version does not suffer from this kind of response. 
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not for the reason provided by Baber. The experience machine objection to 
hedonism does not assume that preferentism is true because, as Nozick points 
out, our preferences about the experience machine do not directly dictate the 
values involved: 
Notice that I am not saying simply that since we desire 
connection to actuality the experience machine is defective 
because it does not give us what we desire< for that would 
make ‚getting whatever you desire‛ the primary standard. 
Rather, I am saying that the connection to actuality is important 
whether or not we desire it—that is why we desire it—and the 
experience machine is inadequate because it doesn’t give us 
that.‛ (Nozick 1989, pp. 106–107, his italics) 
 
Baber’s (2008, p. 133) version of the key premise skips an important step in 
the argument. Baber starts with the equivalent of ‘the vast majority of 
reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in an experience 
machine’ and skips over ‘reality matters intrinsically to the vast majority of 
reasonable people’ straight to ‘reality has intrinsic prudential value’. The first 
step is important because it shows how the preference that is revealed by 
contemplating the experience machine thought experiment is evidence for 
forming a judgement about what matters to us. That judgment (reality 
matters intrinsically) then leads to the judgement that it has intrinsic 
prudential value. 
So, while Baber interprets ‘choosing’ as ‘having a preference for’ in her 
version of the key premise, ‘choosing’ seems better interpreted as ‘making a 
judgment about value’. Of course, that judgment might still be mistaken. But 
if the vast majority of reasonable and informed people make the same 
judgment, then we have reason to believe that it is not mistaken. Consider the 
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possibility that Nozick’s experience machine scenario is found to elicit 
extremely biased judgments and that a new bias-free version of the 
experience machine thought experiment elicits widespread agreement from 
reasonable and informed people that a life in an experience machine is better 
than one in reality. This might give us reason to believe that some version of 
hedonism is true. The method used to reach this hedonism-endorsing 
conclusion is not preferentism; it is the dominant method in moral 
philosophy. As Roger Crisp puts it: ‚Intuitions appropriately reflected upon 
are unavoidable in ethical theory.‛ (Crisp 2006a, p. 636). After all, could there 
be any way to endorse hedonism above other theories of well-being without 
the judgments of reasonable people about whether some X has more intrinsic 
value than some Y?  
Fred Feldman (2011) also criticises the move from ‘matters’ to ‘has value’, 
but on different grounds. Feldman presents a number of different versions of 
the experience machine objection to hedonism, but finds none of them 
particularly convincing. Essentially, Feldman thinks that what matters 
intrinsically to reasonable people is of little consequence to questions of 
intrinsic value because reasonable people lack certain traits that are required 
to really know what has intrinsic value (and therefore what should matter 
intrinsically to us). Most importantly, Feldman insists that the move from 
‘matters intrinsically to reasonable people’ to ‘has intrinsic value’ only works 
if the reasonable people are also ‚axiologically insightful‛—they already 
understand what has intrinsic value. Therefore, he concludes that his close 
analogue of DP4 is false. 
Feldman (2011) rightly points out that changing the argument so that only 
what matters intrinsically to people who are both reasonable and 
axiologically insightful can actually tell us what has intrinsic value would 
produce a solid (deduction-supporting) bridge between ‘matters intrinsically’ 
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and ‘has intrinsic value’. Feldman is also right that changing the argument in 
this way would create a new problem for it: now Hedonists could deny his 
version of DP2 (that reasonable and axiologically insightful people would 
choose reality over a life in an experience machine) and there would be no 
suitably axiologically insightful person who could disconfirm this denial. 
Feldman’s (2011) denial of DP4 reveals a flaw in the deductive version of 
the experience machine objection to hedonism. His refutation of the 
experience machine objection to hedonism is only effective against the 
deductive version, however. We don’t have to assume that reasonable people 
know everything about axiology before we can infer that their agreement 
gives us a defeasible reason to believe that something has value. Again, how 
could we know anything about what has value if only the judgments of 
axiologically insightful people (who already understand what has intrinsic 
value) were relevant to questions of value? So Feldman’s (2011) critique of the 
experience machine objection to hedonism gives us reason to believe that the 
more nuanced abductive version of the argument is the only viable one. 
Sharon Hewitt (2009, p. 348) takes a related approach, arguing that: ‚even 
if our intuitions [about what matters intrinsically to us] are directly 
responsive to the existence of real relationships< this should not immediately 
lead us to conclude that these things are objectively intrinsically valuable.‛37 
Hewitt is arguing that the move from ‘matters intrinsically’ to ‘has intrinsic 
value’ cannot be deductive because there are reasons other than something 
having intrinsic value for us that make things matter intrinsically to us, 
including irrational ones. Or, as Barber (2011, p. 269, his italics) puts it: ‚It is 
not enough< *to+ think that hedonism is mistaken, since we could be 
mistaken that it is mistaken.‛ Jason Kawall (1999, p. 385) agrees for two 
                                                             
37 This is not Hewitt’s complete strategy to refute the experience machine objection to well-
being. This argument is combined with others that are discussed below. 
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reasons. First, Kawall points out that: ‚While it is true that we value many 
things besides our mental lives, it could well be that the other values 
contribute to our personal well-being only through the effects they have on 
our mental lives‛ (1999, p. 385). Kawall also notes that ‚we can value more 
than our own well-being‛ which can lead to people sacrificing their well-
being to further some other value, such as ‚the well-being of their children‛ 
or ‚the search for truth‛ (1999, p. 385). Hewitt (2009) and Kawall (1999) are 
entirely correct and, when combined with Feldman’s (2011) critique, their 
views give us strong reason to believe that DP4 is probably false. 
Analysis of Baber’s (2008), Feldman’s (2011), Hewitt’s (2009) and Kawall’s 
(1999) responses to the experience machine objection to hedonism show that 
the move from ‘choosing’ or ‘mattering intrinsically’ to ‘has intrinsic 
prudential value’ is best understood as an inference to the best explanation, 
not as a deduction. Indeed, no careful philosopher should believe that 
widespread agreement between reasonable people on a matter of value 
deductively proves any particular conclusion. As Silverstein (2000, p. 299, his 
italics) puts it: ‚Most philosophers recognize this< and take the experience 
machine argument to be an indirect refutation of hedonism.‛  
Instead of trying to deductively prove what has value, philosophers 
should focus on making inferences to the best explanation. What then is the 
best explanation for something mattering intrinsically to the vast majority of 
reasonable and informed people? ‘That it has intrinsic value’ is a plausible 
answer to this question. Furthermore, if competing answers have been sought 
by reasonable people and none seem more credible, then there is good reason 
to believe ‘that it has intrinsic value’ is the correct answer. Of course, that 
belief should be amended if a more credible competing answer surfaces at 
any stage. 
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3.2 Responses to the Abductive Version 
Some of the responses to the experience machine objection to hedonism 
discussed in this section may also apply to the deductive version, but they are 
included here because the deductive version has already been shown to be 
implausible. The result in this section is a taxonomy of all of the responses to 
the most plausible version of the experience machine objection to hedonism.  
 
3.2.1 Responses to IP5 
At least three authors have attempted to defend hedonism against the 
experience machine objection by denying IP5 (repeated below for 
convenience). These authors all argue that consideration of the process by 
which our preferences are formed gives us reason to doubt that reality having 
intrinsic prudential value best explains why it matters intrinsically to the vast 
majority of people. 
IP5.  The best explanation for reality mattering intrinsically to the vast 
majority of reasonable people is that reality has intrinsic prudential 
value 
 
Matthew Silverstein argues against IP5 by appealing to the hedonistic basis of 
our seemingly anti-hedonistic preferences: 
 [O]ur experience machine intuitions reflect our desire to remain 
connected to the real world, to track reality. But according to the 
account of the relation between happiness and our desires 
outlined above, the desire to track reality owes its hold upon us 
to the role it has played in the creation of happiness. We acquire 
our powerful attachment to reality after finding again and again 
that deception almost always ends in suffering. We develop a 
desire to track reality because, in almost all cases, the connection 
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to reality is conducive to happiness. Our intuitive views about 
what is prudentially good, the views upon which the experience 
machine argument relies, owe their existence to happiness. 
(Silverstein 2000, p. 296) 
 
According to Silverstein, our desires are created by our experience of what 
has brought us happiness in the past and our intrinsic desires (what matters 
intrinsically to us/what we desire for its own sake) are created by repeated 
experiences of what has brought us happiness in the past. This account of 
desire formation is based on the work of Richard Brandt (1979) and an idea of 
Peter Railton’s (1989). Silverstein distances himself from Brandt’s view 
slightly by stressing that his argument does not rely on Brandt’s extreme 
claim that happiness-related ‚conditioning is the only fundamental process 
involved in the acquisition of desires‛ (Silverstein 2000, p. 293, his italics; 
Brandt 1979, p. 100). Instead, Silverstein claims that all desires are created by 
happiness and that happiness is the main influence on our desires. This 
allows for some desires to be affected by non-happiness-related factors, 
although Silverstein doesn’t discuss any such factors. 
If Silverstein’s (2000) account of desire creation is true, then why doesn’t 
everyone simply save time by desiring only happiness? Silverstein quotes 
both Sidgwick and Mill on what has become known as the paradox of 
hedonism (and also the paradox of happiness) to answer this question.38 The 
                                                             
38 Sidgwick: "[The] fundamental paradox of Hedonism, that the impulse towards pleasure, if 
too predominant, defeats its own aim." (1907, p. 48).  Mill: "I now thought that this end 
[happiness] was only to be attained by not making it the direct end. Those only are happy (I 
thought) who have their minds fixed on some object other than their own happiness<. 
Aiming thus at something else, they find happiness by the way." (1969, pp. 85–86). 
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paradox of hedonism is that pursuing happiness directly is likely to bring 
about much less happiness than pursuing other goods. While not strictly a 
paradox, there is certainly a lot of prima facie tension between the 
propositions ‘happiness is the greatest good’ and ‘happiness should not be 
pursued’. The paradox of hedonism is well-supported in the philosophical 
literature, but it seems to be most true of Folk Hedonism (discussed in 
Chapter 1), which usually entails the greedy pursuit of immediate pleasures 
at the risk of harm and unhappiness for themselves and others sometime 
after. Drug-taking (when the drug causes harmful side-effects) is a good 
example of how taking the direct route to happiness does not pay off in the 
long run. But even if we wanted to pursue happiness directly, it is not clear 
how we would do it. There is no genuine ‘happiness shop’; so our attempts to 
attain happiness are always indirect to some extent (including drug-taking). 
Perhaps Silverstein’s (2000) example of why reality and truth matter 
intrinsically to us is the best example of the lessons to be learnt from the 
paradox of hedonism. Deception has brought pain so consistently, Silverstein 
argues, that reality and truth have come to matter intrinsically to us; we will 
experience much more happiness if we pursue truth and reality than if we try 
to pursue happiness as directly as possible. We might wish to live in a bubble 
of false beliefs because lots of facts about the world can make us unhappy 
(e.g. your partner is cheating on you). In the vast majority of cases, however, 
we will be happier in the long run if we face up to the truth and try to make 
the best of the situation (e.g. confront your partner and sort out your 
problems or break up with them and get a new more loyal partner). So, the 
lessons we should learn from contemplation of the paradox of hedonism are 
that we shouldn’t always prefer what will make us happy in the moment and 
that certain other goods mattering intrinsically to us is the best way to achieve 
this. 
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Silverstein is using his account of intrinsic desire creation to deny IP5 by 
arguing that the best explanation for reality mattering intrinsically to the vast 
majority of people is not that reality has intrinsic prudential value. Rather, it 
is that preferring reality (avoiding deception) nearly always leads to 
happiness in the long run. Silverstein (2000, p. 297) also argues that all of our 
intrinsic desires are formed this way and concludes that: ‚The most plausible 
explanation is a hedonistic one: the reason all of our desires point towards 
happiness is that happiness is the only thing that is intrinsically prudentially 
valuable.‛ So Silverstein has attempted to turn the experience machine 
objection to hedonism on its head by arguing that the widespread preference 
for reality over a life in an experience machine (along with all other 
preferences) actually provides evidence in support of Prudential Hedonism! 
Unfortunately for Silverstein, it is not clear that many philosophers would 
agree that his ‘all desires are created by happiness’ view better explains 
reality mattering intrinsically to the vast majority of people than reality 
having intrinsic prudential value does. The vast majority of philosophers 
would probably accept that the circumstances surrounding our previous 
experiences of happiness will have affected what currently matters to us, but 
they will not accept that those experiences of happiness are always the main 
cause of what currently matters to us. They could argue that reality matters to 
us a small amount because it avoids the pain associated with deception, but 
also that it matters to us a lot because it makes experiences more meaningful 
(regardless of how much happiness they bring). 
This response would leave Silverstein in a difficult position. If strong 
Motivational Hedonism is true (i.e. if all of our desires are completely 
governed by the pursuit of pleasure and avoidance of pain), then Silverstein 
could ignore this response. However, Silverstein (2000, p. 293, n. 42) does not 
claim that strong Motivational Hedonism is true, so he cannot pursue this line 
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of argument. And even if he did, there are good philosophical and 
introspective reasons to doubt strong Motivational Hedonism (as discussed in 
Chapter 1), at least until advanced cognitive science decides this issue for us 
(Silverstein 2000, p. 294, n. 47). This leaves Silverstein the problem of trying to 
motivate why the preference for reality in particular is likely to be largely or 
wholly governed by our underlying preference for happiness. Considering 
the prevalent pluralist beliefs most current philosophers have about 
prudential value (particularly about real achievements and meaning in life), 
Silverstein has not done enough to convince us that reality mainly matters 
intrinsically to us because of our past experiences of reality-related happiness. 
Roger Crisp (2006a) and Sharon Hewitt (2009) also argue that IP5 is false 
because reality mattering intrinsically to the vast majority reasonable people 
is better explained by evolutionary and psychological explanations. Both 
Crisp and Hewitt discuss the paradox of hedonism and then use specific 
examples to argue that many of our judgments about which goods matter 
intrinsically to us could have developed because they aided our ancestors’ 
procreative fitness and provided us with pleasure throughout our personal 
development. Crisp (2006a) mainly discusses how our preference to 
accomplish real achievements could have developed into a powerful intrinsic 
desire under the guidance of selfish genes and a pleasure-seeking brain. 
Hewitt (2009) focuses on how our preference to establish real interpersonal 
relationships could have developed in a similar way. Since both 
accomplishing real achievements and establishing real interpersonal 
relationships require us to live in reality, and on the assumption that 
evolutionary and psychological mechanisms best explain why accomplishing 
real achievements and establishing real interpersonal relationships matter to 
us, Crisp (2006a) and Hewitt (2009) both conclude that  evolutionary and 
psychological mechanisms best explain why reality matters intrinsically to us. 
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Crisp’s (2006a) and Hewitt’s (2009) arguments will encounter the same 
initial problem as Silverstein’s; other philosophers are unlikely to be 
convinced that the evolutionary and psychological mechanisms explain why 
reality matters intrinsically to us better than reality having intrinsic prudential 
value does (e.g. Fletcher 2007). Again, without the support that the truth of 
strong Motivational Hedonism would offer, it seems like proponents of the 
experience machine objection to hedonism can reply that Crisp’s (2006a) and 
Hewitt’s (2009) explanations are plausible, but that connection with reality 
being valuable for its own sake is more plausible and, most importantly, that 
this is the reason it matters intrinsically to them and why they prefer reality 
over a life in an experience machine. 
So even when taken together, Silverstein’s (2000), Crisp’s (2006a), and 
Hewitt’s (2009) denials of IP5 are unlikely to convince many non-hedonists 
that reality mattering intrinsically is mainly caused by it having intrinsic 
prudential value. This is especially the case because non-Hedonists have both 
introspective and philosophical evidence (from the experience machine 
thought experiment amongst other sources) that connection to reality has 
prudential value over and above any pleasure or pain that it might lead to. 
Indeed, it seems like defenders of Prudential Hedonism should put this 
particular argument on the shelf until cognitive science can provide more 
detailed information on how our judgments and preferences are created. 
 
3.2.2 Responses to IP3 
A slightly more promising group of responses to the experience machine 
objection to hedonism deny IP3 (repeated below for convenience). These 
denials all identify features of the experience machine thought experiment 
that might elicit responses to it that are biased or otherwise corrupted by 
irrelevant factors. The arguments all deny IP3 on the basis that the best 
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explanation for why the vast majority of reasonable people report preferring 
reality over a life in an experience machine is that at least one feature of the 
thought experiment (that is irrelevant to the purpose of the thought 
experiment or to assessing well-being) is what really matters to the vast 
majority of reasonable people. 
IP2.  When instructed to ignore their responsibilities to others, the vast 
majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in 
an experience machine. (Empirical claim) 
IP3.  The best explanation for IP2 is that reality matters intrinsically to 
the vast majority of reasonable people 
 
Most proponents of the experience machine objection to hedonism 
understand the experience machine thought experiment to isolate a 
prudential value comparison between reality and how our experiences feel to 
us on the inside. But the ability of exotic philosophical thought experiments, 
like the experience machine, to isolate what they intend to is derided by some 
psychologists and behavioural economists who research how judgements and 
preferences are formed. Cass Sunstein had this to say: 
I believe that some philosophical analysis, based on exotic moral 
dilemmas, is inadvertently and even comically replicating the 
early work of Kahneman and Tversky by uncovering situations 
in which intuitions, normally quite sensible, turn out to misfire. 
The irony is that where Kahneman and Tversky meant to devise 
cases that would demonstrate the misfiring, some philosophers 
develop exotic cases with the thought that the intuitions are 
likely to be reliable and should form the building blocks for 
sound moral judgments. An understanding of the operation of 
heuristics offers reason to doubt the reliability of those 
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intuitions, even when they are very firm (cf. the emphasis on 
moral learning from real-world situations in Churchland 1996). 
(Sunstein 2005, p. 541) 
 
Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and Masur (2010, p. 1609) worry that our intuitive 
reactions to the experience machine thought experiment might be based on 
more than just an isolated prudential value comparison between reality and 
how our experiences feel to us on the inside: ‚When we ask whether someone 
attached to the machine has greater welfare, we must look behind whatever 
visceral aversion to the machine we might have and assess (i) whether that 
aversion relates to welfare and (ii) whether the aversion springs from rejecting 
the rules of the hypothetical example.‛ Bronsteen and colleagues’ worry is 
shared to varying degrees by many philosophers.  
Indeed, many potential causes of negative visceral sensations, especially 
fear, have been identified in the experience machine thought experiment. D. 
W. Haslett (1990) expressed concern that the experience machine thought 
experiment is so unrealistic that it demands too much of the readers’ 
imaginations and that the judgements it elicits should be expected to be 
unreliable. Wayne Sumner (1996, p. 95) asks: ‚How do we know that the 
technology is foolproof? What happens if there is a power failure?‛ Bronsteen, 
Buccafusco, and Masur note that readers of the experience machine thought 
experiment ‚might not be convinced the machine will actually work; or they 
might fear that while on the machine, they will be vulnerable to harm from 
those in the real world‛ (2010, p. 1609). Torbjörn Tännsjö agrees, stating that 
some people might not choose an experience machine life ‚because of an 
(unreasonable) fear that those in charge of the machine< would take 
advantage of them in some nasty way‛ (2007, p. 93). Goldsworthy (1992, p. 
18) emphasises these points, claiming that a reasonable person might choose 
72 
 
not to plug in because of fear of ‚catastrophic, unimaginably horrible 
consequences of malfunction or abuse‛. Hewitt adds that anyone connecting 
to an experience machine ‚must trust those outside of the machine to look out 
for his interests as well as he could himself if he were living in contact with 
the external world‛ (2009, p. 338). Barber (2011, p. 267) makes an analogy with 
some people’s reluctance to fly: ‚Some refuse to fly but will drive even if they 
know this is far more dangerous, and boarding an airplane is nothing 
compared to volunteering oneself up to a different—and delusional—plane of 
reality.‛ 
Adam Kolber (1994, pp. 13–14) notes that the fears of machine 
underperformance or failure are exacerbated by the troubling irrevocability of 
the experience machine and our general fear of the unfamiliar: ‚We are hardly 
comfortable enough with our own world to risk life under totally foreign 
circumstances.‛ (1994, p. 13). Both Weijers (forthcoming-a) and Mendola 
(2006) also emphasise how worries about the machine feed into a general fear 
of the unknown, with Mendola (2006, p. 450) claiming that it is the 
‚unfamiliar gadgetry which invokes our fear of the unfamiliar‛. These fears 
lead Crisp to dismiss the question about whether people would or should 
choose to connect to an experience machine because their choices are likely to 
be affected by ‚differing attitudes to risk‛ (2006a, p. 635). All of these worries 
about the machine are highly relevant to our well-being, but they should not 
enter into a direct comparison between reality and how our experiences feel 
to us on the inside. Therefore, if these worries affect a significant number of 
people’s preference in the experience machine thought experiment, IP3 starts 
to come under pressure. 
Only a few of the authors mentioned argue that these irrelevant fears 
might amount to a refutation of IP3. This is because, although these fears 
plausibly affect people’s preferences in the experience machine thought 
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experiment, they don’t obviously provide a better explanation for them than 
reality mattering intrinsically to us. Even Silverstein (2000), who argues 
against the experience machine objection to hedonism, argues that this 
response to IP3 will not work. Silverstein claims that with ‚a bit of mental 
dexterity‛ (i.e. tweaking the scenario and having faith in the outcomes 
stipulated in the scenario) he thinks that we can allay any doubts about our 
intuitive experience machine-related fears (2000, p. 284). And without these 
fears, Silverstein believes that ‚we remain unwilling to accept a lifetime on 
the experience machine‛ (2000, p. 285).39 For this reason, many of the 
philosophers who argue that these fears might provide a good explanation for 
the widespread preference for reality over a life in an experience machine also 
provide a further objection to IP3. 
That further objection to IP3 is that people can have preferences for things 
because they promote several different kinds of value (not just prudential 
value). Silverstein (2000, p. 290) puts it like this: ‚One way to lessen the force 
of the experience machine intuitions is to demonstrate that they are really 
about something other than well-being.‛ This objection argues that people 
might report preferring reality over a life in an experience machine because 
they prefer to promote aesthetic, moral, or other non-prudential values, which 
they could not achieve while connected to an experience machine. If the 
widespread preference for reality over an experience machine life is best 
explained by the widespread desire to promote moral values, then IP3 is false 
and the experience machine thought experiment does a very bad job of 
isolating a prudential value comparison between reality and how our 
experiences feel to us on the inside. If IP3 is false for this reason, then the 
experience machine thought experiment doesn’t tell us much at all about 
                                                             
39 This claim is empirically tested in Chapter 5. 
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prudential value and, therefore, it can’t provide the basis for a reasonable 
objection to Prudential Hedonism. 
Silverstein (2000, p. 291) argues that the low aesthetic value of an 
experience machine life might be heavily impacting people’s preferences in 
the experience machine thought experiment: ‚When we entertain Nozick’s 
thought experiment, we find life on the machine unattractive: it is 
aesthetically displeasing.‛ Most philosophers who argue for non-prudential 
values affecting our preferences in the experience machine thought 
experiment, however, focus on moral values. Kawall gives the example of a 
soldier who throws himself on a grenade as evidence that people do sacrifice 
their own well-being for moral reasons (1999, pp. 385–386). Mendola notes 
that ‚things other than our own well-being< matter to us. For instance, our 
lives have effects on other people which are quite significant, and which we 
care about‛ (2006, p. 450). Kolber suggests that some people might not report 
preferring a life in the experience machine because it’s self-indulgent and self-
indulgence is considered immoral (1994, p. 14). Bronsteen, Buccafusco, and 
Masur note that readers of the experience machine thought experiment 
‚might not want to forego the opportunity to use their lives to improve the 
lives of others‛ (2010, p. 1609).  
Nozick (1974, p. 43) anticipated this objection and attempted to protect the 
experience machine thought experiment against it by stating: ‚Others can also 
plug in to have the experiences they want, so there’s no need to stay 
unplugged to serve them. (Ignore problems such as who will service the 
machines if everyone plugs in.)‛ But Feldman provides two effective 
examples of why this approach might not work: 
A person might still worry about fulfilling his moral obligations 
even if he were convinced that others would be plugging in. For 
example, consider someone who solemnly promised his mother 
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that he would rescue her if her Experience Machine should 
happen to malfunction. Believing that others would be in 
Experience Machines (or would have the option of plugging in) 
would not relieve him of his feeling of obligation to keep out of 
the machine so as to be available for rescue operations, should 
they be necessary. And even more obviously, suppose he knows 
that others have been given the opportunity to plug in but have 
chosen to remain unplugged. His feeling of obligation to them 
would be unaffected. (Feldman, 2011, n. 17) 
 
Again Silverstein (2000, p. 291) argues that these concerns can be stipulated 
away, but it is unlikely that they can be completely stipulated away. Based on 
how judgements about thought experiments are actually formed, both Hewitt 
(2009) and Weijers (forthcoming-a) have argued that simply stipulating that 
readers needn’t worry about something that they value greatly doesn’t 
always work.40 Therefore, there seems to be good reason to think that some 
people might prefer reality over an experience machine life because a non-
prudential value, probably a morally-related one, matters a lot to them. 
Having said this, without further evidence about how many people report 
preferring reality over an experience machine life because a non-prudential 
value really matters to them, it seems like reality mattering intrinsically to the 
vast majority of people might still be the best explanation for the widespread 
preference for reality. 
When all of these potential causes of people choosing reality over the 
experience machine are taken together, however, they begin to pose a 
potential threat to IP3. The difficulty is in assessing how much effect these 
causes have individually and cumulatively. For this reason, the philosophers 
                                                             
40 Explained in detail in Chapter 3. 
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who argue that these alternate causes might provide the best explanation for 
the widespread preference for reality over a life in an experience machine also 
try to create experience machine scenarios that isolate and eliminate them to 
see if IP2 still holds.  
 
3.2.3 Responses to IP2 
Another group of responses to the experience machine objection to hedonism 
deny IP2 (reproduced below for convenience). The contemporary denials of 
IP2 are often subtle and indirect, but at least one is incredibly straightforward. 
IP2.  When instructed to ignore their responsibilities to others, the vast 
majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in 
an experience machine. (Empirical claim) 
 
Torbjörn Tännsjö takes a direct approach by claiming that he would not 
choose reality over an experience machine (2007, p. 95). He also argues that 
lots of people take drugs, which is basically the pharmacological equivalent of 
connecting to an experience machine (Tännsjö 1998, p. 112). Combined with 
his worry about people’s fear of abuse while connected to an experience 
machine, this evidence forms the basis for his claim that ‚it is far from clear 
that < the claim that we would not plug in, is true‛ (Tännsjö 2007, p. 93, his 
italics). This approach will do very little to convince anyone who has 
presented the experience machine thought experiment to students (or any 
other group of people) that IP2 is true because they have had first-hand 
experience of the vast majority of people reporting that they would prefer 
reality over a life in the experience machine.41  
                                                             
41 The one exception here seems to be Barber (2011, p. 263, n. 7), who claims that his 
undergraduate philosophy students were fairly evenly split (‚52% non-enterers to 48% 
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A much more promising approach to denying IP2 is to construct an 
alternate version of the experience machine thought experiment that does not 
elicit a widespread preference for reality over a life in an experience machine 
while remaining essentially the same in all relevant ways. Based on the worry 
that the potential causes of people’s preference for reality over an experience 
machine life, such as irrational fear, are irrelevant to assessing prudential 
value, several philosophers have developed new experience machine 
scenarios.  These new scenarios attempt to eliminate from consideration all of 
the factors that are irrelevant to an isolated prudential value comparison 
between reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside. If other 
versions of the experience machine thought experiment can equally or better 
isolate this prudential value comparison, and people’s judgments about them 
significantly diverge, then either IP2 or IP3 might be false. Kolber explains the 
strategy behind this approach:  
[A]ll thought experiments that consider the same issue as the 
[experience machine thought experiment] must yield the same 
results< *Otherwise+ Nozick’s argument has failed. *This is 
because] it seems unlikely that a reflective, unbiased person 
could give different answers to two versions of essentially the 
same question. (Kolber 1994, p. 13) 
 
Kolber (1994, p. 15), De Brigard (2010, pp. 47–49), and Weijers (forthcoming-a) 
have all created new experience machine scenarios that attempt to reduce 
interference from irrelevant factors. What is most notable about all of these 
new scenarios is that they are designed to minimise the impact of 
unfamiliarity with, and fear of, experience machines by framing being 
                                                                                                                                                                              
enterers‛), although he implies that his data is not as credible as data from more formal 
surveys. 
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connected to a machine as the status quo.42 The scenarios are discussed in 
much more detail in the next chapter, but here is an excerpt from one of De 
Brigard’s reversed scenarios: 
‚I am afraid I have some disturbing news to communicate to 
you‛ says Mr. Smith. ‚There has been a terrible mistake. Your 
brain has been plugged by error in to an experience machine 
created by super duper neurophysiologists. All the 
unpleasantness you may have felt during your life is just an 
experiential preface conducive toward a greater pleasure< we’d 
like to give you a choice: you can either remain connected to this 
machine (and we’ll remove the memories of this conversation 
taking place) or you can go back to your real life. By the way, 
you may want to know that your real life is not at all as your 
simulated life. In reality you are a prisoner in a maximum 
security prison in West Virginia.‛ What would you choose? (De 
Brigard 2010, p. 4) 
 
Kolber’s (1994, p. 15), De Brigard’s (2010, pp. 47–49), and Weijers’s 
(forthcoming-a) scenarios all appear to isolate a prudential value comparison 
between reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside about as well 
as Nozick’s original scenario. However, the judgements they tend to elicit 
seem to be quite different.43 In all of these reversed scenarios, especially De 
Brigard’s Negative scenario, it seems that most people might prefer a life 
connected to an experience machine over a life in reality. This is a 
questionable empirical claim, but if it’s true then either IP2 is false because the 
vast majority of people don’t actually prefer reality (at least in all cases) or IP3 
                                                             
42 A move similar to the reversal test proposed by Bostrom and Ord (2006). 
43 Empirical evidence surrounding this claim is presented in Chapters 3 and 5. 
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is highly questionable because people’s preferences in experience machine 
cases might be explained better by the status quo (what is most familiar to us) 
than by reality mattering intrinsically. However, exactly how reasonable 
people would decide in these reversed cases is not the only potential problem 
for Kolber, De Brigard, and Weijers; their scenarios might have introduced 
more biases and other confounding factors than were present in Nozick’s 
original scenario.  
Nevertheless, for anyone who endorses the experience machine objection 
to hedonism and found themselves preferring a life connected to an 
experience machine over a life in reality in one of these new scenarios, the 
onus should be on them to point out the confounding feature of the new 
scenario(s). This apportionment of the benefit of the doubt seems fair because 
proponents of the experience machine objection to hedonism have already 
been using a suspect thought experiment (Nozick’s experience machine 
scenario) as evidence in an argument, making it inconsistent for them to deny 
the same practice for others.  
A safer response for proponents of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism is the direct approach taken by Tännsjö above; to simply deny that 
they would choose a life connected to an experience machine over a life in 
reality in the new scenarios. While this approach is safer, it is not enough to 
prevent this kind of denial of IP2 because these authors have begun to test 
their thought experiments and it is no longer clear what the vast majority of 
people believe about experience machine scenarios. Having said this, 
questions have been raised about the validity of some of these specific tests 
and of testing the experience machine in general (e.g. Smith 2011). This means 
that attempts to deny IP2 by creating a new scenario that produces a different 
result from Nozick’s scenario requires a sound empirical result before they 
stand a good chance of convincing stubborn proponents of the experience 
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machine objection to hedonism that IP2 or IP3 is false. For these reasons, the 
merits of these tests are discussed in the subsequent chapters of this section. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This chapter has introduced the experience machine objection to hedonism, 
explained how it is widely thought to refute Prudential Hedonism, and 
presented deductive and inductive versions of the argument supporting it. 
These two versions were used to create a taxonomy of responses to the 
experience machine objection to hedonism that is intended to be exhaustive of 
all the paper-length attempts to refute the experience machine objection to 
hedonism from the last 15 years and indicative of all of the types of critical 
responses to it. 
The discussion of the responses to the deductive version of the experience 
machine objection to hedonism made it clear that it was implausible. Most 
importantly, the deductive version ignored the fairly obvious fact that reality 
might matter intrinsically to us for reasons other than reality being 
intrinsically prudentially valuable. 
This chapter has also shown that the abductive version of the experience 
machine objection to hedonism might eventually be seen as unlikely to be 
true because of the pressure on IP3. That pressure is coming from the 
numerous possible causes of people’s preference for reality over a life in an 
experience machine. Furthermore, when this pressure on IP3 is combined 
with the threat to IP2 coming from alternate experience machine scenarios, 
serious doubts about the experience machine objection to hedonism begin to 
arise. Most prominent of these threats to IP2 and IP3 is the worry that 
people’s preferences for reality over a life in the experience machine in 
Nozick’s scenario are heavily affected by the framing of the status quo, as 
demonstrated by the reversed experience machine scenarios of Kolber (1994), 
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De Brigard (2010), and Weijers (forthcoming-a). To further investigate the fate 
of the abductive version of the experience machine objection to hedonism, the 
potential effects of biases and other confounding factors on our judgments 
about experience machine scenarios are investigated in the next chapter. 
Further empirical investigation later in this section will also give us good 
reason to think that the abductive version of the experience machine objection 
to hedonism is unlikely to be true.  
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Chapter 3 
The Case for Status Quo Bias in Experience Machine 
Scenarios 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter considers whether status quo bias—the irrational preference for 
things to remain the same—affects all of the main experience machine 
scenarios discussed by philosophers. First, the role of intuitions in making 
judgments about thought experiments is discussed. Second, the existing 
experience machine scenarios are analysed to investigate the role of status 
quo bias in our judgements about experience machine scenarios. This analysis 
involves an in-depth examination of the support De Brigard’s (2010) empirical 
results offer to the case for status quo bias affecting judgments about 
experience machine scenarios. It is argued that while the commonplace choice 
to remain in reality when offered a life in the experience machine can credibly 
be partially explained by status quo bias, it is not yet obvious that the status 
quo bias is the main or even a major cause of this choice. 
 
1. Introduction44 
This chapter considers whether status quo bias—the irrational preference for 
things to remain the same—affects all of the main experience machine 
scenarios discussed by philosophers. Thought experiments have long been 
the friend of philosophers, allowing many problems to be addressed without 
requiring the ‘muddying of knees’ often entailed by field work. More 
recently, however, warnings have been issued about thought experiments 
                                                             
44 This chapter is the basis for Weijers (forthcoming-a) and, to a lesser extent, Weijers (2011c). 
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propensity to mislead for a variety of reasons (e.g. Dennett 1980; Hofstader & 
Dennett 1981; Unger 1996; Woodward & Allman 2007). Experimental 
philosophy has also provided many reasons to doubt the philosophical 
usefulness of many specific thought experiments over the last ten years 
(Knobe 2007; Nadelhoffer & Nahmias 2007). This chapter continues these 
emerging traditions by investigating the role of bias (and especially status quo 
bias) in our judgments about experience machine thought experiments. 
First, the role of intuitions in making judgments about thought 
experiments is discussed. Second, the existing experience machine thought 
experiments are analysed to investigate the role of status quo bias in our 
judgements about experience machine scenarios. This analysis involves an in-
depth examination of the support De Brigard’s (2010) empirical results offer 
to the case for status quo bias affecting experience machine scenarios. It is 
argued that while the commonplace choice to remain in reality when offered a 
life in the experience machine can credibly be partially explained by status 
quo bias, it is not yet obvious that the status quo bias is the main or even a 
major cause of this choice. 
 
2. Intuitions and Intuition Pumps 
Dennett coined the phrase ‘intuition pump’ to describe a thought experiment 
that (by design or not) elicits a response with a strong intuitive component 
(Dennett 1980). Typically, judgments about thought experiments will have a 
deliberative component and an intuitive component (Woodward & Allman 
2007). When thought experiments create misleading responses in 
philosophers and other reasonable people who generally pride themselves on 
their rational thinking, the intuitive component is more likely to be blamed. 
Indeed, Bostrom and Ord note that our overall judgments can be ‚crucially 
and unavoidably‛ influenced by the psychological biases that our intuitive 
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cognition is prone to (Bostrom & Ord 2006, p. 657). Systematic biases also 
occur in deliberative thinking; however, the combination of two factors 
characteristic of intuitive judgments makes them more likely to mislead. First, 
it is very difficult to know when a judgment is misguided and, second, it is 
even more challenging to ascertain whether the intuitive component of a 
judgment is tracking relevant, or merely distracting, information. The 
emerging fields of behavioural economics, moral psychology, and 
experimental philosophy have been producing results that are helping us to 
understand the extent to which intuitive cognition impacts our judgments 
and what features of certain thought experiments our intuitive cognition is 
likely to track. However, this task is made very difficult by the nature of 
intuitive cognition. 
Woodward and Allman provide a neurobiological account of intuitive 
cognition and contrast it with the other kind of cognition used in judgments 
about thought experiments—deliberative cognition (Woodward & Allman 
2007). They describe an intuition as the visceral sensation that results from a 
very fast, unconscious and probabilistic processing of many variables in 
parallel—a definition that is widely accepted in the cognitive sciences 
(Lieberman 2000; Myers 2004; Woodward & Allman 2007, p. 13). In contrast, 
deliberative thought is a much slower cognitive process, which consciously 
uses inductive and deductive reasoning on very limited numbers of variables 
at a time (Woodward & Allman 2007, p. 13; Bruner 1960). While both modes 
of cognition have their strengths and weaknesses, and both are susceptible to 
systematic biases, intuitive judgments (judgments that are heavily influenced 
by intuitive cognition) have the significant disadvantage of us not being able 
to know if they have been influenced by various psychological biases 
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(Gilovich, Griffin, & Kahneman 2002).45 This disadvantage arises because of 
the process by which intuitions are created. 
When novel stimuli are encountered, the brain runs probabilistic inference 
simulations based on the matches between all of its current stimuli and past 
experiences (Woodward & Allman 2007). Part of the simulation process 
involves the reward centre, which produces the message (the visceral 
sensation or feeling) that we become consciously aware of (Craig 2004; 
Critchley et al. 2004). We are effectively always performing unconscious 
pattern recognition by monitoring our current environment and comparing it 
to our archive of experiences. The result of this processing is a range of 
predictions about what might happen next. These probabilistically 
determined predictions are then evaluated using a similar process (comparing 
them to the value of similar previous actual events) and an overall evaluation 
is generated. Inferring the value of predicted outcomes in this way can allow 
for psychological biases to systematically influence our intuitions and, 
thereby, our overall judgments. At most risk from this process are judgments 
that are heavily influenced by intuitive cognition—intuitive judgements. 
How does this process affect our judgments about thought experiments? 
Systematic biases can sneak in during this kind of pattern-recognition process 
because the features of the current thought experiment (or past experiences to 
which they are being compared) that have the most weight in the probabilistic 
processing might not be the features deemed morally relevant by the readers 
of the thought experiment. It might be natural to assume that a seasoned 
philosopher could apply their well-honed rational mind to their intuitive 
judgements and eliminate any biases before coming to a final judgment. 
                                                             
45 People might also make biased deliberative judgments without realising, but philosophers 
and anyone else trained in logic would be embarrassed to be caught out making such 
mistakes. 
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However, even when highly educated (and presumably rational) people are 
made fully aware of these biases, they still make judgments that bear all of the 
hallmarks of being adversely affected by them. Consider the self-serving bias: 
the phenomenon that explains why practically everyone (even social 
psychologists who are well aware of this bias) view themselves as more moral 
and better at driving than the average person (Myers 2004, p. 95; van Lange, 
Taris & Vonk 1997). About half of these presumably intelligent people are 
fundamentally mistaken about some of their own characteristics because of a 
bias they should have corrected for.  
To further complicate the matter, it is difficult to know whether or not a 
judgment has a strong intuitive component and if that component has been 
distorted by any biases. Because the causes of our intuitions are processed 
subconsciously, they are not open to introspection (Lieberman 2000; 
Woodward & Allman 2007). That is, we might experience a visceral reaction 
when we come into contact with a new stimulus, such as a thought 
experiment, but we only really know what the sensation feels like; we know 
little, if anything at all, about what caused it and why. The best method for 
establishing the likely causes of an intuition is by reconstruction. By carefully 
considering all of the possible environmental cues and how they might match 
a subject’s past experiences, one (or more) of those cues may stand out as an 
obvious candidate for explaining how the intuition was initially constructed. 
This is the process usually followed (although rarely explicated) by 
philosophers when they interpret what evidence a particular thought 
experiment might provide. Using this process, we can reasonably assume that 
the uneasy feeling we suddenly notice while imagining a thought experiment 
is probably caused by our imagining of the thought experiment (unless we 
have just eaten at that dodgy diner around the corner). What is much less 
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reasonable to assume, however, is which aspects of the thought experiment 
are causing the intuitive judgment.  
Philosophers often assume they have isolated the relevant moral factors in 
the construction of their thought experiments (Sunstein 2005), but this 
assumption shows either a misunderstanding of the internal workings of 
intuitive cognition or a lack of awareness that our intuitive cognition can 
affect our overall judgments. The pared-down, and often unrealistic, thought 
experiments used by philosophers usually stipulate only very few aspects of 
the situation under assessment. Indeed, the decision to create thought 
experiments in this way is often justified by claiming that less background 
information prevents irrelevant factors from being considered. But, this is not 
necessarily the case (Hewitt 2009). Recall that intuitive cognition operates by 
comparing the new stimuli with existing experiences to try to predict what 
might happen next. Minimalistic thought experiments are matched to the 
closest real experiences. Those real experiences will not be minimalistic, 
however; they will contain many features absent from the thought 
experiment, including emotionally salient (and therefore powerful) ones. 
Subconscious simulations are then run based on the real experiences that the 
thought experiment was most closely matched with. Since this process takes 
into account features that were relevant to the real experiences, but not 
included in thought experiment, the resulting intuitions will be partly based 
on irrelevant information.  
Making matters even worse, however, is the fact that most philosophical 
thought experiments stipulate features that are so unrealistic that we have not 
experienced anything like them—indeed we are likely to have experienced 
the very opposite of them. When these clashes occur, our intuitions are likely 
to be based on information that is not just irrelevant, but contrary to the point 
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of the experiment itself. This misinformed intuition then corrupts the overall 
judgment that we reach about such thought experiments. 
For example, a thought experiment that was designed to fairly evaluate a 
particular kind of life might describe that life as being computer-generated to 
make the scenario more plausible. The stipulation that the life in question 
would be computer-generated is supposed to be irrelevant, but it is actually 
quite likely to affect our intuitive judgment of that life. Many of our 
experiences with complex computerized machinery have involved 
disappointing underperformance and catastrophic crashing. (Is there an 
academic who has not lost important work due to her computer crashing?) 
So, when our intuitive cognition is matching the stipulations of the thought 
experiment with our past experiences, some of our myriad experiences of 
computer failure might be the most similar to the stipulations of the thought 
experiment as a whole despite contradicting some individual stipulations. So 
our intuition about choosing the life that just happens to be computer-
generated could be influenced by the misapplication of our otherwise rational 
fear of computer failure. 
It is these features of intuitive cognition that enable structural biases to 
affect our judgments about thought experiments in ways that they do not 
affect our deliberative cognition. With this understanding of how judgments 
about thought experiments are formed, we now return to the experience 
machine objection to hedonism to assess the likelihood that reasonable 
people’s judgments about it are affected by bias or other irrelevant factors that 
we might not be aware of. 
 
3. Intuitions and the Experience Machine Objection to Hedonism 
As discussed in the previous chapter, the vast majority of people who read 
Nozick’s (1974) experience machine scenario think that they would choose to 
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remain in reality. Based on this widespread judgment, the experience 
machine objection to hedonism infers that there is more to the good life for 
the one living it than how our experiences feel to us on the inside. 
Furthermore, because the lack of a direct connection with reality in an 
experience machine life is assumed to be the only relevant difference between 
the two options in Nozick’s scenario, most people also infer that living in 
reality must make our lives go better for us regardless of whether it leads to 
increased enjoyment. It deserves to be emphasised that the main justification 
for both of these inferences is the widespread judgement that connecting to an 
experience machine in Nozick’s scenario is a bad idea. 
Just how widespread is the judgment that connecting to an experience 
machine in Nozick’s scenario would be worse for us than continuing our 
normal life in reality? Most introductory ethics lecturers know that the vast 
majority of students presented with Nozick’s scenario claim not to want to 
connect to the experience machine. Similarly, most philosophers know that 
none, or nearly none, of their colleagues would choose to connect to an 
experience machine. Furthermore, initial empirical data from the 
International Wellbeing Study indicates that these judgements may generalise 
to non-philosophers. In the Further Assessment Study component for the first 
intake of the International Wellbeing Study, only 12% (19/156) of the 
participants46 chose to connect to an experience machine when presented with 
a simplified version of Nozick’s experience machine scenario. The 
International Wellbeing Study Further Assessment Study experience machine 
scenario (IWSFAS scenario) reads as follows:  
                                                             
46 The sample for the Further Assessment Study component for the first intake of the 
International Wellbeing Study (www.wellbeingstudy.com, Jarden et al.) is far from 
representative. It could roughly be described as a self-selecting group of English speakers 
from several countries around the world who are interested in well-being and like filling out 
questionnaires about well-being. 
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Imagine that scientists figured out a way to stimulate a person's 
brain so that they experience constant and permanent pleasure 
every moment of their life. It's perfectly safe, no chance of 
malfunction, and not harmful to a person's health. Would you 
choose to be plugged into such a machine? 
 
It is likely that this widespread judgement about Nozick’s scenario has a 
strong intuitive component. This can be inferred because, upon first exposure, 
it is not always obvious why the thought of connecting to an experience 
machine produces the negative feeling that it usually does.47 Regardless of the 
actual causes of intuitions, when the vast majority of philosophers share an 
intuition, it can be used as a premise in philosophical arguments. Good 
philosophers do not consider widely agreed upon intuitions to be 
unquestionable premises, however. David Sobel, for example, uses the 
widespread intuition that a real life is better than a life connected to an 
experience machine as a premise in his argument against Quantitative 
Hedonism, while acknowledging that discrediting the intuition would refute 
his argument (2002, p. 244). Sobel explains that the credibility of intuitions 
elicited from contemplation of thought experiments can be undermined by 
‚telling a convincing story about the genesis of such intuitions that would 
explain why we have them while revealing them to be misleading‛ (2002, p. 
244). Apparently unbeknownst to Sobel, a version of this story had already 
been told by Adam Kolber (1994), who identified the status quo bias as the 
                                                             
47 Since deliberative judgments are open to introspection, and intuitive judgments are not, 
judgments that appear to be formed because of a reason are more likely to have a large 
deliberative component and judgments that appear to be formed without any immediately 
obvious reason are more likely to have a large intuitive component. 
92 
 
main cause of the widespread negative intuition about connecting to an 
experience machine in Nozick’s scenario.  
 
4. Kolber and Status Quo Bias 
In Kolber’s (1994) story about our intuitive responses to Nozick’s scenario, 
status quo bias is the lead villain. For now, status quo bias is best defined as 
an inappropriate preference for things to remain the same (Bostrom & Ord 
2006), but a more detailed discussion of this complex psychological 
phenomenon follows below. Kolber argues that our intuitive judgments about 
thought experiments should only be considered good evidence for an 
argument if other thought experiments considering the same issue elicit 
similar intuitive judgments (1994, p. 13). Kolber presents a thought 
experiment that reverses one aspect of Nozick’s scenario, while keeping the 
other aspects consistent and focussing on the same issue: 
[I]magine that you are currently hooked up to an experience 
machine. Nothing seems any different under these circumstances 
than it seems in the real world. The paper you are now reading 
wouldn’t exist in the traditional sense but would only seem to. It 
is, in fact, a possibility that you are currently hooked up to such 
a machine since there is nothing in the world (or module) that 
could prove otherwise to you. Suppose you had reason to 
believe that you were hooked up to such a machine. Would you 
then care any less about your parents and friends (that is, the 
people you call your ‚parents‛ and ‚friends‛)? In deciding 
whether or not to get off the experience machine, you might 
want to know what life would be like in the real world. This is 
fair enough. If Nozick lets you know what life is like on the 
experience machine, we can likewise say some things about life 
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in the ‚real‛ world. We can imagine lots of possibilities, but this 
much is sure: Your life off of the experience machine will 
contain worse mental states than your life on it. The easiest way 
to consider this is to imagine life in the real world as less 
enjoyable (in an experiential sense) than your life currently is. In 
addition, if you get off the machine, the totality of subjective 
mental states will be worse. We can also stipulate that everyone 
else’s mental states will either stay the same or get worse by 
your getting off the machine. (Kolber 1994, p. 15, his italics) 
 
Kolber asserts that ‚more people would want to stay on the machine *in this 
reversed scenario+ than would agree to connect in *Nozick’s scenario+‛ (1994, 
p. 15). Kolber goes on to argue that the different intuitive judgments elicited 
by the two scenarios reveal that a bias is likely to be affecting our judgements 
about what matters to us in experience machine scenarios. Kolber mentions 
several potential sources of bias, but concludes that continuing the status quo 
seems to be what really matters to us when we consider experience machine 
scenarios (1994, pp. 15–16). Status quo bias is implicated in this result because 
the only difference between the two scenarios seems to be whether reality or 
the experience machine is framed as the status quo. Since the status quo is 
arbitrary and since the experience of the status quo could be maintained 
perfectly by an experience machine, Kolber advises against using the 
experience machine to investigate what matters or what should matter to us 
regarding well-being (1994, p. 16). 
 
5. Weijers and Status Quo Bias 
Building on Kolber’s idea of creating a reversed experience machine scenario 
to examine the role of status quo bias in our judgments about experience 
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machines, Weijers (forthcoming-a) presents the trip to reality thought 
experiment. The Trip to Reality holds constant the realness of experiences 
inside and outside of the machine, while changing a few other factors that are 
usually considered irrelevant by proponents of the experience machine 
objection to hedonism. 
Imagine that you leave your family for a weekend to attend a 
conference on the experience machine thought experiment. 
While you are there, someone informs you that you are actually 
in an experience machine. (Which means that you haven’t really 
left your family behind to go to this conference because all of 
your experiences have been machine-generated). She offers you 
a red and a blue pill. She explains that taking the blue pill will 
take you to reality and taking the red pill has the dual effects of 
bringing you back from reality and completely wiping any 
memories of having being in reality or being offered funny pills. 
Being a curious philosopher you swallow the blue pill. It turns 
out that reality is quite different to the world you have been 
experiencing inside the machine. Some of the most noticeable 
differences are that your experiences are more mundane and 
less enjoyable than before. You also discover that nearly all of 
your friends and family are either in experience machines or do 
not exist in reality! Your father is there, so you spend time with 
him. But, a few conversations reveal that he is not really the 
person you know as ‘Dad’. It is time to make the choice. Will 
you take the red pill so that you can go back to your previous 
life (with no idea that it is not in fact real)? Or will you throw 
the red pill away and try to make the best life you can in the 
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more real, but less enjoyable, surrounds of reality? (Weijers 
forthcoming-a) 
 
In the Trip to Reality thought experiment, the thought of getting into an 
experience machine does not elicit the same intuitive judgment that the 
equivalent act does in Nozick’s scenario. In my experience of presenting the 
two scenarios, dramatically more people choose a life in an experience 
machine when considering the Trip to Reality thought experiment than when 
considering Nozick’s experience machine scenario. If my experience is 
representative, then status quo bias provides a plausible and fairly elegant 
explanation for this difference.  
 
6. Status Quo Bias 
A group of overlapping psychological heuristics, best referred to as status quo 
bias, might provide the best main causal explanation for both the intuitive 
judgment that a life in Nozick’s experience machine is worse than real life and 
the intuitive judgment that reality is worse than a life in an experience 
machine in the Trip to Reality thought experiment. But a better understanding 
of status quo bias is required to assess this claim. Status quo bias is closely 
linked to a family of psychological heuristics, including loss aversion (valuing 
losses more than equivalent gains in uncertain circumstances) and the 
endowment effect (overvaluing what we have and know). Note that status 
quo bias and status quo heuristic will be used differently here. Status quo 
heuristic will be taken to mean the cognitive mechanism that influences our 
choices towards the status quo, while the status quo bias will refer to 
instances of the status quo heuristic that are inappropriate for some reason—a 
misfiring of the status quo heuristic.  
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The overlapping psychological heuristics that make up status quo 
heuristic are importantly linked by our valuing prospective gains only about 
half as much as we value avoiding equivalent prospective losses of things we 
already have or know—the status quo.48 Simply put, status quo bias is an 
inappropriate preference to keep things the way they are.49 Such preferences 
are often considered inappropriate or irrational because they assign value to 
certain things over and above any utility value they might have (in the 
broadest possible sense).50 
The endowment effect—an aspect of the status quo heuristic—has been 
used to explain why only about 10% of undergraduate students, who were 
rewarded with either a mug or a chocolate bar for filling out a survey, took up 
                                                             
48 See for example Gilbert (2006), Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman (2002), Kahneman and 
Tversky (2000), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991), Samuelson and Zeckhauser (1988), 
Tversky and Kahneman (1991). 
49 Psychologists’ definitions of status quo bias are less useful because they are often long-
winded and technical. The long-windedness is likely a result of the uncertainty about what 
related psychological heuristics and biases should be considered a part of status quo bias. 
Aspects of prospect theory, loss aversion, the endowment effect, and other psychological 
phenomena have all been proposed as possible constituents or causes of status quo bias. See 
for example Druckman (2001), Gilbert (2006), Gilovich, Griffin and Kahneman (2002), 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991), Kahneman and Tversky (2000), Samuelson and 
Zeckhauser (1988), and Tversky and Kahneman (1991). An alternate definition for status quo 
bias to the one I use here has been published in the philosophical literature: ‚people come to 
prefer what they are likely rather than unlikely to get‛ (Dorsey 2010, p. 535). While this 
definition is fairly compatible with the one used here, it seems to be unduly weighted in 
favour of future concerns. 
50 Note that even items that are monetarily worthless can have immense utility value. Take, 
for instance, your child’s first pair of baby shoes. Their resale value is approximately nil, but 
every time you see them, you recall pleasant memories that bring you joy. An irrational 
preference for these shoes would be to prefer them to something else that would give you 
more joy (and other types of utility), all other things being equal. 
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the cost-free opportunity to swap their reward for the other type51 (Knetsch 
1989; Knetsch & Sinden 1984). An irrational preference for the status quo has 
been posited as the explanation for Hartman, Doane and Woo’s field study of 
power consumers (Hartman, Doane, & Woo 1991). The consumers were 
sorted into two groups, one for consumers with more reliable and expensive 
power services and one for consumers with less reliable and expensive power 
services. When provided with six reliability-to-cost mixes, with one option 
indicated as their status quo, the vast majority in both groups expressed a 
preference for the mix indicated as the status quo for their group (60% and 
58%) while only a tiny fraction wanted the reliability-to-cost mix that the 
other group had (both 6%) (Hartman, Doane, & Woo 1991, p. 149).  
The huge number of studies establishing the ubiquity and influence of the 
status quo heuristic might be resisted if they were all experiments concerning 
swapping chocolate bars and mugs, or even experiments concerning 
important financial decisions. The fact of the matter is, however, that even 
post facto analysis studies of real-life important decisions (such as choosing a 
mutual fund) also demonstrate the pervasive effects of the status quo 
heuristic (e.g. Kempf & Ruenzi 2006; Samuelson & Zeckhauser 1988). Even 
establishing torture as the status quo (by saying that it has been common 
practice for 40 years) made participants in one study significantly more likely 
to report supporting the practice of torture (Crandall et al. 2009).  
Possible explanations, other than the status quo heuristic, do exist for these 
examples, but the literature in support of the status quo heuristic is extensive 
                                                             
51 Cost-free is perhaps not totally accurate here, since participants had to raise a sheet of 
coloured paper that was on their desk to indicate that they would like to switch rewards. 
However, this cost would be so small that it would only affect the behaviour of the laziest 
students< most of which would probably still have been at home in bed during the 
experiment. 
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and, while the mechanisms underpinning the status quo heuristic, and other 
related psychological heuristics, might not yet be fully understood, 
psychologists are generally convinced that the effects of the status quo 
heuristic on our judgments are significant, widespread, and often irrational 
(Gilovich, Griffin & Kahneman 2002; Kahneman & Tversky 2000). Therefore, 
the claim that responses to experience machine thought experiments are 
heavily influenced by status quo bias is greatly strengthened when the wealth 
of support for the status quo heuristic in the social sciences literature is 
considered. 
 
7. The Case for Status Quo Bias Explaining Our Judgments about the Trip 
to Reality and Nozick’s Scenario 
In the experience machine thought experiment the choice to get into the 
machine involves giving up something very important and (in nearly all 
cases) valuable that you have and are familiar with (your current life) for 
something that is supposedly more valuable but fairly unknown to you (a life 
in the machine). It is clearly risky to consider swapping your current life for 
another one if you are unsure of what the new life will be like. I propose that 
both this caution regarding the unknown and an irrational over-valuing of the 
familiar is affecting intuitive judgments regarding the experience machine 
thought experiment. Evidence for this can be found by a comparison between 
Nozick’s scenario and the Trip to Reality thought experiment, in which being 
in the machine is framed as our current (familiar) life. This comparison is 
similar to what Bostrom and Ord call the reversal test, which specifically 
assesses whether status quo bias is an important causal factor in the resulting 
judgment (Bostrom & Ord 2006). The reversal test turns the scenario around 
to frame the supposedly operant variable as the status quo rather than as a 
change in circumstances. In the Trip to Reality thought experiment, being in 
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an experience machine is described as our current real life, which means the 
status quo for us is being hooked up to a machine. Comparing both scenarios, 
we might discover that the majority of judgments are in favour of maintaining 
the status quo regardless of how real the future experiences would be.  
We must pause at this point to consider if there are any differences 
between Nozick’s scenario and the Trip to Reality thought experiment, other 
than the framing of the status quo. It turns out that there are other differences 
that seem to affect our intuitive judgments in these cases, but that they are all 
related to the status quo. The most notable difference is that the risks involved 
in each case seem markedly different. In the original experience machine 
thought experiment, our intuitive cognition would have deemed a machine 
life as risky, despite the stipulation in the thought experiment that the 
machine works perfectly. This intuition of risk likely arises from all of our 
previous experience with computerized machines crashing at least once, if not 
regularly, and often not providing the quality of performance that they 
promise.52 In the Trip to Reality thought experiment, the risks of machine 
failure and machine underperformance are less likely to affect our intuitive 
judgment about a life in a machine because that scenario would be matched to 
our non-crashing real-life experiences during the intuitive processing of the 
thought experiment.  
It might be argued that these considerations imply that a preference for 
the status quo is not at all irrational; why would it be irrational to prefer to 
avoid potential risk? Of course, taking risk into consideration would not be 
irrational if you were offered to connect to an experience machine in real life. 
It would be rational to demand the highest possible level of evidence that 
there was no risk—something that is rarely possible in real life. In Nozick’s 
                                                             
52 Note that this is my attempt at reconstructing the intuition and so, for the reasons discussed 
above, it should be viewed as an imprecise process. 
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scenario, however, the risk of machine underperformance or failure was ruled 
out by stipulation. Therefore, considering these risks during judgment 
formation about the thought experiment is irrational—it gives weight to 
irrelevant factors.  
Another factor that seems likely to affect our judgments in the original 
experience machine thought experiment is Nozick’s stipulation that we are to 
ignore family considerations (Nozick 1974, p. 43). Nozick explains that we do 
not have to worry about this because they could all plug into a machine as 
well (Nozick 1974, p. 43). It might be argued that the choice not to plug into a 
machine is therefore based on the rational preference not to force such a risky 
decision on your whole family, or if risk could somehow be eliminated, the 
rational preference not to force such an important decision on your whole 
family. This is a defect in Nozick’s formulation of the thought experiment—it 
brings an important real-life factor into consideration that should be omitted 
when arguing about well-being, or what the good life is for the person living 
it. A person’s machine life could be experientially identical, in respect to 
experiences with family, to a real life and need not include the experience of 
forcing them to do anything. If Nozick had simply stipulated that 
considerations of obligations to others should be ignored, then considering 
them would become irrational—it would give weight to irrelevant factors.53 It 
is less obvious that the preference to maintain our current family relationships 
as they are is related to status quo bias, but it does reflect the most important 
aspects of an irrational preference for the way things are. The preference 
would be irrational in this case because it is for the real family connections 
over the different (but experientially the same or better) family connections 
                                                             
53 In view of the discussion above, however, it should be clear that our intuitive cognition 
would probably not be able to reliably comply with the stipulation to ignore our family. 
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that would result in a machine life. Recall that when in the machine we would 
not know that we were no longer experiencing reality. 
In a similar vein, it might be argued that the choice to remain in the 
machine in the Trip to Reality thought experiment is at least partially the 
result of a rational, as opposed to irrational, preference for the close 
relationships and other goods that we have and know in our machine life—
perhaps the status quo heuristic at work, but not status quo bias. Indeed, this 
seems likely, and this further undermines the experience machine objection to 
hedonism. The experience machine objection to hedonism was devised to 
show that reality (and not just how our experiences feel on the inside) should 
matter to us and, since internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism do not 
intrinsically value reality, they must be false. Consideration of the Trip to 
Reality thought experiment reveals, however, that it is in fact rational to 
prefer the life we experience over a real life, which is great news for internalist 
accounts of Prudential Hedonism. 
All things considered, there are several potential differences between the 
experience machine and Trip to Reality thought experiments, and the reasons 
why they might elicit the judgments that they do. All of the important 
differences are related to the status quo, however—they are all related to what 
we have, what we know, and how we value those things. Therefore, the best 
explanation for why most people prefer their real life to a life plugged into 
Nozick’s experience machine is not obviously that real experiences are 
important for our well-being. Rather, the best explanation might be that 
people’s judgments are heavily influenced by an irrational preference for 
what they already have and know—by status quo bias. In order to be more 
confident about exactly how good an explanation status quo bias is for the 
widespread preference for reality over an experience machine life, we can 
turn to some initial empirical evidence. 
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8. De Brigard and Status Quo Bias 
Kolber’s (1994) & Weijers (forthcoming-a) arguments could be easily 
dismissed if it is not the case that more people would choose to stay in the 
machine on their versions than on Nozick’s version. However, experimental 
data gathered by De Brigard (2010) seem to show that reversed experience 
machine thought experiments do elicit very different intuitions from 
Nozickian ones. De Brigard asked three groups of 24 Chapel Hill students 
whether they would choose an experience machine life or a real life in 
different scenarios. All of the scenarios were reversed experience machine 
thought experiments, but each described reality differently. De Brigard’s 
Neutral scenario read as follows:  
It is Saturday morning and you are planning to stay in bed for at 
least another hour when all of the sudden you hear the doorbell. 
Grudgingly, you step out of bed to go open the door. At the 
other side there is a tall man, with a black jacket and sunglasses, 
who introduces himself as Mr. Smith. He claims to have vital 
information that concerns you directly. Mildly troubled but still 
curious, you let him in. ‚I am afraid I have some disturbing 
news to communicate to you‛ says Mr. Smith. ‚There has been a 
terrible mistake. Your brain has been plugged by error in to an 
experience machine created by super duper neurophysiologists. 
All the unpleasantness you may have felt during your life is just 
an experiential preface conducive toward a greater pleasure 
(e.g., like when you had to wait in that long line to get tickets for 
that concert, remember?). Unfortunately, we just realized that 
we made a mistake. You were not supposed to be connected; 
someone else was. We apologize. That’s why we’d like to give 
you a choice: you can either remain connected to this machine 
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(and we’ll remove the memories of this conversation taking 
place) or you can go back to your real life.‛ What would you 
choose? [Please circle only one option] 
      o      o 
Remain connected     Go back to reality  
Please explain your answer briefly: (De Brigard 2010, p. 47) 
 
De Brigard’s Positive and Negative scenarios both added two sentences to the 
end of his Neutral scenario (after ‚your real life‛). In De Brigard’s Negative 
scenario, the following is added: ‚By the way, you may want to know that 
your real life is not at all as your simulated life. In reality you are a prisoner in 
a maximum security prison in West Virginia.‛ (De Brigard 2010, p. 47). And, 
in De Brigard’s Positive scenario, this is added: ‚By the way, you may want to 
know that your real life is not at all as your simulated life. In reality you are a 
multimillionaire artist living in Monaco.‛ (De Brigard 2010, p. 47). The results 
of these three scenarios are shown in Figure 1 below. 
 
Figure 1: Reported Choices between an Experience Machine Life and 
One of Three Descriptions of Reality in De Brigard’s Scenarios 
 
 
87.5 
45.8 50.0 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Negative Neutral Positive
C
o
n
n
e
ct
 %
 
104 
 
Anyone who thinks that living in reality is very important to us might find 
the results for De Brigard’s three scenarios quite surprising. Less than 13% 
(3/24) of the participants responding to De Brigard’s Negative scenario chose 
reality, just over 54% (13/24) of the participants chose to return to reality in De 
Brigard’s Neutral scenario, and 50% (12/24) of the participants responding to 
De Brigard’s Positive scenario chose reality (De Brigard 2010, pp. 47–48).  
De Brigard’s Negative scenario is the closest to Kolber’s (1994, p. 15) 
suggestion and, as Kolber predicted, the result is very different from what we 
would expect (and I have found) from testing Nozick’s scenario.54 
Unfortunately, De Brigard did not test Nozick’s scenario on any of his sample 
groups, so we can’t easily get an idea of exactly how large the difference is 
between the responses to Nozick’s scenario and to his reversals of it. The best 
we can do is to compare the results of De Brigard’s Negative scenario with the 
International Wellbeing Study Further Assessment Study (IWSFAS) scenario. 
Less than 13% (3/24) of the participants responding to the De Brigard’s 
Negative scenario and about 88% (137/156) of participants responding to the 
IWSFAS scenario reported preferring to live in reality. This difference is 
certainly large, but it’s impossible to say how much of the difference is caused 
by varying characteristics between the sample groups. 
De Brigard’s Negative scenario also appears to be the most similar to 
Nozick’s scenario in terms of the relative difference between the two key 
aspects that experience machine thought experiments are widely thought to 
compare (reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside). In 
Nozick’s scenario, the choice is between average but real experiences and 
great but unreal experiences. In De Brigard’s Negative scenario, the choice is 
between bad but real experiences and average but unreal experiences. De 
Brigard believes that whether reality or an experience machine was framed as 
                                                             
54 See Chapter 5. 
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the status quo explains a considerable amount of this difference between the 
responses to his scenarios and the responses to (non-reversed) Nozickian 
experience machine scenarios (2010, pp. 50–51). 
De Brigard provided further evidence for the impact of status quo by 
conducting a follow up experiment; De Brigard’s Neutral Status Quo 
Emphasised (Neutral SQE) scenario. De Brigard’s Neutral SQE scenario is 
based on his Neutral scenario, replacing some of the text after ‘give you a 
choice’. The changes are signified by italics in the following: ‚you can either 
remain connected to this machine (and we’ll remove the memories of this 
conversation taking place) or you can disconnect. However, you may want to 
know that your life outside is not at all like the life you have experienced so far. What 
would you choose? Remain connected[/] Disconnect‛ (De Brigard 2010, p. 49). 
Just over 54% (13/24) of the participants chose to return to reality in De 
Brigard’s Neutral scenario compared to 41% (33/80) of the participants in De 
Brigard’s Neutral SQE scenario (De Brigard 2010, pp. 48–49). De Brigard 
argues that the 13% difference between his two neutral scenarios probably 
came about because the subtle change in the wording of the second scenario 
tapped into the status quo bias; i.e. that stipulating that ‚your life outside is 
not at all like the life you have experienced so far‛ in the Neutral SQE 
scenario made reality less familiar and therefore less desirable because of our 
irrational preference for things to stay the same (2010, pp. 48–49).55 The results 
of these two scenarios are shown in Figure 2 below. 
 
                                                             
55 Despite the small number of respondents in De Brigard’s Neutral scenario group, applying 
a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test to the data (with the hypothesis to expect a difference 
between the two groups) shows that we can be approximately 91% confident that the 13% 
difference in responses to these two scenarios was not caused by chance (p = 0.094). 
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Figure 2: Reported Choices between an Experience Machine Life and One 
of Two Descriptions of Reality in De Brigard’s Scenarios 
 
 
De Brigard contends that the best explanation for the results of his 
experiments is that experience machine thought experiments elicit intuitions 
that are tainted by status quo bias (2010, pp. 50–51). Basil Smith (2011), 
however, is not so sure.  
 
9. Smith and Status Quo Bias 
Basil Smith (2011) points out several weaknesses of De Brigard’s experiments 
and conducts his own experiment to support his argument. Smith’s criticisms 
of De Brigard’s experiments include, the sample groups being too small, a 
lack of information about the procedure of the experiment, and an important 
disanalogy between De Brigard’s scenarios and Nozick’s scenario.56  
The sample groups in De Brigard’s experiments certainly are small; three 
of the four groups contained only 24 participants (De Brigard 2010, p. 46). The 
small size of these groups means that we can be less confident in the results, 
especially if there are other potentially confounding factors involved. But, as 
                                                             
56 Smith also expresses concern with the representativeness of De Brigard’s all-student 
sample, but since this is also a potential issue for my experiments, it is addressed in the next 
chapter. 
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Smith points out, it’s difficult to assess the likelihood of the influence of other 
potentially confounding factors because De Brigard provides little 
information about the procedure and background conditions of his 
experiments (Smith 2011, p. 35).  
Even more importantly, Smith identifies a subtle but significant 
disanalogy between De Brigard’s scenarios and Nozick’s scenario that seems 
like it would encourage the participants in De Brigard’s scenarios to choose 
an experience machine life over reality (Smith 2011, pp. 37–39). In Nozick’s 
scenario, neither remaining in reality nor connecting to an experience 
machine would necessarily mean experiencing starting life anew (i.e. starting 
life with completely new relationships and employment and domestic 
circumstances). Continuing a real life clearly doesn’t involve starting life 
anew and, since a life in the experience could be very similar to a person’s real 
life (except with a much higher incidence of amazing experiences), an 
experience machine needn’t feel like starting life anew either. In De Brigard’s 
scenarios, however, there is an imbalance between the two choices; remaining 
connected to an experience machine does not involve starting life anew, but 
returning to reality does. In De Brigard’s Positive and Negative scenarios, life 
starting anew is stipulated by the inclusion of ‚< your real life is not at all as 
your simulated life‛ (2010, p. 47). In De Brigard’s Neutral SQE scenario, life 
starting anew is stipulated by the inclusion of ‚< your life outside is not at all 
like the life you have experienced so far‛ (2010, p. 49). Although there is no 
similar stipulation in De Brigard’s Neutral scenario, starting life anew is at 
least partially implied in this scenario as well (2010, p. 47).  
De Brigard might have two responses to this criticism. First, he might 
suggest that Nozick’s scenario also implies that choosing the experience 
machine life requires starting life anew in terms of the above-mentioned 
personal circumstances, thereby making his scenarios analogous with 
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Nozick’s after all. It is true that Nozick’s silence on this point may lead some 
people to believe they would have to start their life anew in the experience 
machine.57 However, there still remains a large difference between the slight 
ambiguity in Nozick’s scenario and the implication and stipulations in De 
Brigard’s scenarios on this issue. 
De Brigard might also argue that starting life anew is an integral facet of 
losing the status quo. Such a response would be inadequate, however; an 
experience machine life in Nozick’s scenario does involve a change in the 
status quo, but it does not necessitate a change to the same magnitude. While 
Nozick’s scenario involves a change in a person’s connection to reality, De 
Brigard’s scenarios involve a change in a person’s connection to reality and a 
change in their social, domestic, and employment circumstances. Importantly, 
such a change in these personal circumstances is also likely to result in a 
major interruption in that person’s pursuit of their life plans and goals. 
Furthermore, Smith’s own experiments highlight the importance people 
tend to place on not dramatically changing these personal circumstances 
(Smith 2011, pp. 40–44). Smith conducted nine experiments on a variety of 
different groups, including members of a philosophy club from London, 
students from a community college in Virginia, a hiking group from Southern 
California, and attendees of a Sunday service at Westminster Abbey (2011, 
p.40). The individual groups were small (between 13 and 30 participants) and 
were probably homogenous in many respects. Taken together, however, the 
184 participants represented both genders and most ages well. The groups as 
a whole are also likely to have covered a wide range of personal 
characteristics, although not necessarily in a way that is representative of any 
                                                             
57 Indeed, my test of Nozick’s scenario revealed that four respondents (out of the 99 who 
chose reality) reported reasons in line with cutting off their current relationships as a 
justification for their choice. See Chapter 5 for more details. 
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large population. Smith’s scenarios were based on De Brigard’s Neutral 
scenario and will be referred to as Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario and 
Smith’s Neutral scenario. Half of each of the smaller groups was presented 
with Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario and the other half was presented with 
Smith’s Neutral scenario (Smith 2011, p. 42). Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario 
reads as follows: 
It is a Saturday morning and you are planning to stay in bed for 
at least another hour when all of the sudden you hear the 
doorbell. Grudgingly, you step out of bed to go to the door. At 
the door is a tall man, with a black jacket and sunglasses, who 
introduces himself as Mr. Smith. He claims to have vital 
information that concerns you directly. Mildly troubled but still 
curious, you let him in. ‚I have some news to communicate to 
you‛ says Mr. Smith. ‚You are a client of my corporation. 
Decades ago, you employed our super-duper 
neurophysiologists to plug your brain into an experience 
machine. All the experiences you have had so far are nothing 
but the product of a computer program designed to provide you 
with pleasurable experiences. All the unpleasantness you may 
have felt during your life is just an experiential preface 
conducive toward greater pleasure (e.g. like when you had to 
wait in that long line to get tickets for that concert, remember?). 
Of course, you do not remember employing us. Regardless, 
every decade, we offer our clients the option of either remaining 
connected to this machine (and yes, we’ll remove your 
memories of this conversation), or you can go back to your real 
life.‛ 
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Please understand that, if you choose to return to the real 
world, your entire life up to this point has been fabricated. So, if 
you choose to return, you will be starting life anew, without any 
of the relationships, employment, or domestic circumstances of 
this life. Since all of this was fabricated, none of it ever existed. 
Therefore, if you do so choose, we can give you counselling, and 
can offer you a comparable future. But you will begin anew. 
(Smith 2011, pp. 41–42) 
 
Smith refers to this scenario as being ‚Pretend Neutral‛ to make the point that 
De Brigard’s Neutral and (especially) Neutral SQE scenarios don’t describe 
reality as neutral at all because they involve the negative feature of requiring 
participants to start life anew (2011, p. 42). Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario is 
designed to be analogous to De Brigard’s Neutral SQE scenario so that he can 
compare it to another scenario that does not require that participants start 
their life anew if they choose reality (Smith’s Neutral scenario). This 
comparison will indicate how much effect the prospect of starting life anew 
has on participants when choosing between reality and an experience 
machine life. If the comparison reveals that the prospect of starting life anew 
has a significant effect on participants’ choices, then De Brigard’s inclusion of 
the requirement that those choosing reality must start their life anew means 
his results have much less relevance to critiquing Nozick’s scenario.  
Despite the major sampling differences between De Brigard’s Neutral SQE 
scenario and Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario, these roughly analogous 
scenarios produced fairly similar results. About 71% of the respondents to 
Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario (Smith 2011, p. 43) and about 59% of the 
respondents to De Brigard’s Neutral SQE scenario chose to remain connected 
to an experience machine (De Brigard 2010, p. 49). As discussed, the similarity 
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of these two results makes the outcome of Smith’s Neutral scenario relevant 
when assessing the importance of De Brigard’s results for critiquing Nozick’s 
scenario.  
Smith’s Neutral scenario starts with the exact same paragraph that his 
Pretend Neutral scenario begins with, but replaces the second paragraph with 
one that reads as follows: 
Please understand that, if you choose to return to the real world, 
your entire life up to this point has been fabricated. However, 
this will not affect you, and you will not know about it. 
Scientists have sifted through your memories (i.e. our computer 
files), copied them, have cloned all your relations, created your 
exact job, and have rebuilt your domestic circumstances. If you 
choose to return to reality, we will erase your memory of this 
conversation, and your life will continue as before. (Smith 2011, 
pp. 41–42) 
 
About 27% of the respondents to Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario chose to 
remain connected to an experience machine (Smith 2011, p. 43). When 
compared to the 71% of the respondents who chose to remain connected to an 
experience machine in Smith’s Pretend Neutral scenario, the difference is 
large (about 45%) and highly statistically significant.58 The results of these two 
scenarios are shown in Figure 3 below. 
 
 
                                                             
58 Using a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe that we can be more than 99.9% 
confident that the difference between these two scenarios is not the product of chance (p = 
0.000 to 3 d.p.). 
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Figure 3: Reported Choices between an Experience Machine Life and One 
of Two Descriptions of Reality in Smith’s Scenarios 
 
 
The results of Smith’s experiments indicate that, at least for his eclectic 
sample, whether an option in a choice involves starting life anew can have a 
very large impact on that choice. Specifically, Smith’s results indicate that 
having to acquaint oneself with new social, domestic, and employment 
circumstances seems to be considered as a very large disincentive when 
choosing between lives. This essentially endorses an aspect of Kawall’s 
insight that people will always tend to reject offers for ‘better’ lives if that 
means giving up their ‚current lives and commitments‛ (Kawall 1999, p. 383). 
This is somewhat surprising because De Brigard cites this very passage from 
Kawall in defense of his argument (De Brigard 2010, p. 51). Nevertheless, De 
Brigard’s construction of his scenarios ties reality with starting life anew and 
therefore makes them disanalogous to Nozick’s scenario in what seems to be 
a very important way.  
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experiences in reality and in an experience machine. This implication arises 
from very little mention of what experience machines do, no specific mention 
of the relative difference in the quality of experiences between reality and in 
an experience machine, and the stipulation in the last line of the scenario that 
‚If you choose to return to reality, we will erase your memory of this 
conversation, and your life will continue as before.‛ (Smith 2011, p. 42, emphasis 
added). 
Considering all of the problems Smith has identified with De Brigard’s 
experiments, and his own intriguing experimental results, what should we 
conclude about the possible effects of status quo bias on responses to 
experience machine scenarios? First, it is clear that there are enough 
important differences between both De Brigard’s and Nozick’s, and Smith’s 
and Nozick’s, scenarios that none of them are related enough to provide 
direct support or criticism of Nozick’s scenario.  
But it should also be clear that both De Brigard’s and Smith’s experiments 
suggest that status quo bias has at least some effect on at least some 
respondents’ choices between lives in reality and lives in experience 
machines. In Smith’s Neutral scenario, nearly 27% of respondents chose to 
remain connected to an experience machine even though it was ambiguous as 
to whether their lives would be different in any way if they switched to 
reality. It seems reasonable to believe that a considerable proportion of this 
27% were affected by a desire not to change their status quo. 
Despite all of the problems with De Brigard’s experiments, the difference 
between his Negative scenario and the IWSFAS scenario is very large (about 
75%). Even if we assume that the difference between Smith’s scenarios (about 
45%) was wholly caused by whether respondents had to start life anew if they 
chose reality, much of the difference between the results of De Brigard’s 
Negative scenario and the IWSFAS scenario remains in need of explanation. 
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Again it seems reasonable to believe that a considerable proportion of this 
remaining amount (about 30%) could be explained by reference to status quo 
bias. Of course, these differences could be explained by several biases or other 
factors, including sampling differences or even chance, but the established 
pervasiveness of status quo bias (discussed above) offers considerable 
support for the claim that the effects of status quo bias on our responses to 
experience machine thought experiments considerably reduces the 
philosophical value of those responses. 
 
10. Conclusion and Implications 
While it’s not clear exactly how much influence status quo bias and other 
confounding factors have on our judgments about Nozick’s scenario, it seems 
very likely that they are having at least some affect. Therefore, there is a 
strong case that the normative significance of the intuitions elicited by 
Nozickian experience machine thought experiments is undermined. 
Furthermore, since reversed experience machine thought experiments, such 
as De Brigard’s and Smith’s, also frame certain aspects of one of the choices as 
the status quo, the normative significance of the intuitions elicited by these 
kinds of experience machine thought experiment is also undermined.  
Furthermore, that the experience machine thought experiment appears to 
have misled the widespread and firmly held judgments of so many 
reasonable people stands testament to the fact that we should all be less 
confident about using thought experiments alone as evidence for our 
arguments. This is especially the case when those thought experiments are 
unrealistic, since our intuitive cognition is much more likely to process 
irrelevant factors in such cases (Churchland 1996). The status quo bias is of 
course just one of many psychological biases that can have major effects on 
any of our judgments with a significant intuitive component. So, heed the 
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warning; many thought experiments in philosophy should be revisited by 
applying what we are currently learning about intuitions to ensure that more 
of our firmly held judgments are not, unbeknownst to us, marred by the 
effects of psychological biases. 
But, most importantly, what does this all mean for the experience machine 
objection to hedonism? Is status quo bias the best explanation for why the 
vast majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in an 
experience machine? And, would the vast majority of people choose reality 
over an experience machine life in a scenario that was free from the 
pernicious effects of status quo bias and other confounding factors?  
It is clear from the foregoing analysis that status quo and related biases are 
very likely to be affecting reasonable people’s judgments about experience 
machine scenarios to some extent. But it is not clear that status quo bias is the 
best explanation for why the vast majority of reasonable people report 
preferring reality over a life in an experience machine, even when combined 
with the other potentially confounding factors mentioned in the previous 
chapter. The nature of intuitive cognition simply makes it too difficult to 
speculate about the magnitude of the effects of these factors. Perhaps the best 
way to get a better idea about whether certain factors have a significant 
influence on our judgments about experience machine cases is to test whether 
very minor differences in the scenarios significantly affect the outcomes from 
the same sample of respondents. Identifying and eliminating confounding 
factors in this way might tell us what the best explanation is for why the vast 
majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in an 
experience machine in Nozick’s scenario. Furthermore, eliminating 
confounding factors brings us closer to an unbiased experience machine 
scenario that might not produce widespread agreement about whether reality 
is a better choice than a life in an experience machine. If this is the case, then 
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one of the strongest aspects of the experience machine objection to hedonism 
(that nearly everyone agrees on which the best life is) will become untenable, 
putting the whole argument in jeopardy. 
To further investigate these possibilities, Chapter 5 attempts to isolate and 
eliminate status quo bias and other confounding factors from the experience 
machine thought experiment through the testing method described above. 
But before this task can be carried out with good conscience, Basil Smith’s 
(2011) argument that the experience machine cannot be properly tested at all 
must be assessed. This is the task of the next chapter.  
117 
 
Chapter 4 
We Can Test the Experience Machine 
 
Chapter Summary 
Critiques of experimental philosophy abound. The most potentially damning 
of these criticisms are arguments against certain kinds of experiments being 
able to provide useful information about specific philosophical questions. For 
example, in his provocative ‚Can We Test the Experience Machine?‛ (2011), 
Basil Smith argues that we should recognise a limit on experimental 
philosophy and that experiments on the experience machine fall on the wrong 
side of that limit. In this chapter, I will argue that even if we take Smith’s limit 
seriously it does not prevent us from usefully testing most experience 
machine thought experiments, including De Brigard’s inverted experience 
machine scenarios. I will also argue that taking Smith’s limit seriously has far-
reaching consequences for traditional (non-experimental) philosophy. Then, I 
will argue that Smith’s limit is too rigid be taken seriously anyway. Finally, I 
address Smith’s objection to student samples being useful for testing 
philosophical thought experiments. 
 
1. Introduction59 
The advent of experimental philosophy has intensified debate about the role 
of intuitions and judgments about thought experiments in philosophy. The 
rise of experimental philosophy has also led to a broad range of criticisms 
about the aims and techniques of experimental philosophers. Since criticisms 
can lead to improvements, these debates appear likely to improve both 
                                                             
59 This chapter provided the basis for Weijers (forthcoming-b). 
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experimental and traditional philosophy. This chapter enters these debates, 
but only in a very limited way. This chapter focuses on the only argument in 
these debates that specifically targets the experience machine. 
 In his provocative ‚Can We Test the Experience Machine?‛ (2011), Basil 
Smith argues that we should recognise a limit on experimental philosophy 
that acknowledges the uselessness of testing certain kinds of thought 
experiments, including the experience machine. Smith particularly targets De 
Brigard’s (2010) experiments on experience machine scenarios. This chapter 
analyses Smith’s proposed limit and concludes that Smith’s arguments should 
do little to deter most kinds of tests on experience machine thought 
experiments.  
In this chapter, I will argue that even if we take Smith’s limit seriously, it 
does not prevent us from usefully testing most experience machine thought 
experiments, including De Brigard’s inverted experience machine scenarios. I 
will also argue that taking Smith’s limit seriously has far-reaching 
consequences for traditional (non-experimental) philosophy. Then, I will 
present counterexamples to smith’s limit and argue that it is too rigid to be 
taken seriously anyway. Finally, I address Smith’s objection to student 
samples being useful for testing philosophical thought experiments. 
 
2. Smith’s Limit 
Smith describes his proposed limit on experimental philosophy as follows: 
[C]ertain philosophical thought experiments (e.g. the experience 
machine, the trolley problem, etc.) ask subjects to make 
decisions from the position of confronted agents, or those who 
have entered a specific state of mind. But when taking surveys 
(answering either ‘yes’ or ‘no’ or giving a score on a Likert 
scale), subjects are not in that state of mind, nor can they 
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imagine it. Therefore, when experimental philosophers claim 
they have tested certain philosophical experiments (and thereby 
the intuitions they evoke) we have reason to believe they have 
not. (Smith 2011, p. 30, his italics) 
 
Essentially, Smith recommends that experimental philosophers should stop 
asking questions of the form: ‘how would you react in this situation?’ 
(henceforth ‘would questions’), especially when the situation is hypothetical, 
intense, and unfamiliar. I will refer to this as ‘Smith’s limit’. Smith argues for 
his limit on the grounds that survey answers to would questions do not 
provide useful information because they require respondents to perform a 
very difficult task—accurately predicting their reactions to hypothetical, 
intense, and unfamiliar situations.  
Smith gives two reasons for why it is so difficult for survey respondents to 
accurately predict their reactions to hypothetical, intense, and unfamiliar 
thought experiments. Both of the reasons are related to how difficult it is for 
survey respondents to adopt the role of an appropriately confronted agent. A 
confronted agent is someone who has context-specific subjective experiences, 
including affective responses such as feelings of confusion, incredulity, fear, 
and uncertainty. First, the respondents would have none of the affective 
responses they would have experienced if the scenario were real (Smith 2011, 
p. 39). Second, respondents would have given their ideal responses (how they 
think they should react in the given scenario) as opposed to how they think 
that they would actually react if they really found themselves in the 
hypothesised scenario (Smith 2011, p. 39). Since the affective responses we 
experience can heavily influence our reactions, and since how we think we 
should react is often different to how we would actually react, Smith 
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concludes that ‚we cannot compare the responses subjects give on a survey with 
their reactions to the real event.‛ (Smith 2011, p. 39, his italics). 
Smith also provides two examples of types of studies that require 
respondents to adopt the role of confronted agents to some extent; studies that 
involve respondents anticipating their own futures and ones that involve 
respondents attempting to identify with the moral decisions of others (Smith 
2011, p. 46). Smith concludes his article by clarifying that his limit on 
experimental philosophy affects studies ‚just to the degree‛ that they require 
respondents to adopt the role of confronted agents (Smith 2011, p. 46, his 
italics). Presumably this means that studies with questions requiring 
respondents to undertake just a small amount of would-based pondering 
(relative to the total pondering required to form a judgment about the 
relevant scenario) should not automatically be considered failed tests, just 
somewhat undermined tests. 
 
3. Taking Smith’s Limit Seriously 
Smith acknowledges that his limit ‚does not apply to most experimental 
studies‛ (Smith 2011, p. 46). But does it apply to studies on experience 
machine thought experiments? Or, as Smith puts it in the title of his paper: 
can we test the experience machine? Although never directly stated, we can 
infer that Smith’s answer to this question would be: ‘we can only test 
experience machine thought experiments that do not require respondents to 
adopt the role of a confronted agent’. Smith is very clear about his belief that 
De Brigard’s inverted experience machine thought experiments cannot be 
tested:  
[T]he inverted experience machine, as well as other similar such 
experiments (e.g. justified theft dilemmas, questions of torture, 
the trolley problem, etc.) have a unique set of characteristics that 
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make it impossible to gather the right subjects to test [i.e. 
subjects that can adopt the role of an appropriately confronted 
agent]. Therefore, in practice, these thought experiments are 
impossible to test. (Smith 2011, p. 37) 
 
Smith is relatively quiet, however, on whether other variants of the 
experience machine thought experiment can be tested. I will argue that his 
limit does not prevent us from usefully testing most experience machine 
thought experiments, including De Brigard’s inverted experience machine 
scenarios. 
The most famous experience machine thought experiment was proposed 
by Robert Nozick. Nozick describes experience machines as being able to 
‚give you any experience you desired< a lifetime of bliss‛ all without you 
realising that your experiences were machine-generated (Nozick 1974, pp. 42–
43). Nozick then asks his readers: ‚Would you plug in‛ to an experience 
machine for the rest of your life? (Nozick 1974, pp. 43). This is clearly a would 
question—one that, on Smith’s view, only an appropriately confronted agent 
could credibly provide an answer to. Therefore, Smith would object to any 
attempt to test this scenario. 
De Brigard (2010, p. 47) asks ‚What would you choose?‛ at the end of all 
of his scenarios. Therefore, applying Smith’s limit to De Brigard’s inverted 
experience machine thought experiments reveals the same judgment; Smith 
would object to any attempt to test this scenario too. 
Smith’s (2011, p. 37) claim that De Brigard’s tests are useless, and his 
implication that any test of Nozick’s experience machine scenario would also 
be useless, is based on the assumption that these tests have the purpose of 
discovering what people would choose if they were really offered a choice 
between reality and a life in an experience machine. It’s far from clear, 
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however, that when De Brigard and Nozick were creating their thought 
experiments discovering the truth about what people would do was their 
ultimate aim.  
The stated purpose of De Brigard’s tests was to investigate how informing 
participants that they ‚have been living inside an experience machine [their] 
entire life< would affect, per se, their judgements on their own happiness or 
well-being‛ through studying their responses to his scenarios (De Brigard 
2010, p. 46). It is true that De Brigard mentions the connection between the 
experience machine and Psychological (Motivational) Hedonism: ‚Many 
philosophers< consider the alleged effectiveness of this thought-experiment 
a rather convincing proof against the tenability of psychological hedonism. 
(De Brigard 2010, p. 45). However, this is the only mention of it in the whole 
article. De Brigard makes it more clear in his conclusion (2010, pp. 53–55) that 
his primary research question is whether our preferences in experience 
machine scenarios are best explained by our valuing of reality or the status 
quo (i.e. the truth of IP3).60  
The stated purpose of Nozick’s experience machine scenario is to 
demonstrate that ‚something matters to us in addition to experience‛ (Nozick 
1974, p. 44). Furthermore, when Nozick discusses his experience machine 
thought experiment in more detail, he stresses that he takes the experience 
machine to provide evidence about what has prudential value, not just what 
motivates us: ‚the connection to actuality is important whether or not we 
desire it—that is why we desire it—and the experience machine is inadequate 
because it doesn’t give us that‛ (Nozick 1989, pp. 106–107, his italics).  
                                                             
60 Restated for your convenience here. IP3: The best explanation for IP2 is that reality matters 
intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable people. IP2: When instructed to ignore their 
responsibilities to others, the vast majority of reasonable people report preferring reality over 
a life in an experience machine. 
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For both of these stated purposes, then, it seems that knowing what people 
think is in their best interest to do, would be more useful than knowing what 
they would actually choose. This is because (as Smith has pointed out) when 
actually choosing, people are confronted agents and their decisions are 
affected by feelings of confusion, incredulity, fear, and uncertainty. In most 
cases, we should expect these influences to cause confronted agents’ revealed 
choices to be less rational than they would have otherwise been.61 However, if 
we could really know what people think they should choose, then we would 
have a much better understanding of our well-being-related judgements, 
which is what it seems De Brigard and Nozick were really after. 
In fact, assuming that Smith is correct about the reasons why survey 
participants cannot credibly respond to would questions, then De Brigard’s 
and Nozick’s ‘what would you choose?’ questions are probably eliciting 
responses more closely aligned with what the respondents think they should 
choose if they were given that option. If the feelings of confusion, incredulity, 
fear, and uncertainty that are required to properly adopt the role of a 
confronted agent for De Brigard’s and Nozick’s scenarios are likely to cause 
less rational choices, then the removal of them is likely to lead to more rational 
choices (i.e. choices that better reflect what the respondents think they should 
choose).62 Therefore, while Smith (2011, p. 39) bemoans the fact that responses 
to De Brigard’s scenarios are likely to be the participants’ ‘ideal choices’, as 
                                                             
61 See, for example, Hodgson (1988, pp. 10, 11, 57) on the many revealed ‘decisions’ based on 
unconscious reactions to context and psychological states of stress, fear, excitement, social 
pressure, and so on. 
62 I am not making the false claim that rational decisions are those made with as little 
emotional processing as possible, just that decisions made under normal emotional 
conditions are likely to be more rational than those made under extreme emotional 
conditions.  
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opposed to what they would actually choose if the scenario were real, this 
actually seems like a strength of De Brigard’s experiments. 
Indeed, using questions of the ‘how would you react in this situation?’ 
variety is common, even when the researchers are not directly interested in 
what respondents would actually do if the scenarios were real. For example, 
Petrinovich and colleagues ran experiments on typical philosophical thought 
experiments (including trolley problems) using explicit would questions, but 
made it clear that they were most interested in better understanding people’s 
underlying moral intuitions (Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen 1993, p. 476).63 
Furthermore, Alex Barber (2011, p. 263, n. 6, his italics) has argued that ‚I read 
*Nozick’s experience machine objection to hedonism+ as being interested in 
your views about what you (self-interestedly) should do, but what you would 
do is our best guide to these views.‛64 ‘Best guide’ is surely too strong here, 
but this quote shows that philosophers are also aware of the importance of the 
                                                             
63 ‚It also might be objected that this research concerns only intuitions and that it is not 
possible to determine whether the intuitions revealed here would be translated into action. Of 
course, this objection is justified. However, the intent of this research is not to understand or 
predict what people would do but to probe the structure of their systems of moral intuitions. 
The impetus for the research was provided by the views of many moral philosophers 
regarding how people construct the world of morality. We argue that these dilemmas probe 
the core of moral beliefs. It would seem that an understanding of how people resolve these 
fantasy dilemmas might be a good basis on which to begin to understand action but that 
translation is not part of the present undertaking, although it would be a fascinating question 
for future research.‛ (Petrinovich, O'Neill, & Jorgensen 1993, p.  476). 
64 Barber goes on to congratulate Nozick for revealing to Hedonists that their theoretical 
convictions might contradict their professed hypothetical actions since it might be able to get 
Hedonists to admit that in their ‚heart of hearts‛ they are not really Hedonists (2001, p. 266). 
Barber summarises: ‚Our hypothetical actions speak louder than our theoretical words‛ 
(2001, p. 266). 
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distinction between what we would do and what we should do in regards to 
the experience machine.  
So what does this mean for experimental studies of experience machine 
scenarios that directly ask would questions, but do not seek to discover how 
people would actually react if the scenarios were real (a category that seems 
to include De Brigard’s experiments)? Does Smith’s limit deem them useless? 
Even if the questions were reworded to (or reinterpreted by non-
confronted respondents as) ‘what should you choose?’ questions, De Brigard’s 
and Nozick’s scenarios still require respondents to contemplate some would 
questions.  On the new wordings (or interpretations), respondents no longer 
have to predict if they would actually choose an experience machine life, but 
they still have to ask themselves what a life in an experience machine would be 
like. Imagining what an experience machine life would be like is fairly easy 
for someone who has previously been confronted with one. Unfortunately, no 
one has come across an experience machine yet, so there is no group of people 
who could answer the question ‘what should you choose?’ as an 
appropriately confronted agent. This is one of the main points that Smith was 
trying to make (captured in the following claim):  
[T]he inverted experience machine< [has] a unique set of 
characteristics that make it impossible to gather the right 
subjects to test. Therefore, in practice, [it is] impossible to test. 
(Smith 2011, p. 37) 
 
Nevertheless, it seems like participants’ responses to the question ‘what 
should you choose?’ require less knowledge and emotional upheaval to be 
credible than their responses to the question ‘what would you choose?’ So, 
Smith might conclude that any studies on reworded versions of Nozick’s or 
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De Brigard’s experience machine thought experiments should be considered 
as flawed, but still useful tests, as opposed to being worthless non-tests.  
And what of De Brigard’s actual experiments and Nozick’s actual 
scenario? Given their probable purposes, and the likelihood of their ‘what 
would you choose?’ questions being reinterpreted by readers and 
respondents as ‘what should you choose?’ questions, then it seems that 
Smith’s limit does not rule out their usefulness. Indeed, it seems like only a 
very uncommon kind of experimental study on an experience machine 
scenario would be ruled out by Smith’s limit. Even more importantly for 
current purposes, even if De Brigard’s actual intent was to investigate the 
relevance of the experience machine to the plausibility of Motivational 
Hedonism, I have usefully employed his tests to investigate the relevance of 
the experience machine to the plausibility of Prudential Hedonism. 
Furthermore, the same arguments that I have run here could be used to 
redeem most of the other experimental studies that Smith claims to be failed 
tests (trolley problems etc.).  
All of the results of my application of Smith’s limit differ to those from his 
application of it. I have argued that appropriately applying Smith’s limit 
identifies a few experimental studies as worthless and many as flawed (but 
still useful). Smith may disagree with my analysis of which particular studies 
belong in each of these categories, but we seem to agree on his justifications 
for being concerned about would questions. Non-confronted agents cannot 
imagine having the intense emotions that really being in extreme and 
unfamiliar situations elicit. And since intense emotions have can have strong 
and unpredictable effects on our reactions, non-confronted agents should not 
be expected to be able to accurately predict how they would react in extreme 
and unfamiliar situations. This is why responses to experience machine 
scenarios should not be taken at face value—no one could be sure about how 
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they would react to being in an experience machine. So, Smith and I agree 
that questions requiring survey respondents to predict how they would react 
in future or hypothetical scenarios are undermined, but perhaps we disagree 
about the extent to which asking would questions affects an experiment’s 
usefulness.  
 
4. How Taking Smith’s Limit Seriously Could Affect Traditional 
Philosophy 
When considering the extent to which asking would questions will affect an 
experiment’s usefulness, it is worth also thinking about a very closely 
analogous case. Notice that when philosophers, and other readers of 
philosophy, ponder thought experiments they too are required to predict how 
they would react in future or hypothetical scenarios, or attempt to identify 
with the moral decisions of others. Notice also that philosophers and 
philosophy students don’t usually appear to be experiencing feelings of 
confusion, incredulity, fear, and uncertainty when they read or discuss 
Nozick’s experience machine or any other thought experiment.65 Smith makes 
no comment about his limit on experimental philosophy applying to 
philosophy in general, but his justifications for the limit seem to apply to 
nearly all of philosophy. Many arguments in philosophy use thought 
experiments that require the reader to either predict how they would react in 
future or hypothetical scenarios or attempt to identify with the moral 
decisions of others. Therefore many arguments in philosophy would be 
deemed either flawed or useless by Smith’s limit.  
                                                             
65 I think that the reality here is that imagining a thought experiment does cause affective 
responses in the imaginer, but that these responses are much more muted than they would 
have been if the scenario were really experienced. The difference in responses to my Stranger 
and Self scenarios, discussed in the next chapter, seem to provide evidence for this claim. 
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I repeat Smith’s justification for his limit here, with a few words changed 
(indicated by square brackets), to show how easily it applies to much more 
than just experimental philosophy: 
[C]ertain philosophical thought experiments (e.g. the experience 
machine, the trolley problem, etc.) ask subjects to make 
decisions from the position of confronted agents, or those who 
have entered a specific state of mind. But when [reading 
thought experiments, readers] are not in that state of mind, nor 
can they imagine it. Therefore, when [people] claim they have 
[learnt from] certain philosophical [thought] experiments (and 
thereby the intuitions they evoke) we have reason to believe 
they have not. (Smith 2011, p. 30, his italics) 
 
Of course, there are other reasons why the results of experimental studies 
may be less reliable than the opinion of philosophers about a particular 
thought experiment.66 But Smith discusses his limit on experimental 
philosophy separately, claiming that it is strong enough by itself to show that 
certain thought experiments cannot be tested at all (2011, p. 37). Given that 
the justifications for Smith’s limit imply that all thought experiments are 
undermined to the extent that they require us to adopt the role of confronted 
agents, I am curious about what Smith believes. He might believe: that 
philosophers, and others who read thought experiments, are better at 
adopting the role of confronted agents, or that large swathes of philosophy 
are flawed or useless, or that Nozick’s and De Brigard’s scenarios (whether 
experimented on or simply read by someone) are only slightly undermined 
by his concern about adopting the role of an appropriately confronted agent. 
                                                             
66 Smith (2011) discusses many potential problems with experimental studies, all of which can 
be minimised or avoided by sound experimental design. 
129 
 
In the context of the debate about the effectiveness of the experience 
machine objection to hedonism, it seems that most of these possibilities would 
be welcomed by Hedonists. If both reading experience machine thought 
experiments and responding to experience machine scenarios in a survey 
elicit severely flawed or useless judgments, then IP3 is likely to be false; i.e. 
the best explanation for why the vast majority of reasonable people report 
preferring reality over a life in an experience machine is probably not that 
reality matters intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable people. Indeed, 
we wouldn’t be able to say what the best explanation for the widespread 
reported preference for reality is because those reports are all useless (or at 
least severely undermined).  
Furthermore, if both reading experience machine thought experiments and 
responding to experience machine scenarios in a survey elicit only slightly 
undermined judgments, then De Brigard’s (2010) and others’ challenge to IP2 
(based on alternate experience machine thought experiments) should not be 
significantly affected; i.e. since Smith’s limit would not significantly reduce 
our confidence in De Brigard’s (2010) experimental result (that less than 13% 
of respondents to his Negative scenario chose reality over an  experience 
machine life), we have reason to believe that the vast majority of reasonable 
people do not always choose reality over an experience machine life. 
Furthermore, the slight reduction in confidence that Smith’s limit causes us to 
acknowledge with De Brigard’s results should apply equally to the original 
interpretation of IP2 based on people reading (but not being tested on) 
Nozick’s scenario. Therefore, even if we take Smith’s limit seriously, we seem 
to have no significant reason to believe that the arguments of De Brigard 
(2010) and others, against the experience machine objection to hedonism, are 
any weaker. 
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5. Smith’s Limit is too Rigid to be Taken Seriously 
It is not clear that we have good reason to take Smith’s limit clearly, however. 
Given the justifications Smith provides for his limit, the limit itself is too rigid. 
Just how useless the inclusion of would questions will make an experiment 
seems to be a question of degree. Indeed, this seems to be the case even when 
the would questions are explicit and involve participants attempting to predict 
their reactions to hypothetical, intense, and unfamiliar situations.  
For example, imagine a survey designed to investigate the risks people 
would take for financial reward.  A group of people would be asked (via 
survey) if they would accept an offer of $1million to attempt a dangerous 
high-altitude balancing stunt. I contend that they would probably not exhibit 
any signs of feeling confused, incredulous, fearful, or uncertain, but their 
answers would likely be fairly predictive of their actual choice if they were 
really presented with such an offer. Therefore, even though this group would 
be being asked to predict their reactions to a hypothetical, intense, and 
unfamiliar situation, and they failed to adopt the role of an appropriately 
confronted agent, their responses would be far from useless. This example 
shows that Smith’s limit is too rigid because it is not sensitive to the fact that 
all hypothetical, intense, and unfamiliar situations are not created equal; we 
are likely to be better at predicting our reactions to some situations even if we 
can’t adopt the role of a confronted agent. 
This criticism suggests that Smith’s limit shouldn't be a limit at all. Rather, 
it should be something that experimental philosophers, and researchers using 
experimental data, should consider when evaluating the significance of the 
data for their particular research question. Researchers should ask themselves 
how useful the survey respondents’ non-confronted responses are likely to be. 
If the research question is ‘how would members of a certain group react to 
their home town being invaded by evil aliens?’, then the non-confronted 
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responses will be of limited value. But, if the research question is ‘how should 
members of a certain group react to their home town being invaded by evil 
aliens?’, then the non-confronted responses will be worth something. 
Furthermore, it should be noted that non-confronted responses to this 
question are likely to be more useful than confronted responses to it because 
non-confronted responses will be less affected by irrational emotional 
influences. Therefore, Smith’s limit should be understood as one quality 
control check of data, among many, that may lead to a reduction in the degree 
of significance the data has for the research question. 
This new interpretation of Smith’s limit supports the possibility from 
above that both reading experience machine thought experiments and 
responding to experience machine scenarios in a survey elicit only slightly 
undermined judgments when the research question is ‘does reality have 
intrinsic prudential value?’ And, as mentioned, since this slight undermining 
applies to both the defenders and attackers of IP2 (that we prefer reality over 
an experience machine life), Smith’s newly interpreted limit does not 
significantly affect the debate about the experience machine objection to 
hedonism.  
 
6. Student Samples 
Smith (2011) levels one more interesting criticism at experimental 
philosophers, which applies to the experiments of De Brigard and the 
experiments I conduct in the next chapter. Smith criticises the use of student 
samples, arguing that they are not representative enough to provide accurate 
results for experimental philosophy, including for testing the experience 
machine. Smith argues that many factors about participants, such as their age, 
class, religious beliefs, gender, and culture, will affect whether they are likely 
to think that connecting to an experience machine is a good idea (2011, pp. 35, 
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40). I expect that Smith is entirely correct, but that doesn’t entail that middle-
class, Western, undergraduate students are always an unrepresentative 
sample. In this part of my thesis, I am investigating the merits of using the 
experience machine objection to hedonism to make an argument in 
philosophy and arguments in philosophy often intend to be able to convince 
nearly all reasonable people who might come across them. According to IP2 
of the argument, we want to know about the judgments of ‘reasonable 
people’. Are students representative of all reasonable people? 
We can probably assume that a sufficiently large sample of students will 
be made up of mainly reasonable people; however it is clear that student 
samples are not ideally representative of all reasonable people. But they might 
not be all that far off. As discussed in the previous chapter, Smith’s (2011) test 
of his Pretend Neutral scenario on a two-country, multi-setting, and multi-
demographic group of participants produced a fairly similar result to De 
Brigard’s test of his roughly analogous Neutral Status Quo Emphasised 
scenario on a mono-country, mono-setting, and all-student group (71% and 
59% respectively). Furthermore, most of the 12% difference between these two 
results might be explained by the extra emphasis that Smith put on having to 
start life anew in reality in his Pretend Neutral scenario.  
What does this mean in relation to the debate about the experience 
machine objection to hedonism? It certainly means that we should consider 
results from student samples to be slightly less significant than results from 
more representative samples of all reasonable people. But it should also be 
noted that all-student sample groups are probably more representative of all 
reasonable people than trained philosophers are. The average undergraduate 
student class is clearly a more diverse group than most gatherings of trained 
philosophers in terms of their values, interests, personalities, and so on. 
Therefore, any proponent of the experience machine objection to hedonism 
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arguing something along the lines of: ‘De Brigard’s experimental results are 
not very significant because they are based on a fairly unrepresentative 
sample’, faces a devastating response. De Brigard could simply deny IP2 
because philosophers’ evidence for it comes from their presentations of 
experience machine scenarios to philosophers and philosophy students (i.e. 
De Brigard could say that we do not know whether the vast majority of 
reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in an experience 
machine because no one has ever bothered to ask a representative sample of 
reasonable people!) So again, Smith’s criticism seems to have only a small 
effect on how we should evaluate empirical results, but it also has an equal or 
greater effect on the practice of traditional philosophers. 
Furthermore, the worry about the representativeness of student samples 
can be somewhat allayed by testing Nozick’s scenario as well as the alternate 
experience machine scenarios on the same all-student sample group (without 
any individual completing more than one survey). This way the differences in 
responses to the different scenarios can still be very informative, since the 
specific idiosyncrasies of the particular student sample will be held constant 
across the different scenarios. For this reason, this approach is followed in the 
next chapter. 
 
7. Conclusion 
None of Smith’s (2011) arguments give us a good reason why we cannot 
pursue the testing of experience machine scenarios proposed at the end of the 
previous chapter. However, we should learn from Smith’s proposed limit that 
our judgments about exotic thought experiments are not as reliable as they 
are often thought to be and that the experience machine is a good example of 
an exotic scenario. Acknowledging this fact does give us reason to be cautious 
about the results of our tests, but it gives proponents of the experience 
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machine objection to hedonism equal reason to be cautious. Indeed, Smith’s 
concerns seem to demand just as much caution about reality mattering 
intrinsically to us being the best explanation for why the vast majority of 
reasonable people choose reality over a life in an experience machine in 
Nozick’s scenario. The use of student samples was also shown not to be a 
significant problem when conducted in the right way and compared to the 
traditional philosophical approach. The next chapter begins my testing (with 
due caution) of experience machine scenarios.  
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Chapter 5 
Reducing Status Quo Bias and other Confounding 
Factors in Experience Machine Scenarios 
 
Chapter Summary 
As discussed at length in this section so far, Robert Nozick’s experience 
machine thought experiment (Nozick’s scenario) is widely thought to provide 
a knockdown argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-
being. Recently, however, it has been argued that Nozick’s scenario should 
not be used in this way because it elicits judgements marred by status quo 
bias and other irrelevant factors. These arguments all involve reversed 
experience machine thought experiments, but these scenarios also elicit 
judgements marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors.  In this 
chapter, several experiments that were conducted in order to create and test a 
relatively bias-free experience machine scenario are reported on. It is argued 
that this relatively bias-free scenario should be used instead of all previous 
scenarios when evaluating internalist mental state theories of well-being. 
Unlike the existing experience machine scenarios, when this new scenario is 
used to assess internalist mental state theories of well-being it does not 
provide strong evidence to refute or endorse them. The implications for the 
experience machine objection to hedonism are discussed. 
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1. Introduction67 
As discussed at length in this section so far, Robert Nozick’s (1974) experience 
machine thought experiment (Nozick’s scenario) is widely thought to provide 
a knockdown argument against all internalist mental state theories of well-
being. As discussed in Chapter 2, however, several philosophers have 
recently argued that the experience machine thought experiment elicits 
judgments that are biased in ways that are irrelevant to an isolated prudential 
value comparison between reality and how our experiences feel to us on the 
inside. 
As discussed in Chapter 3, status quo bias has been identified as a likely 
candidate for significantly marring judgments about experience machine 
scenarios. These arguments used to single out status quo bias all involve 
reversed experience machine thought experiments, but these scenarios also 
elicit judgements marred by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. 
Indeed, as Alex Barber (2011, p. 268) points out: ‚How successfully these or 
other tweaks can deal with all confounding factors is unclear.‛ When 
combined with the point from Chapter 4 that philosophers’ evidence in 
favour of IP268 is drawn from a particularly un-representative sample, we are 
left in a situation where we really can’t be sure whether IP2 is true (i.e. we 
can’t be sure if it’s true that the vast majority of reasonable people report 
preferring reality over a life in an experience machine). We can’t be sure of the 
truth of IP2 for Nozick’s scenario because it has never been formally tested 
(and informal tests have mainly been requests for a show of hands during 
                                                             
67 A paper based on this chapter has a ‘minor revisions required’ judgment from Philosophical 
Psychology. 
68 IP2: When instructed to ignore their responsibilities to others, the vast majority of 
reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in an experience machine. (Empirical 
claim) 
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philosophy lectures). But this is the least of our problems for assessing the 
experience machine objection to hedonism because we are also unsure of how 
much the judgments elicited by Nozick’s scenario have been affected by 
status quo and other irrelevant biases (as discussed in Chapter 2). The key 
problem to assessing the experience machine objection to hedonism, 
therefore, is that we can’t be sure of the truth of IP2 for a relatively bias-free 
experience machine thought experiment.69 
In this chapter, I report on several experiments that were conducted in 
order to test what features of Nozick’s scenario are likely to confound the 
usefulness of the judgments it elicits for assessing the relative prudential 
value of reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside. This process 
involves refining each iteration of experience machine scenario so that the 
final scenario is relatively bias-free compared to the rest. It is argued that this 
relatively bias-free scenario should be used instead of all previous scenarios 
when evaluating internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism and all other 
internalist mental state theories of well-being. Unlike the existing experience 
machine scenarios, when this new scenario is used to assess internalist mental 
state theories of well-being it does not provide strong evidence to refute or 
endorse them. The implications for the experience machine objection to 
hedonism are then discussed, with the conclusion that, on balance, IP2 is 
probably false (i.e. it is not true that the vast majority of reasonable people 
report preferring reality over a life in an experience machine). 
 
                                                             
69 Creating clear criteria for what counts as ‘relatively bias free’ is no easy task. Clearly 
‘completely bias free’ experiments would be ideal, but they are probably impossible to create 
in real life. Indeed, the main problem is that it is probably impossible to know exactly how 
biased any particular experiment’s results are. For this reason, a ‘relatively bias free’ 
experiment should be understood as an experiment that has less bias than the main previous 
experiments on the problem in question. 
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2. Analysing Nozick’s Scenario 
To investigate the potential influences on judgments about Nozick’s scenario 
(discussed in Chapter 2), I presented 125 first year philosophy students with a 
verbatim version of Nozick’s scenario and asked them if they would connect 
to an experience machine and why.70 The sample is from two undergraduate 
philosophy courses at Victoria University of Wellington. Nozick’s scenario 
and the two questions were written on sheets that were handed out by the 
tutors of the course. The survey sheets were handed out to the two classes on 
the same week. This scenario was tested at the same time as my Stranger No 
Status Quo scenario (discussed later). All participants in all of my 
experiments only ever took part in one survey and were only ever exposed to 
one scenario. The two scenarios were randomly distributed amongst the 
students. The experiment was conducted in April 2011 during the second 
week of my lectures on unrelated topics (the morality of advertising and 
philosophy of religion). 
Only 21% (26/125) of the students indicated that they would connect to an 
experience machine in Nozick’s scenario. For the 79% of students who didn’t 
want to connect, ‘reality, truth, or something related’ was the most common 
justification. However, this justification only accounted for 35% (35/99) of the 
reasons this group gave for choosing reality over the experience machine.  
Surprisingly, 44% (44/99) of the main justifications given by the students 
who didn’t want to connect to an experience machine indicated that they 
experienced imaginative resistance to the stipulated or implied features of 
Nozick’s scenario. The main justifications displaying imaginative resistance 
were grouped as follows: ‘bad experiences are required to appreciate good 
experiences or to develop properly’ (19%, 19/99); ‘you would have no 
                                                             
70 See pp. 68–69 of this thesis for the wording of Nozick’s scenario as it appeared in my 
experiment. 
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autonomy or control in the machine’,71 (14%, 14/99); ‘I can’t because I have 
responsibilities to others’ (4%, 4/99); ‘the machine might break down or not 
produce great experiences in the future’ (3%, 3/99).  
Some main justifications also revealed overactive imagination, for 
example, ‘the machine seems scary or unnatural’ (8%, 8/99). Other main 
justifications were consistent with the thought experiment and didn’t indicate 
overactive imagination but were nonetheless irrelevant for evaluating the 
relative value of reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside. 
These main justifications reveal problems with using Nozick’s scenario to 
investigate the the relative value of reality and how our experiences feel to us 
on the inside. These confounding factors included ‘getting out every two 
years would be depressing’ (6%, 6/99). One participant even gave the status 
quo-endorsing reason that ‚reality is always preferable, because I have done 
it‛. These results show that all of the factors that concern philosophers seem 
to influence at least some participants’ judgments about Nozick’s scenario. 
Considering that Nozick stated the purpose of his experience machine 
thought experiment as assessing what, if anything, matters other than how 
our experiences feel to us on the inside, all of these justifications for not 
connecting are irrelevant. The fact that 60% (59/99) of the participants that 
chose reality stated an irrelevant reason as the main justification for their 
choice gives us reason to believe that Nozick’s scenario is not very useful for 
assessing the relative prudential value of reality and how our experiences feel 
to us on the inside.72 Furthermore, as discussed above, it seems that all of the 
                                                             
71 To clarify, the justifications related to lack of autonomy in the machine did not include any 
that referred to being able to make decisions that impacted the real world. The justifications 
classified in this group involved thinking that the programming of the experience meant that 
they could not decide how to act during the time they were connected to the machine. 
72 These stated justifications might not be the real reason for the choice the participants 
actually made because the main cause of their judgment could have been subconscious (as 
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existing experience machine scenarios elicit responses marred by some degree 
of status quo bias, making none of them ideal candidates for this role. 
 
3. Reducing Imaginative Resistance and Other Irrelevant Factors 
Since all of the extant experience machine scenarios appear to engender so 
many biased, irrelevant, and imaginatively resistant judgments, a question 
arises: is it possible to create an experience machine scenario that is not so 
heavily affected by these confounding factors? To begin investigating this 
question, I created a new experience machine scenario that addressed some of 
the imaginative resistance-related and other concerns raised in the responses 
to my test of Nozick’s scenario. This new scenario was then tested on 93 
undergraduate business students. The sample is from three streams of an 
undergraduate business course at Victoria University of Wellington. My Self 
scenario and the two questions were written on sheets that were handed out 
by myself and a colleague (both unknown to the students). The survey sheets 
were handed out to the different streams on the same day. As a part of the 
same experiment, three other scenarios were tested at the same time (my 
Friend, Cousin, and Stranger scenarios). The four scenarios were randomly 
distributed amongst the students. The experiment was conducted in July 2010 
during the second week of term.73 The Self scenario, was worded as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                              
discussed in Chapter 3). However, the justifications given match up to the reasons that some 
philosophers have predicted would impact participants’ judgements and we might expect 
that some of the judgments of the few participants who confabulated their justification are 
offset by those of the few participants who couldn’t articulate the real cause of their 
judgement. My seemingly successful attempt to control for these irrelevant factors (discussed 
below) provides at least weak evidence that some of the respondents’ claims about why they 
didn’t want to connect to the experience machine were probably true. 
73 The only observable difference between business and philosophy students was their 
likelihood to provide a justification for their choice. Only 2% (5/249) of the philosophy 
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It’s 2062 and you are riding a hovertube to town. You have been 
offered a permanent spot in an Experience Machine and are now 
trying to decide if you should accept.  
You have had a go in an Experience Machine before and 
know that they provide an unpredictable roller-coaster ride of 
remarkable experiences. When in the machine, you still made 
autonomous decisions and faced tough situations, such as 
striving for your goals and feeling grief, but your experiences 
were vastly more enjoyable and varied. You also recall that, 
while you were in the Experience Machine, you had no idea that 
you had gotten into a machine or that your experiences were 
generated by a machine.  
If you accept the spot, then you would stay in an Experience 
Machine permanently. If you reject the spot, then you would 
never be offered a spot again. Your life would be the same 
length in an Experience Machine as it would otherwise have 
been. 
 
1) Ignoring how your family, friends, any other dependents, 
and society in general might be affected, and assuming that 
                                                                                                                                                                              
students provided no answer to the open-ended ‚Briefly explain your choice‛ question, 
compared to 21% (71/345) of the business students. This difference was stable across the sub-
groups of business and philosophy students; none of the differences between the business 
student groups or between the philosophy student groups were statistically significant (to the 
95% or p = 0.050 level using a one-tailed Fischer’s exact test), whereas the difference between 
the business student groups and the philosophy student groups were all highly significant (p 
< 0.010). Where relevant, such as when discussing the amount of imaginative resistance 
demonstrated by the answers to the open-ended ‚Briefly explain your choice‛ question, this 
has been corrected for. 
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Experience Machines always work perfectly, what is the best 
thing for you to do for yourself in this situation?  
 
Tick only one of these options: 
o You should accept the spot in an Experience Machine 
o You should not accept the spot in an Experience Machine 
 
2) Briefly explain your choice: 
 
Nearly 37% (34/93) of participants responding to the Self scenario chose to 
connect to the experience machine. Comparing the responses to the Self 
scenario with those to Nozick’s scenario reveals a statistically significant 16% 
increase in participants choosing to connect to the experience machine in the 
Self scenario.74 Furthermore, since participants were asked to explain their 
choice, the total amount of imaginative resistance and other confounding 
factors can also be compared. In the Self scenario, 24% (22/93) of participants 
provided an irrelevant main justification for their choice, compared to 47% 
                                                             
74 Using a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe that we can be more than 99% confident 
that the difference between these two scenarios is not the product of chance (p = 0.004). Social 
scientists are likely to appreciate standardised effect sizes, rather than differences between 
percentages, so I calculated Cohen’s d effect sizes for the differences between the main 
scenarios (always using 1 as the value for connecting to an experience machine and 0 for not 
connecting). Cohen’s d effect sizes for the differences between all of the main scenarios are 
reported in Table 2 near the end of this paper. All Cohen’s d effect sizes are reported to three 
decimal places. As a general guide, an effect size of 0.2 is small, 0.5 is medium, and 0.8 is 
large. The Cohen’s d effect size between the Self scenario and Nozick’s scenario was d = 0.352. 
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(59/125) in Nozick’s scenario.75 The majority of this difference is explained by 
far fewer respondents to the Self scenario justifying their choice with the ‘bad 
experiences are required to appreciate good experiences or to develop 
properly’ and ‘you would have no autonomy or control in the machine’ 
reasons. Although we cannot expect the stated main justification for the 
participants’ choices to correlate perfectly with the actual main cause of their 
choice (as discussed in Chapter 3), these results nevertheless give us good 
reason to think that the Self scenario is a better test of the relative value of 
reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside.  
What could we conclude about internalist accounts of Prudential 
Hedonism and all other internalist mental state theories of well-being based 
on the results of the Self scenario? It’s not clear that we can draw any firm 
conclusions. Nearly two thirds of respondents to the Self scenario still chose 
to forego the experience machine, but all of the 24% (22/93) of respondents 
who provided an irrelevant main justification for their choice chose reality 
over to an experience machine life. It would be reasonable to expect that at 
least some of the participants might have chosen to connect to the experience 
machine if they had not considered the irrelevant factor they cited as 
justifying their choice.76 Recall that one of the main strengths of the experience 
machine objection to hedonism is that the overwhelming majority agree that 
it’s best to choose reality over an experience machine life. The results of my 
                                                             
75 It should be noted that, contrary to best practice, I coded the qualitative responses myself. 
This is a weakness of these comparisons. 
76 This assumption will not sound reasonable to anyone who thinks that the vast majority of 
these justifications are likely to be confabulations—vain attempts by our deliberative mind to 
explain the verdict of our intuitive cognition. Readers with this belief needn’t accept this part 
of the argument because they are likely to be more heavily swayed by the main argument 
about the effects of status quo and other biases on our judgments about experience machine 
scenarios. 
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experiments on Nozick’s and the Self scenarios show that this strength might 
be lost if the participants adhered to the stipulations of the thought 
experiments more closely. And this is before the status quo bias has been 
taken into account. 
 
4. Reducing Status Quo Bias 
Assuming status quo bias is interfering with the usefulness of our intuitive 
responses to most kinds of experience machine thought experiments, a further 
question arises: is it possible to create an experience machine scenario that is 
relatively unlikely to elicit responses affected by status quo bias? 
Furthermore, any successful attempt to reduce the effects of status quo bias 
on responses to experience machine scenarios will provide additional 
evidence that they were tainted by status quo bias in the first place. 
How could a thought experiment be designed in order to reduce the 
potential effects of status quo bias? One potential way to mitigate the effects 
of status quo bias is to reduce any oversensitivity to potential losses. 
Evolutionary considerations give us good reason to think that we should be 
loss averse in conditions of uncertainty; losses were probably more 
deleterious to our ancestors’ evolutionary fitness than equivalent gains were 
beneficial (Chen, Lakshminaryanan, & Santos 2006). Based on this 
evolutionary consideration, it is reasonable to expect that the less we know 
and care about someone, the less likely we are to be oversensitive to the risk 
of them losing something. Indeed, this has been demonstrated in several 
experiments. The experiments show that when we make decisions for people 
in conditions of uncertainty our value function for gains and losses becomes 
increasingly flat the less we care about the people we are making decisions for 
(Bloomfield et al. 2006). That is to say that we are more likely to value 
equivalent losses and gains equally, just like an economist’s rational agent 
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would, if we are impartial towards the people we are making decisions for. 
Therefore, I hypothesise that participants will experience less overactive 
imagination, and imaginative resistance to stipulations about experience 
machines, if they are judging the value of the potential lives of someone other 
than themselves. If this hypothesis is correct, then we should expect that we 
are more likely to think that the unfamiliar (and therefore risky) experience 
machine life is going to be a better idea for someone we care less about than 
ourselves; that participants will be more likely to think that a stranger should 
connect to an experience machine than a friend, and a friend more than 
themselves.  
This hypothesis was tested by adapting the Self scenario to create versions 
about people that participants should care about less than themselves. These 
new scenarios involved making the decision about a friend, a cousin, and a 
stranger. All of these scenarios were tested on first year business students at 
the same time as the Self scenario. The Stranger scenario reads as follows: 
It’s 2062 and you are riding a hovertube to town. A stranger sits 
down next to you, introduces himself as Boris, and tells you that 
he has been offered a permanent spot in an Experience Machine. 
Although you would never actually tell Boris your opinion, you 
are trying to decide if you think he should accept.  
You have had a go in an Experience Machine before and 
know that they provide an unpredictable roller-coaster ride of 
remarkable experiences. When in the machine, you still made 
autonomous decisions and faced tough situations, such as 
striving for your goals and feeling grief, but your experiences 
were vastly more enjoyable and varied. You also recall that, 
while you were in the Experience Machine, you had no idea that 
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you had gotten into a machine or that your experiences were 
generated by a machine.  
If Boris accepts the spot, then he would stay in an Experience 
Machine permanently. If he rejects the spot, then he would 
never be offered a spot again. Boris’ life would be the same 
length in an Experience Machine as it would otherwise have 
been. 
 
1) Ignoring how Boris’ family, friends, any other dependents, 
and society in general might be affected, and assuming that 
Experience Machines always work perfectly, what is the best 
thing for Boris to do for himself in this situation?  
 
Tick only one of these options: 
o Boris should accept the spot in an Experience Machine 
o Boris should not accept the spot in an Experience Machine 
 
2) Briefly explain your choice: 
 
The Stranger scenario is very similar to the Self scenario, the only difference 
being that the choice is now about whether Boris, the stranger, should connect 
to an experience machine, instead of participants choosing for themselves. As 
predicted, participants responding to the Stranger scenario were much more 
likely to think that connecting to the experience machine was a good idea 
than those responding to the Self scenario. Over 48% (45/93) of participants 
responding to the Stranger scenario decided that connecting to an experience 
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machine made the life in question better, 12% more than participants 
responding to the Self scenario.77  
The results for the Friend and Cousin scenarios add further weight to the 
hypothesis that status quo bias can be reduced by making the scenario about 
someone the decision-maker cares less about. The Friend scenario makes 
Boris the participants’ (unnamed) friend, instead of a stranger, and the cousin 
scenario makes Boris the participants’ cousin (named Boris). Otherwise the 
scenarios remain the same as the Self and Stranger scenarios. It is reasonable 
to expect that most participants will be more oversensitive to the risk of losses 
to these people in order of how close they are to them, i.e. in the following 
order: themselves, their unnamed friend, their cousin Boris, a stranger named 
Boris. Figure 1 (below) shows the differences in the responses to these four 
scenarios and Table 1 (further below) shows the differences between these 
scenarios, the statistical significance of those differences (calculated using a 
two-tailed Fischer’s exact test), and the Cohen’s d measure of the effect sizes.  
Table 1 also shows that we can only be very confident (about 95% 
confident) that two of the differences between these groups are not the 
product of chance—the differences between the Stranger and Self scenarios 
and the Cousin and Self scenarios. Fortunately, the difference between the 
Stranger and Self scenarios is the most important and the other differences 
still register small effects that are probably not the product of chance. 
 
 
                                                             
77 Using a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe that we can be about 96.5% confident 
that the difference between these two scenarios is not the product of chance (p = 0.035). The 
Cohen’s d effect size between these two scenarios is d = 0.240. 
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Figure 1: Reducing Status Quo Bias in Responses to 
Experience Machine Thought Experiments by Decreasing the 
Extent to which the Decision-Maker Cares about the Subject 
 
 
Table 1: Relative Differences in the Propensity to Report that 
Connecting to an Experience Machine is Better for Well-being 
than Living in Reality in Scenarios with Differences in the 
Extent to which the Decision-Maker Cares about the Subject 
 
Scenarios 
Difference 
in  
Connect % 
Connect #/n  
&  
Connect #/n 
p-value 
(3 d.p.) 
Cohen’s d  
effect size  
(3 d.p.) 
Stranger & Self 11.8 45/93 & 34/93 0.035 0.240 
Cousin & Self 9.7 44/95 & 34/93 0.056 0.198 
Stranger & Friend 7.8 45/93 & 26/64 0.106 0.156 
Cousin & Friend 5.7 44/95 & 26/64 0.146 0.115 
Friend & Self 4.0 26/64 & 34/93 0.376 0.083 
Stranger & Cousin 2.1 45/93 & 44/95 0.223 0.041 
 
It might be argued that it is good to be sensitive to risk, especially in 
important decisions like how to spend the rest of your life. The point of this 
argument is that eliminating sensitivity to risk is not a virtue of my scenarios, 
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but a weakness. On the contrary, experience machine scenarios should be 
designed to eliminate oversensitivity to the risk of losses because the losses 
and gains should be fixed so as to better isolate the relative value of reality 
and how our experiences feel to us on the inside. Furthermore, many of the 
specific kinds of losses envisaged by participants responding to Nozick’s 
scenario (machine failure, loss of autonomy, the experience machine’s 
inability to provide all-important negative experiences, etc.) are either 
specifically ruled out in the scenario or are clearly irrelevant to comparing 
reality with how our experiences feel to us on the inside. 
 
Another potential method for reducing status quo bias is to frame all of the 
options as equally familiar. Nozick’s scenario, and all of my scenarios so far, 
are likely to suffer from the status quo bias because they all frame reality as 
the status quo, and therefore, as a much less risky option. I hypothesise that 
framing both options as equally familiar will produce results that are much 
less affected by status quo bias. This hypothesis was tested by creating a 
version of the Stranger scenario in which neither an experience machine life 
nor a real life was framed as the status quo. The Stranger No Status Quo 
(Stranger NSQ) scenario read as follows: 
A stranger, named Boris, has just found out that he has been 
regularly switched between a real life and a life of machine-
generated experiences (without ever being aware of the 
switches); 50% of his life has been spent in an Experience 
Machine and 50% in reality. Nearly all of Boris’ most enjoyable 
experiences occurred while he was in an Experience Machine 
and nearly all of his least enjoyable experiences occurred while 
he was in reality. Boris now has to decide between living the 
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rest of his life in an Experience Machine or in reality (no more 
switching). 
You have had a go in an Experience Machine before and 
know that they provide an unpredictable roller-coaster ride of 
remarkable experiences. When in the machine, you still made 
autonomous decisions and faced tough situations, such as 
striving for your goals and feeling grief, but your experiences 
were vastly more enjoyable and varied. You also recall that, 
while you were in the Experience Machine, you had no idea that 
you had gotten into a machine or that your experiences were 
generated by a machine. 
Boris’ life will be the same length in an Experience Machine 
as it would in reality. No matter which option Boris chooses, 
you can be sure of two things. First, Boris’ life will be very 
different from your current life. And second, Boris will have no 
memory of this choice and he will think that he is in reality. 
 
1) Ignoring how Boris’ family, friends, any other dependents, 
and society in general might be affected, and assuming that 
Experience Machines always work perfectly, what is the best 
thing for Boris to do for himself in this situation?  
 
Tick only one of these options: 
o Boris should choose the Experience Machine life 
o Boris should choose the real life 
 
2) Briefly explain your choice: 
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As expected, when neither reality nor the experience machine were framed as 
the status quo, participants were more likely to think that Boris should 
connect to an experience machine than when reality was framed as the status 
quo. Over 60% (75/124) of participants responding to the Stranger NSQ 
scenario thought Boris should connect to an experience machine, which is 
12% more than in the Stranger scenario.78 Since the only difference between 
the scenarios was the framing of the status quo, there is good reason to think 
that the main cause of this difference was the reduction of the endowment 
aspect of the status quo bias—the overvaluing of what we have and what we 
know. 
By comparing the Self scenario with the Stranger NSQ scenario, we can see 
a 24% increase in the proportion of participants indicating that they think an 
experience machine life is better than a real life.79 Assuming that the main 
reason for this dramatic increase is a reduction in the effects of status quo 
bias, then we have good reason to believe that scenarios that frame reality as 
the status quo are likely to heavily bias the results in favour of reality. Indeed, 
this result supports De Brigard’s (2010) claim that status quo bias renders 
Nozick’s scenario relatively useless. If the results of my experiment on 
Nozick’s scenario were adjusted to take the likely effects of status quo bias 
into account, nearly half of the participants would have chosen to connect to 
an experience machine. Again, such a result would take away the main 
strength of the experience machine objection to hedonism—the widespread 
                                                             
78 Using a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe that we can be about 97.5% confident 
that the difference between these two scenarios is not the product of chance (p = 0.025). The 
Cohen’s d effect size between these two scenarios is d = 0.243. 
79 Using a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe that we can be more than 99.9% 
confident that the difference between these two scenarios is not the product of chance (p = 
0.000 to 3d.p.). The Cohen’s d effect size between these two scenarios is d = 0.491. 
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agreement that reality is better than a life in an experience machine would be 
lost. 
 
5. The Experience Machine is Dead, Long Live the Experience Machine! 
Assuming that the three main hypotheses put forward so far are well 
supported by the evidence from my experiments, we can explain the three 
main reasons for the difference between the high connection rate for the 
Stranger NSQ scenario and the low rate for Nozick’s scenario.80 Figure 2 
(below) shows the differences in the responses between my main scenarios.  
 
 
Figure 2: Reducing Status Quo Bias and Other Confounding 
Factors in Experience Machine Thought Experiments 
 
 
First, we can see that reducing the impact of irrelevant factors, such as worries 
about loss of autonomy and machine failure, appears to make about 16% 
difference (compare Self to Nozick’s). Second, we can see that making the 
                                                             
80 I say ‘assuming’ here because it is quite possible that I have inadvertently elicited some 
additional biases or other irrelevant factors in my new scenarios that were not existent in 
Nozick’s scenario. 
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choice on behalf of a stranger instead of ourselves appears to make about 12% 
difference (compare Stranger to Self). As was argued, this is presumably 
because we are less irrationally loss averse (oversensitive to the risk of loss in 
conditions of uncertainty) when deciding on behalf of people we care less 
about. Third, we can see that neutralising what was framed as the status quo 
(what we are familiar with) appears to make about 12% difference (compare 
Stranger NSQ to Stranger). Finally, the total difference between the Stranger 
NSQ scenario and Nozick’s scenario is about 40%, a large and very highly 
statistically significant difference. The differences between the scenarios, the 
statistical significance of those differences (calculated using a two-tailed 
Fischer’s exact test), and the Cohen’s d measure of effect sizes for the 
differences are displayed in Table 2 below. 
 
Table 2: Relative Differences in the Propensity to Report that 
Connecting to an Experience Machine is Better for Well-Being 
than Living in Reality in the Main Scenarios 
 
Scenarios 
Difference 
in  
Connect % 
Connect #/n  
&  
Connect #/n 
p-value 
(3 d.p.) 
Cohen’s d  
effect size  
(3 d.p.) 
Stranger NSQ & Nozick's 39.7 75/124 & 26/125 0.000 1.950 
Stranger & Nozick's 27.6 45/93 & 26/125 0.000 0.603 
Stranger NSQ & Self 23.9 75/124 & 34/93 0.000 0.491 
Self & Nozick's 15.8 34/93 & 26/125 0.004 0.352 
Stranger NSQ & Stranger 12.1 75/124 & 45/93 0.025 0.243 
Stranger & Self 11.8 45/93 & 34/93 0.035 0.240 
 
The combination of the large differences between the responses to my 
scenarios and Nozick’s scenario with the higher level of imaginative 
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resistance to Nozick’s scenario provides good reason to think that Nozick’s 
scenario is not the best scenario to choose when trying to argue about the 
relative value of reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside. So it 
seems that Kolber (1994), De Brigard (2010), and Weijers (forthcoming-a) were 
correct in calling for an end to the use of Nozick’s scenario for evaluating 
internalist mental state theories of well-being. Indeed, we now have good 
reason to think that Nozick’s scenario elicits intuitions that are about 40% off 
the mark, and since alternative, less biased, scenarios are available, the use of 
Nozick’s scenario as a knockdown argument against internalist accounts of 
Prudential Hedonism or any other internalist mental state theories of well-
being should be well and truly over. The experience machine thought 
experiment (based on Nozick’s scenario) is dead! 
Which experience machine scenario should be used for evaluating 
internalist mental state theories of well-being then? The Stranger NSQ 
scenario addresses the question of the relative prudential value between 
reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside while making use of 
the memorable, mysterious, and intriguing concept of the experience 
machine. Furthermore, the Stranger NSQ scenario appears to be much less 
affected by the status quo bias and other irrelevant factors than Nozick’s 
version is, and without being much more complicated. All of the existing 
experience machine scenarios, except for the Stranger NSQ scenario appear to 
be non-negligibly affected by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors. 
Therefore, although the Stranger NSQ scenario is possibly affected by some 
confounding factors, we have good reason to believe that it is relatively bias-
free compared to all of the other scenarios. For these reasons, the Stranger 
NSQ scenario should be used, instead of any of the existing experience 
machine scenarios, for investigating the relative prudential value of reality 
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and how our experiences feel to us on the inside. Long live (the Stranger NSQ 
version of) the experience machine! 
 
6. Conclusion and Implications 
So, what could the results of the Stranger NSQ scenario tell us about the 
relative value of reality and how our experiences feel to us on the inside? And 
what should we think about internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism and 
all other internalist mental state theories of well-being? Since 60% (75/124) of 
the participants thought that Boris should connect to an experience machine 
in the Stranger NSQ scenario, we can conclude that there is probably not 
widespread agreement about the relative value of reality and how our 
experiences feel to us on the inside. That is to say that IP2 is probably false; it 
is probably not true that the vast majority, or any kind of majority, of 
reasonable people report preferring reality over a life in an experience 
machine. Recall that the great power of the experience machine objection to 
hedonism (when based on Nozick’s scenario) was that nearly everyone agreed 
that connecting to an experience machine was a bad choice even though a lot 
more enjoyment was offered by a life connected to an experience machine. 
Many people then inferred that directly connecting with reality must be the 
reason for this because reality was the only obvious difference between the 
lives on offer. The results of the new scenarios presented here provide good 
evidence that the widespread agreement about Nozick’s scenario was guided 
at least as much by status quo bias and other irrelevant factors as it was by the 
value of reality.81  
                                                             
81 For evidence of this, compare the approximate 40% change in respondents’ choices between 
my test of Nozick’s scenario and my Stranger NSQ scenario to the proportion of respondents 
to Nozick’s scenario whose main justification for not connecting to the experience machine 
was ‘reality, truth, or something related’—28% (35/125). 
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Therefore, contemplation of the experience machine objection to hedonism 
should no longer give us a prima facie reason for rejecting internalist accounts 
of Prudential Hedonism and all other internalist mental state theories of well-
being. The results of the Stranger NSQ scenario certainly do not provide 
endorsement for any internalist mental state theories of well-being either, 
however. Nearly 22% (27/124) of participants still mentioned that having a 
veridical connection between their experiences and the cause of those 
experiences matters to them. For internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism 
or any other internalist mental state theory of well-being to be true, anything 
that is outside of the internal aspects of our experiences (such as whether they 
are, unbeknownst to us, caused by a machine) has no intrinsic value and 
should not matter to us over and above the positive experiences it might lead 
to. Contemplation of the experience machine, therefore, still produces some 
judgements that constitute evidence against internalist accounts of Prudential 
Hedonism. However, since these judgments are now a minority, they should 
be considered defeasible instead of decisive evidence against internalist 
accounts of Prudential Hedonism and all other internalist mental state 
theories of well-being. Consider what a reworking of the experience machine 
objection to hedonism based on my Stranger NSQ scenario would look like. 
The best explanation for 40% of respondents reporting a preference for reality 
over a life in an experience machine might not be that reality really matters to 
the vast majority of reasonable people, especially if only 22% of respondents 
even mentioned tracking reality as the justification for their choice. 
The important points here are: First, that Nozick’s experience machine 
scenario should no longer be considered to provide conclusive or strong 
evidence that hedonism and all other internalist mental state theories of well-
being are false. Second, that it is reasonable to believe that the experience 
machine objection to hedonism is very unlikely to be true. And, finally, that it 
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might still be true that reality matters intrinsically to the vast majority of 
people, regardless of what people report when surveyed about experience 
machine scenarios. An argument against the plausibility of Prudential 
Hedonism might simply run as follows: 
P1. Reality matters intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable 
people. (Empirical claim) 
P2.  The best explanation for reality mattering intrinsically to the vast 
majority of reasonable people is that reality has intrinsic prudential 
value 
P3.  Inference to the best explanation: If a hypothesis is the best 
explanation of an observation, then it is rational to believe that 
hypothesis is true. (Standard methodological premise) 
C1. Therefore, it is rational to believe that reality has intrinsic 
prudential value. (Modus ponens P2, P3) 
P4.  If internalist Prudential Hedonism is true, then the internal aspects 
of pleasure and pain are the only things of intrinsic prudential value 
(or disvalue) in a life. (Stipulated definition) 
C2.  Therefore, it is rational to believe that internalist Prudential 
Hedonism is false. (Modus tollens, C1, P4) 
 
Of course, P1 and P2 of this argument are debateable. My point is to 
demonstrate that our intuitions about the value of reality might still form the 
basis of an objection to Prudential Hedonism without the need to call on the 
dubious influence of exotic thought experiments like Nozick’s experience 
machine scenario. Having said this, proponents of the argument above would 
probably have to provide some sort of motivation for P1 (reality mattering 
intrinsically to the vast majority of reasonable people) and philosophers find 
it hard not to use thought experiments in situations like this. The findings of 
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this section indicate that it might be methodologically unproblematic to use a 
thought experiment to motivate P1, but that, if we do rely on thought 
experiments to motivate P1, we should be very careful in doing so. Indeed, to 
be somewhat confident that the thought experiment is isolating the right 
prudential value comparison, it should be tested on a sample group alongside 
several other versions of the same scenario with relatively minor tweaks. 
Perhaps, using this approach, will allow for a suitable thought experiment to 
support P1. That thought experiment might even be an experience machine 
scenario, but I doubt it. Based on the discussion about intuitive cognition in 
Chapter 3, it seems that more realistic thought experiments might be better 
suited to this role. 
Another important implication of the results of this section is that the way 
hedonism and well-being are taught in many introductory philosophy classes 
should change. It is common practice, in introductory philosophy classes that 
discuss well-being, to describe Prudential Hedonism and then promply 
dismiss it based on a quick discussion of Nozick’s experience machine. The 
main problem is not that students are inclined away from internalist accounts 
of Prudential Hedonism, and all other internalist mental state theories of well-
being, by the way the experience machine is taught (because there are several 
other fairly good arguments against the plausibility of these theories, as 
discussed in Chapter 1). Rather, the main problem is that students are taught 
that unrealistic thought experiments can constitute knockdown philosophical 
arguments without warning them about the many biases and other irrelevant 
factors that might be affecting our judgements about these kinds of scenarios.  
And, as for the minor problem of swaying the students’ opinion about 
internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism, a natural experiment occurred 
during my tests, which demonstrates the potential influence this kind of first 
exposure to experience machine scenarios can have on philosophy students. 
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About half of the students in my tests of Nozick’s and my Stranger NSQ 
scenarios had not been exposed to the experience machine before and the rest 
had listened to a lecturer discuss it for about 10 minutes. The lecturer made it 
clear that most people decline the opportunity to connect to an experience 
machine and that this shows that internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism 
and all other internalist mental state theories of well-being are probably false.  
There was a statistically significant difference in the two groups’ responses 
to Nozick’s scenario—15% (10/67) of the group who had been lectured to 
about the experience machine would connect to the machine compared to 
28% (16/58) of the group who had not been lectured to about it. Using a two-
tailed Fischer’s exact test, we can be about 97% confident that this difference 
was not caused by chance (p = 0.032). Being exposed to a short discussion 
about the experience machine in a lecture could influence students’ 
judgments by encouraging them to think more deeply about the matter, but a 
more likely explanation for this difference is the combined pressures to agree 
with the majority and with the lecturer (an authority figure). Regardless of the 
reason, these data give us very good reason to think that we should be careful 
how we teach the experience machine because it does seem to make a 
difference to how future philosophers will think about well-being. 
Interestingly, there was not a statistically significant difference in the two 
groups’ responses to my Stranger NSQ scenario; 59% (40/68) of the group 
who had been lectured on the experience machine would connect to the 
machine compared to 63% (35/56) of the group who had not been lectured on 
it. Using a two-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe p = 0.204. And with a 
one-tailed Fischer’s exact test, we observe p = 0.409.82 Therefore, being 
                                                             
82 One-tailed Fischer’s exact tests are to be used when there is no prior reason to expect a 
difference between the two sample groups and two-tailed tests are to be used when there is a 
prior reason to expect a difference between the two sample groups. 
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exposed to a short discussion about the experience machine in a lecture 
appeared to have little to no influence on the Stranger NSQ scenario. Perhaps 
the Stranger NSQ scenario was different enough from Nozick’s scenario to 
avoid the large and statistically significant effect on the choices of the 
participants that responded to Nozick’s scenario after listening to a lecturer 
discuss it for about 10 minutes. 
Instead of misleading students, philosophers would be better off teaching 
how to assess the power of thought experiments as evidence for arguments. 
Indeed, it should be considered a vital component of metaphilosophy and 
introductory philosophy courses. Since the differences in responses elicited by 
Nozickian, reversed, and Stranger NSQ scenarios are so large, the experience 
machine thought experiment (in all of its guises) would be an excellent 
example for this kind of instruction. Long live (all versions of) the experience 
machine! 
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Part 2 
Part 2 of this thesis focuses on practice. In particular, Part 2 is concerned with 
how considerations of happiness can inform certain specific areas of practice 
and also help us to understand what we should do in those circumstances.  
Unlike in Part 1, there is not one specific question that acts as a focal point 
for all of the component chapters in Part 2. Each chapter in Part 2 identifies a 
separate question related to happiness, and none rely on the conclusions of 
the other chapters. Chapter 6 shows how considerations of happiness can be 
useful for guiding us in deciding what to do in a very personal endeavour; 
the quest for the meaning of life. Chapter 7 demonstrates how considerations 
of happiness can help us decide what to do in an extremely public endeavour; 
apportioning the responsibilities to deal with problems likely to be caused by 
rapid climatic change. The Postscript for Policymakers demonstrates how 
general philosophical considerations can help us to decide what to do 
regarding questions about whether, and how, happiness should guide 
policymaking. 
Chapter 6 argues that an optimistic view about scientific and technological 
progress allows for two interesting new theories for the meaning of life 
debate. It also discusses what people with certain kinds of beliefs might want 
to do to achieve true meaning in life. One of these novel theories posits that 
causing there to be infinite happiness can be a way to lead a truly meaningful 
life. The discussion in Chapter 6 is not designed to encourage all readers to 
believe the new theories proposed, rather it is designed to provide a plausible 
option to people with specific existing beliefs about something else they can 
believe to relieve an epistemic tension they might have and to provide a guide 
for how they should live if they were to adopt this further belief. 
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Chapter 7 demonstrates how considerations of human happiness can 
justify why a particular set of distributive principles is the fairest way to 
distribute the burdens associated with adapting to and mitigating the 
potentially devastating effects of rapid climactic change. The main competing 
distributive principles discussed in the philosophical literature on climate 
ethics have often been thought to arrive at the same recommendations when 
applied to the real world. And, generally speaking, they have done. The 
discussion in Chapter 7, however, reveals that how the choice of distributive 
principle is justified can affect the specific policy recommendations that 
result. Based on the considerations of human happiness, Chapter 7 includes 
fairly specific policy recommendations about what governments should do 
about climate change. 
This thesis also includes a Postscript for Policymakers, which is positioned 
after the main conclusion of the thesis. While similar to Chapters 6 and 7, in 
that it is a stand-alone piece of applied philosophy, the Postscript for 
Policymakers is different enough in its method from the rest of the thesis to 
warrant its partial separation from the main chapters. Compared to the other 
chapters (especially Chapters 2 to 7), the Postscript for Policymakers takes a 
much higher-level approach—it seeks to provide general answers to two very 
broad questions—and should be read more as a potential direction for future 
research than a defense of a specific thesis.  
Given its broader scope and different intended audience, the Postscript for 
Policymakers does not include in-depth discussion of all likely objections. The 
two questions addressed in the Postscript for Policymakers are: should 
policymakers use findings from the science of happiness to guide their policy 
decisions, and how can they best do that? The Postscript for Policymakers 
relies in part on a philosophy of social science approach in addressing these 
questions, arguing that some of the claims of social scientists about the science 
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of happiness are not supported by their methods or the results they discuss. 
The Postscript for Policymakers concludes that findings from the science of 
happiness should be used to guide policymaking (with several qualifications), 
and it provides recommendations for how best to do this. 
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Chapter 6 
Theories of the Meaning of Life: Optimistic Naturalism 
and Infinite Happiness 
 
Chapter Summary 
Naturalist theories of the meaning of life are often criticised for not setting the 
bar high enough for what counts as a meaningful life. Tolstoy’s version of this 
criticism is that Naturalist theories do not describe truly meaningful lives 
because they do not require that we connect our finite lives with the infinite. 
Other versions include Naturalist theories not requiring the meaning to be 
objective and not being able to resolve the Absurd—the vast difference 
between how meaningful our actions and lives appear from subjective and 
objective viewpoints. These perceived weaknesses of Naturalist theories 
might cause would-be Naturalists to adopt Nihilism or Supernaturalism, as 
Tolstoy did. This chapter defends a novel view, Optimistic Naturalism, in 
order to refute these criticisms. Optimistic Naturalism is the idea that 
scientific and technological advancement will allow us to lead truly 
meaningful lives through the infinite consequences of our purposeful actions. 
Purposeful actions with infinite consequences are argued to connect our finite 
lives with the infinite in a way that is sufficient to confer subjective and 
objective meaning, and therefore true meaning, on our lives. In achieving this, 
Optimistic Naturalism provides one avenue for resolving the Absurd and 
constitutes a refutation of the criticisms mentioned above.  
Furthermore, the plausibility of Optimistic Naturalism allows for an 
interesting new version of the Utilitarian Theory of Meaningfulness (UTM), 
which holds that a life is meaningful to the extent that it increases utility. My 
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Infinite Happiness Theory of Meaningfulness is shown to adequately defend 
itself against currently unanswered counterexamples to UTM in interesting 
ways. 
 
1. Introduction83 
In the analytic debate on the meaning of life, theories are predominantly 
categorised according to a tripartite taxonomy: Supernaturalism; that more 
than a purely physical universe is required for life to be meaningful, 
Naturalism; that a meaningful life is possible in a purely physical universe, 
and Nihilism; that life cannot be meaningful.84 A major criticism of Naturalist 
theories is that they offer less meaning than Supernaturalist theories. Tolstoy 
was amongst the first to articulate a version of this criticism. He identified the 
inability of Naturalistic theories to offer any kind of meaningful connection 
with the infinite.85 In response to these criticisms, this chapter has three main 
aims: 
1) To explain and argue for the plausibility of a novel Naturalistic 
position for the meaning of life debate, Optimistic Naturalism, and its 
three central principles. 
                                                             
83 A paper based on this chapter has a ‘major revisions required’ judgment from Sophia. 
84 For more background on the debate and the established positions, see any of these useful 
reviews: (Metz 2001; 2002; 2007; 2008). 
85 ‚I understand that< the answer given by rational knowledge was only an indication that 
the answer might be got if the question were< the question of the relation of the finite to the 
infinite. I also understand that, no matter how irrational and monstrous the answers might be 
that faith gave, they had this advantage that they introduced into each answer the relation of 
the finite to the infinite.‛ (Tolstoy 2000, p. 17). 
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2) To argue that Optimistic Naturalism is a counterexample to Tolstoy’s 
criticism on the basis that it is a Naturalist theory that does allow for us 
to meaningfully connect with the infinite.  
3) To argue that Optimistic Naturalism can resolve the tension of the 
Absurd—the vast difference between how meaningful our actions and 
lives appear from the subjective and objective viewpoints. Optimistic 
Naturalism can resolve the Absurd by identifying the objective 
meaning present in subjectively meaningful activities that have infinite 
consequences. 
 
This chapter also has the supplementary aim of showing that if Optimistic 
Naturalism is plausible, then other philosophical debates about the meaning 
of life might be affected. Metz’s (2003a) criticisms of the Utilitarian Theory of 
Meaningfulness are used as an example. 
 
This chapter begins with some background on Tolstoy’s criticism and the 
argument that contemplation of the Absurd causes problems for Naturalist 
theories of the meaning of life. Optimistic Naturalism is then explained and 
argued to be a refutation of these criticisms. The bulk of this chapter is 
devoted to explaining and arguing for two of Optimistic Naturalism’s three 
core principles: Infinite Consequence; purposeful actions that have an infinite 
consequence are sufficient to make a life truly meaningful, and Scientific 
Optimism; continual scientific and technological advancement will allow our 
actions to have infinite consequences. This is followed by a brief discussion on 
how groups with various beliefs should act in light of Optimistic Naturalism. 
Finally, the interesting new version of the Utilitarian Theory of 
Meaningfulness (UTM) that the plausibility of Optimistic Naturalism enables 
is discussed. This new version of the UTM, the Infinite Happiness Theory of 
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Meaningfulness, is shown to adequately defend itself against currently 
unanswered counterexamples to UTM in interesting ways. 
 
2. Tolstoy’s Criticism and the Absurd 
Tolstoy’s criticism of Naturalism arose because he began questioning the 
importance of his actions and the very meaning of his life (Tolstoy 2000). 
Tolstoy was a dedicated Naturalist who became paralysed by what Nagel 
(1986) and others have referred to as ‘the Absurd’—the vast difference 
between how meaningful our actions and lives appear from the subjective 
and objective viewpoints. Initially, Tolstoy thought that his writing and his 
effects on the people around him were making his actions meaningful. 
Subsequent recognition of the Absurd led Tolstoy to reject his subjective 
view—that his actions and life as a whole were meaningful. He came to 
believe that all Naturalistic views entailed that his life, and all the potentially 
meaningful products of his actions, would eventually be destroyed.86 This led 
Tolstoy to conclude that Naturalist theories could not provide any meaningful 
answers to the question of the meaning of life.87 Specifically, Tolstoy was 
looking for a theory of the meaning of life that acknowledged the importance 
                                                             
86 ‚All my affairs, no matter what they might be, would sooner or later be forgotten, and I 
myself should not exist.‛ (Tolstoy 2000, p. 13). ‚You are an accidentally cohering globule of 
something. The globule is fermenting. This fermentation the globule calls its life. The globule 
falls to pieces.‛ (Tolstoy 2000, p. 15). 
87 ‚My situation was a terrible one. I knew that I should not find anything on the path of 
rational knowledge but the negation of life, and there, in faith, nothing but the negation of 
reason, which was still more impossible than the negation of life.‛ (Tolstoy 2000, p. 16). ‚I 
sought in all the sciences, but far from finding what I wanted, became convinced that all who 
like myself had sought in knowledge for the meaning of life had found nothing.‛ (Tolstoy 
1940, p. 23). 
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of connecting with the infinite in a meaningful way, something none of the 
extant Naturalist theories offered.88  
In the end, Tolstoy’s recognition of the Absurd and his disappointment 
with Naturalist theories led him to reject Naturalism and adopt a 
Supernaturalist theory of the meaning of life. He became a Christian of sorts.89 
Indeed, contemplation of the Absurd might be a major cause of dissatisfaction 
with Naturalist theories of the meaning of life. Belief that Naturalism cannot 
offer the things that make a life truly meaningful might lead those who are 
tolerant of supernatural beliefs to opt for Supernaturalism and those who are 
intolerant of them to opt for Nihilism (Boylan 2008; Metz 2008).  
The act of mentally stepping back from our lives allows us to question our 
actions, motives and plans. Many Naturalists believe that from this objective 
viewpoint we can better evaluate how meaningful our actions and our lives 
are. From this once-removed position, we are supposed to be able to see 
obvious truths about what has meaning. We should see, for example, that our 
watching every episode of The Simpsons ten times in reverse to enter the 
Guinness Book of World Records is not as meaningful as lovingly raising a 
family. But, we can step back again. From this twice-removed viewpoint, we 
can see that our subjective standards of evaluation are still being used to 
decide which actions confer meaning on our lives. However, it could be 
                                                             
88 While he was dealing with his dilemma, Tolstoy’s conception of connecting with the 
infinite in a meaningful way involved living forever or creating something that persists 
infinitely (Flew 1963, p. 113). However, Tolstoy’s conception later changed to be explicitly 
supernatural; ‚What real result will come of my life?—Eternal torment or eternal bliss. What 
meaning has life that death does not destroy?—Union with the eternal God: heaven.‛ 
(Tolstoy 1940, p. 50). In his most recent writings, such as What I Believe, Tolstoy stopped 
discussing the infinite despite still discussing the meaning of life (Flew 1963, p. 117). 
89 Tolstoy often used Christian terminology in his later works of non-fiction and studied the 
Gospels extensively, but he also studied several other religions (Flew 1963, p. 116). 
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argued that every reasonable person would agree that lovingly raising a 
family is a meaningful activity.90 Even if this claim about what other people 
would believe is correct, it is not obviously enough to make that action 
objectively meaningful. By taking another step back, we can see that the 
evaluative measure used is still the subjective (and therefore contingent) 
beliefs of humans, albeit in aggregated form. Relevantly similar aliens, or an 
omniscient being, might be able to point out the bias all humans are suffering 
from.  
When we continue stepping further and further back from our subjective 
viewpoint in this way, two notions become salient. The first is that it is not 
clear our actions have the meaning we attribute them. The second is that, even 
if our actions are meaningful, they have a finite amount of meaning. 
Evaluating a finite amount of meaning from a great distance (from the far side 
of the universe, say) makes it seem vanishingly small—virtually meaningless 
from a distant objective viewpoint. Consideration of these two points 
(subjective meaningfulness and objective lack of meaningfulness) puts one 
deep in the grip of the absurdity of natural human existence. Being in the grip 
of the Absurd in this way might encourage would-be Naturalists to scale up 
their quest for objective meaning and adopt Supernaturalism or give up and 
opt for Nihilism. 
According to Optimistic Naturalism, our actions and lives can achieve 
objective meaning by having an infinite consequence. Furthermore, this 
objective meaning can become ‘true meaning’ when coupled with the correct 
subjective states. For Naturalists like the mid-life Tolstoy, who are deeply 
affected by the Absurd, Optimistic Naturalism can provide guidance by 
explaining which actions should be seen as meaningful from both the 
subjective and objective viewpoints. For Supernaturalists and Nihilists who 
                                                             
90 Darwall argues for a theory that operates along these lines (1983, chap. 11–12). 
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wanted to have an infinite consequence, but could not conceive of how to 
achieve it with Naturalism, Optimistic Naturalism explains how this can be 
achieved in a natural universe. For the rest of the Supernaturalists and 
Nihilists, and for the Naturalists who are satisfied with limiting themselves to 
a life that seems meaningful from the subjective viewpoint only, Optimistic 
Naturalism should be viewed as a challenge to their position. To these 
groups, the plausibility of Optimistic Naturalism would mean that they could 
be leading a more meaningful life by following its guidance (in some cases in 
addition to the guidance of their existing beliefs). The implausibility of 
Optimistic Naturalism, however, would also be of interest to these groups, 
since they could use it to demonstrate the futility of arguing for a ‘truly’ 
meaningful Naturalist theory of the meaning of life. 
 
3. Optimistic Naturalism 
Optimistic Naturalism is the idea that scientific and technological 
advancement will allow us to lead truly meaningful lives through the infinite 
consequences of our purposeful actions. Since Optimistic Naturalism holds 
that a meaningful life does not require more than a purely physical universe, 
it is a type of Naturalism. However, Optimistic Naturalism’s detailed account 
of how we can meaningfully connect our finite lives with the infinite stands it 
apart from the existing Naturalist theories.91 If plausible then, Optimistic 
Naturalism provides an avenue for refuting the criticisms of Tolstoy and 
others that Naturalist theories do not provide accounts of the meaning of life 
that are meaningful enough. Optimistic Naturalism also provides us with the 
                                                             
91 The idea that it is in principle possible to meaningfully connect with the infinite in a natural 
universe has been hinted at in the literature (e.g. Metz 2003b, p. 171), but has never been 
discussed in any detail. 
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chance to resolve the Absurd by explaining how some of our subjectively 
meaningful actions could also be objectively meaningful.  
Optimistic Naturalism is based on the following three principles:  
 
Naturalism: meaningful lives are possible in a purely physical universe. 
 
Infinite Consequence: purposeful actions with infinite consequences are 
sufficient to make a life truly meaningful when accompanied by the 
appropriate beliefs. 
 
Scientific Optimism: continual scientific and technological advancement will 
allow our actions to have infinite consequences.  
 
Belief that all three of these principles are true makes one an Optimistic 
Naturalist. Optimistic Naturalism is intended to be a hybrid (subjective-
objective) Naturalist theory. According to objective theories, the amount of 
meaning in a life is determined by factors external to the life in question. This 
meaning-determining role played by external factors in objective theories 
makes it possible for a hypothetical omniscient observer to inform someone if 
he or she is right or wrong about how meaningful their life is. According to 
subjective theories, factors within the mind of the individual are what make 
that person’s life meaningful. Hybrid theories require the union of objective 
and subjective features for a life to be meaningful, as eloquently captured by 
the phrase ‚meaning arises when subjective attraction meets objective 
attractiveness‛ (Wolf 1997, p. 211). For example, a subjective theory might 
make the amount of meaning in a life depend on the extent to which a person 
thought their most important desires were satisfied. A similar objective theory 
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might make the amount of meaning in a life depend on the extent to which an 
objective list of ‘ideal’ desires are satisfied for that person, regardless of 
whether they actually have those desires. A corresponding hybrid theory 
might dictate that the amount of meaning in a life is proportional to the 
number of satisfied desires from the ‘ideal’ list that the person also happens to 
consider important.  
Optimistic Naturalism is a hybrid theory because it requires the following 
subjective and objective elements: the person must believe that having an 
infinite consequence makes an action meaningful, the action must be 
performed with the intention that it could have an infinite consequence, and 
the action must have an infinite consequence. Assuming that a truly 
meaningful life can be defined as one that includes subjective and objective 
meaning derived from the same actions,92 Optimistic Naturalism provides us 
with the chance to lead a truly meaningful life. Theories of what a truly 
meaningful life is, defined in this way, allow us to resolve the Absurd by 
helping us recognise which of our actions are subjectively, objectively, and 
truly meaningful. This definition also helps us to better recognise the different 
types of meaning that a life might accrue and their relative importance. 
According to Optimistic Naturalism then, if a life of someone who believes 
that having an infinite consequence confers meaning includes any actions that 
were intended to and do have an infinite consequence, then that life can be 
considered truly meaningful.  
 
3.1 Naturalism 
Naturalism is the idea that a meaningful life is possible even if all that exists is 
purely physical. In line with the majority of recent analytic work on the 
meaning of life, this chapter assumes, rather than argues, that Naturalism is 
                                                             
92 This is argued for later. 
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independently plausible (Metz 2007, p. 203). A typical assumption made by 
Naturalists is that the meanings available in their accounts of the meaning of 
life are meaningful enough. Not all Naturalists would agree that ‘true 
meaning’ (as defined above) is necessary to achieve a meaningful enough life. 
Some naturalists, such as Taylor (2000), find subjective meaning sufficient to 
make a life meaningful. In order to resolve, rather than dissolve, the Absurd 
and refute, rather than ignore, the criticisms from above, however, a higher 
standard of meaning is required. Since this chapter is designed to refute these 
criticisms, only truly meaningful lives (ones in which subjective and objective 
meaning are correctly aligned) will be considered meaningful enough.  
 
3.2 Infinite Consequence 
Infinite Consequence is the idea that when a purposeful action with infinite 
consequences is accompanied by the appropriate beliefs, that action is 
sufficient to make the life of the actor truly meaningful. Within this broad 
conception of Infinite Consequence, there are three important components. 
First, purposefully performing an action with the beliefs that the action is 
meaningful and that it will have an infinite consequence is sufficient to make 
a life subjectively meaningful. Second, actions with infinite consequences can 
also be objectively meaningful, even from a distant objective viewpoint. 
Third, the correct alignment of subjective and objective meaning can make a 
life truly meaningful. The first two components of Infinite Consequence will 
be argued for. Then, the third component will be stipulated and motivated. 
 
From the subjective viewpoint, how meaningful an action is depends on the 
mental states of the individual. As a result, the subjective viewpoint permits 
practically any action to be seen as meaningful to the actor. Some subjective 
theories of the meaning of life require that actions must comply with a 
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person’s carefully considered or innermost desires to be able to confer 
meaning upon that person’s life (Metz 2008). But even theories with these 
restrictions sanction avid-enough marble collectors to meaningfully use their 
time hunting through second hand detritus at garage sales. Subjective 
theories of the meaning of life are often criticised for allowing such ostensibly 
inane actions to confer meaning. It could be argued that avid marble 
collectors would recognise their hobby as absurdly meaningless if they 
examined it from the objective viewpoint. But many people who spend their 
whole lives absorbed in seemingly fruitless hobbies admit that their hobbies 
seem objectively meaningless and nonetheless continue to find them 
subjectively meaningful. It is precisely this feature of the Absurd that makes it 
so difficult to resolve for some people.  
A more constructive approach to evaluating the meaning of such actions 
draws on the distinction between subjective, objective, and true meaning 
discussed above. If an action seems meaningful to the corresponding actor, no 
matter how objectively meaningless it might be, then it should be considered 
to confer subjective meaning on the life of the actor. Subjectively meaningful 
actions should only be considered truly meaningful, however, if they are also 
objectively meaningful. Assuming this tiered approach to evaluating meaning 
is reasonable, there are few, if any, grounds for arguing against any sort of 
actions being able to confer subjective meaning on people with suitably 
organised mental states.  
The principle of Infinite Consequence stipulates that the coincidence of the 
following three conditions is sufficient to make an action subjectively 
meaningful: the action is hoped to have an infinite consequence, the action is 
accompanied by the belief that it is possible it will have an infinite 
consequence, and the action is accompanied by the belief that it is meaningful. 
Since these conditions are sufficient for subjective meaning (as opposed to 
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being necessary), the principle of Infinite Consequence remains silent about 
other potential ways to achieve subjective meaning.  
Given that attaining subjective meaning in life is usually understood to be 
merely a matter of believing that one’s life is meaningful, the principle of 
Infinite Consequence’s addition of two further sufficiency conditions makes 
subjective meaning harder to obtain. However, the addition of the conditions 
that the action be both purposefully performed and accompanied by the belief 
that the action could have an infinite consequence can be easily motivated.  
The kinds of actions that nearly all of us find subjectively meaningful are 
those that we purposefully carry out with a specific goal or consequence in 
mind. As we teach and care for our children, we hope that they grow up to be 
healthy and happy. We consider putting time and effort into lovingly raising 
children in this way as a particularly meaningful activity. If the intention for 
our actions to achieve that consequence is removed, however, the action loses 
its subjective meaning. If our children happen to grow up to be healthy and 
happy without our purposefully having tried to facilitate that outcome, then 
that aspect of our life seems no more meaningful. Our belief that the goal or 
consequence can be achieved also affects the meaningfulness of the 
corresponding action. Overzealous parenting might seem subjectively 
meaningful to the overbearing parents at the time because the goal of happy 
children appears achievable. When the children turn out to be miserable, 
however, their parents will question if their overzealous actions were as 
meaningful as they thought them to be. 
Something that could make purposeful actions such as these more 
subjectively meaningful is if the intended consequence or goal is increased. 
Imagine an aid worker is making his life more subjectively meaningful by 
purposefully increasing the well-being of those in need. If the aid worker can 
help 10,000 needy people instead of 100, then his actions would be more 
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subjectively meaningful. Now, imagine a young philosopher who considers 
her action of writing a book to be subjectively meaningful because it will 
bring her fame and fortune. The more people who buy and read the 
philosopher’s book, the more subjectively meaningful her action of writing 
the book will be. Those who consider some of their purposeful actions to be 
subjectively meaningful because they achieve a finite goal should also accept 
that having an infinite consequence can be subjectively meaningful. For 
example, if the philosopher’s book becomes a central text in philosophy for 
infinity, then her action of writing it becomes even more subjectively 
meaningful.  
As mentioned, none of this excludes other conditions that might permit 
actions to confer subjective meaning on a life. However, the principle of 
Infinite Consequence is concerned with these specific conditions because they 
can lead to a truly meaningful life. In light of this, Infinite Consequence’s 
stipulation that purposeful actions with infinite consequences are sufficient to 
confer subjective meaning when accompanied by the appropriate beliefs is 
clearly plausible. 
 
More importantly, it is also plausible that a life could be made objectively 
meaningful by containing actions that also convey subjective meaning along 
the lines above. The second component of Infinite Consequence stipulates that 
purposeful actions with infinite consequences are sufficient to make a life 
objectively meaningful. As mentioned earlier, many subjectively meaningful 
actions seem meaningless when examined from the objective viewpoint, 
creating an absurd asymmetry between how meaningful our actions should 
seem objectively and how they actually do seem to us subjectively. Indeed, the 
further we step back from the subjective viewpoint, the more meaningless our 
subjectively meaningful actions become. No matter how far we step back 
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from our subjective viewpoint, however, infinite consequences do not vanish 
into meaninglessness.  
By taking a step back from the subjective viewpoint of the philosopher 
who desired fame and fortune, her goals seem to be idiosyncratic, tainted by 
subjective values, and unlikely to confer objective meaning. Many of the 
existing Naturalist objective theories of the meaning of life seem to have been 
developed from a position only one step back from the subjective viewpoint—
a near objective viewpoint. Consider the following claims about which kinds 
of actions confer objective meaning on a life: actions that maximise friendship, 
beauty, knowledge, and some other goods (Railton 1984), actions that 
promote our rational nature (Hurka 1993), actions that improve the well-
being of persons and sentient nonpersons (Singer 1996, ch. 4) and actions that 
lead us to overcome the fundamental challenges of the time (Dworkin 2000, 
ch. 6). Some of these claims need more detail to be usefully action-guiding. 
Who decides which challenges are fundamental, for example? The accounts 
that are detailed enough stipulate that certain actions, such as promoting 
friendship and beauty, are objectively meaningful. But, by taking more steps 
back, to a distant objective viewpoint, these more-detailed objective theories 
appear to be strongly influenced by subjective values. 
The particular kinds of goals that we strive for will all seem unimportant 
from a distant objective standpoint, their professed significance ineluctably 
stained with subjective values. As we step back, the specific goals and 
subjective values drop away, but the significance of the size of an action’s 
consequences remains. After a few more steps, however, even the 
consequences become vanishing small, all of them except for the infinite 
consequences, that is. No matter how far we step back, no matter how distant 
the objective viewpoint is that we take, infinite consequences will never 
vanish into insignificance. When all the values and finite consequences have 
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disappeared into the distance, actions with infinite consequences remain, 
indelibly influencing future events. Having an infinite consequence is 
objectively meaningful because infinite consequences will always be 
significant, no matter how far we step back. Note that any negative 
implications about other objective Naturalist theories stemming from these 
comments are not intended to suggest that only actions with infinite 
consequences can confer objective meaning on a life. I am merely arguing that 
an action’s having infinite consequences is sufficient to make it objectively 
meaningful in a way that helps combat the Absurd. 
 
The third component of Infinite Consequence is that the correct alignment of 
subjective and objective meaning from the first two components can make a 
life truly meaningful. According to the first two components of Infinite 
Consequence, a purposeful action with infinite consequences can be 
objectively meaningful and also subjectively meaningful if it is accompanied 
by the appropriate beliefs. The third component dictates that if a single action 
achieves both subjective and objective meaning in this way, then it has met the 
sufficient conditions to confer true meaning on the life of the actor. This 
component is definitional in character. As mentioned earlier, some people 
will be satisfied with only a subjectively meaningful life. This third 
component of Infinite Consequence is stipulated, rather than argued for, 
because this chapter is mainly addressing an issue for people who, like 
Tolstoy, are not satisfied with subjective meaning alone. Nevertheless, its 
inclusion will be briefly motivated.  
A person, whose life is only subjectively meaningful, might rightly worry 
whether her actions are actually meaningful or if they merely seem that way. 
This worry could potentially be allayed by external or objective evaluation of 
her actions. When the objective evaluation is negative, then the Absurd arises. 
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If the evaluation is positive, however, then the person can be confident that 
her life is truly meaningful. In this way, true meaning is much better to have 
than subjective meaning alone. Similarly, true meaning is better to have than 
solely objective meaning. Someone whose life was objectively meaningful, but 
was not aware of it or hated that their life was objectively meaningful, also 
lacks something that would make their life more meaningful.  
Even someone whose life was both subjectively and objectively 
meaningful might not have a truly meaningful life, however. Imagine a 
person whose subjective meaning came from objectively meaningless actions, 
and who was disgusted by his actions that were objectively meaningful. This 
person would not be sure that the meaning he experienced from the 
subjective viewpoint was actually meaningful and he would experience 
nothing meaningful about his objectively meaningful actions. This person’s 
life would be more meaningful if his subjectively meaningful actions were the 
same as his objectively meaningful actions. If the objective and subjective 
meaning of this person’s actions were aligned in this way, then he would get 
to enjoy his objectively meaningful actions and be free from the suffering 
caused by his doubt of the authenticity of his subjectively meaningful actions. 
The concept of a truly meaningful life, as defined here, is useful because it 
allows us to acknowledge that the correct alignment of subjective and 
objective meaning is more desirable than the alternatives mentioned above. 
The concept of a truly meaningful life is also useful for identifying a 
theoretical possibility for resolving the problem of the Absurd. Indeed, the 
very situation of comparing the subjective and objective meaning of our 
actions reveals the value of actions that cause those meanings to coincide. By 
valuing truly meaningful actions over the others, the tension between the 
different perspectives of the Absurd can be resolved.  
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To completely resolve the Absurd in a positive way (avoiding Nihilism), a 
plausible theory of how subjective and objective meaning can coincide is 
required. The principle of Infinite Consequence provides such a theory—it 
describes what kinds of actions are sufficient to confer both subjective and 
objective meaning on a life. Recall that, Infinite Consequence is the idea that 
when a purposeful action with infinite consequences is accompanied by the 
appropriate beliefs that action is sufficient to make the life of the actor truly 
meaningful. But what does it really mean for our actions to have an infinite 
consequence? 
 
In the context of meaningful lives for human beings, infinite consequences are 
the results of an action that affect humankind (or perhaps other forms of life)93 
and continue to do so. The consequences need not affect all humans at any 
moment, but need to continue to affect some humans (or perhaps other forms 
of life) as time goes by. The consequences need not be of infinite value in any 
moment of time (if that is possible), such as by making someone infinitely 
happy. The duration of the consequences must, however, be infinite. This 
could take the form of one continuous consequence or many sequential 
consequences. The consequences need not be affecting life constantly for 
infinity; periodic consequences for infinity are sufficient to count as ‘infinite 
consequences’ for the purposes of the principle of Infinite Consequence.  
Note that living for infinity does not, by itself, entail that your life is 
classified as truly meaningful according to the principle of Infinite 
Consequence. Living for infinity would permit performing an infinite number 
of actions, but it does not entail that any of those particular actions would be 
                                                             
93 Consequences for all forms of life that have the capacity to experience truly meaningful 
lives, such as intelligent aliens, may even be preferable to the anthropocentric view presented 
here.  
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truly meaningful. If none of those actions had infinite consequences, then 
none of them would be truly meaningful. Living for infinity does seem to 
increase the chances of performing a truly meaningful action, however.  
With this description of Infinite Consequence in mind, we can see that the 
following purposeful actions can confer true meaning on a life because of 
their infinite consequences and appropriate accompanying beliefs. Imagine a 
musician who considers it a meaningful goal that his music influences 
humankind infinitely. Because the musician believes that his music is 
important, he gains subjective meaning from performing and recording it. If 
his music does in fact influence humankind for infinity, he will also gain 
objective meaning from these actions. Whether the musician’s actions are 
truly meaningful, then, rests most heavily upon the condition that his music 
continues to influence people for infinity.94 Ultimately, the influence his work 
will have on others is something that the musician cannot control. All he can 
do is attempt to make his work as good, and as easily available, as possible. 
Furthermore, even if his music is popular throughout his life, the musician 
will never be able to know if his music will be admired by future listeners for 
infinity. These two elements, striving to achieve some kind of effect on 
something outside of himself and not being able to know for sure if he has 
succeeded, seem apt for a truly meaningful life. At least they prevent two 
potential problems. First, affecting others is not always directly under our 
control, adding some appropriate difficulty and uncertainty to this method of 
achieving true meaning in life. Second, the fact that we cannot know if any of 
our actions will have the right kind of consequences for infinity means that we 
will be less likely to be in the potentially boring position of knowing that we 
have already made our lives truly meaningful and having to struggle to work 
                                                             
94 But note that, since Infinite Consequence sets out sufficient conditions for truly meaningful 
actions, it is possible that the musician’s actions are truly meaningful for some other reason. 
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out what to do next.95 Indeed, lack of certainty about whether we have 
achieved true meaning in our life will motivate us to keep on striving to 
perform meaningful actions. 
Imagine also a scientist who devises a new technology that allows 
humankind to escape a disaster that would otherwise have destroyed all 
sentient life on Earth, such as the supernova of the sun. All of the scientist’s 
forebears, many of the people that she interacted with during her life, tax 
payers who helped to fund her research institute, other past and present 
scientists whose findings were relevant for her learning and her humankind-
saving discovery, and many other tangentially related people have all played 
some degree of causal role in ensuring the on-going existence of all future 
humans. Performing an action with a non-trivial causal role in humankind 
persisting for an infinite period of time is objectively meaningful according to 
Infinite Consequence. However, only those like the scientist, who performed 
these actions with both the purpose of enabling humankind to live on for 
infinity, the belief that the continuation of humankind is a meaningful 
achievement, and the belief that they will be successful, conferred true 
meaning on their lives. 
Both of these examples of how to achieve a truly meaningful life require 
that humankind actually lives on for infinity. If the universe became 
permanently inhospitable due to heat death sometime after the scientist 
helped us avoid the supernova of the sun, humankind would still fail to live 
on for infinity. If humankind does not live on for infinity, then the 
philosopher, the musician, and the scientist all fail to achieve their infinite 
consequences. Since this failure would happen after their deaths, it would not 
                                                             
95 I say ‘less likely’ here because there may be other ways that lives become truly meaningful 
and we might gain true meaning from these other avenues and also come to know that we 
have acquired true meaning somehow. 
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affect the subjective meaning that they experienced during their life. It would 
mean, however, that their actions were probably never objectively meaningful 
and, thereby, probably never truly meaningful.96 The issue of whether it is 
possible for human life (or perhaps other sentient life) to live on for infinity is 
discussed in the next section. 
 
3.3 Scientific Optimism 
The principle of Scientific Optimism holds that continual scientific and 
technological advancement will allow our actions to have infinite 
consequences. In light of the discussion in the previous section, the most 
important facet of adherence to Scientific Optimism is the belief that continual 
scientific and technological advancement will allow humankind (or perhaps 
other forms of life) to live on for infinity. Belief in Scientific Optimism does 
not require the belief in any specific account of how life will come to live for 
infinity. It merely requires the belief that continual scientific and technological 
advancement will make it possible somehow.  
Scientific Optimism will be argued for here because the plausibility of 
Optimistic Naturalism, its usefulness for resolving the Absurd, and its ability 
respond to the criticisms mentioned above all depend on it. If Scientific 
Optimism is implausible, then belief in Infinite Consequence will provide no 
solace to those in the grip of the Absurd. Such people will see a theoretical 
solution to the tension between how meaningful their lives are from the 
subjective and objective viewpoints, but they will also see no physical 
possibility for enacting that solution. 
Scientific Optimism might seem incredibly optimistic because of its 
stipulation that continual scientific and technological advancements will 
                                                             
96 Again, I say ‘probably’ here because there could be some other reason why their actions 
were objectively meaningful. 
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enable humankind to live on for infinity. Readers can be forgiven for thinking 
that science has confirmed as a fact that humankind will eventually be 
annihilated. Indeed, most cosmologists do believe that the universe will be 
unable to support life indefinitely (Starobinsky 2000). The most common 
justification for this belief is the prediction that the universe will continue to 
expand and cool until there is no free energy left to support life. The leading 
alternate theory predicts that the Big Bang and subsequent expansion of 
matter will reverse at some point. If all matter is eventually drawn back 
together, no life is expected to survive this Big Crunch. There are other 
Naturalistic theories about the fate of the universe, however, including some 
with a more optimistic outlook about the chances of humankind’s on-going 
survival.  
 
One live theory in cosmology, Eternal Inflation, predicts that new baby 
universes will always bubble out from our existing one.97 If this theory turns 
out to be true, then the right kinds of technology might enable humankind to 
escape into new universes whenever the existing one was becoming 
uninhabitable and, thereby, live on for infinity.  
Several leading scientists have successfully modelled the theoretical 
possibility of how humankind might intentionally create a new area of 
inflation (usually called a baby or bubble universe).98 Two practical problems 
still stand in the way of creating a useful baby universe in this way, however; 
                                                             
97 Or, perhaps it would be more accurate to say that new parts of the universe are inflating all 
of the time while other parts come to a halt because many physicists use ‘universe’ to mean 
‘all that there is’, and others use it to mean ‘all that there is that obeys this set of physical 
laws’ (Bettini 2005). See Aguirre (2006) for an accessible introduction to Eternal Inflation. 
98 Research on the topic includes: Farhi & Guth (1987), Farhi, Guth & Guven (1990), Fischler, 
Morgan & Polchinski, (1990a; 1990b), Guendelman & Portnoy (1999; 2001), and Sakai et al. 
(2006). 
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the energy required to create them and finding a way to safely travel into 
them.  
To condense the required materials into the tiny space needed to create the 
baby universe would take approximately the total energy output of a galaxy 
(Kaku 2004). While this seems like a prohibitive amount of energy, prominent 
physicist Michio Kaku is confident that we will have the technology to 
harness this huge amount of energy well before the sun envelopes the Earth. 
Even if we could create a baby universe, however, the intense forces involved 
might make it impossible to transport humans into it before it slips out of 
contact with our universe (Kaku 2004). In response to this worry, Kaku 
suggests that we could use additional energy to stabilise the new universe 
long enough for humans or nanobots to enter it. If nanobots could survive the 
transition to a new universe, then they might also be programmed to collect 
and combine the raw materials necessary to create human life. If this or other 
similar processes prove to be physically as well as theoretically possible, then 
repeatedly recreating human life in new universes would allow humankind 
to live on for infinity.  
 
An objection to the possibility of scientific and technological advancement 
enabling humankind to continue to avoid disasters in this way might arise at 
this point. If there is a greater than zero probability that some disaster will 
prevent humankind from surviving in any finite period of time, then a 
disaster definitely will prevent humankind from surviving at some point over 
an infinite amount of time.  This objection does not provide a good reason to 
believe humankind could not live on for infinity. At best it provides a reason 
to think that it is unlikely that humankind could live on for infinity. To see 
why, consider rolling a die; the probability of rolling a six is quite small if the 
die is only rolled once, and if the die is rolled four or five times, then the 
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probability of rolling at least one six is much higher. Notice, however, that a 
robot could roll a die over and over indefinitely and it is possible that a six 
would never come up. In the same way, it is entirely possible that, despite the 
strong odds against it, an unavoidable humankind-destroying disaster never 
occurs even if we survive for infinity. 
Furthermore, there is a good reason to think that the longer humankind 
survives (assuming that we continue to advance science and technology), the 
better equipped we will be to avert potentially humankind-destroying 
disasters. We have seen amazing scientific and technological advancements 
over the past century and the near future promises even more and at an 
increasingly faster rate. Ray Kurzweil and other technologists and 
philosophers predict the future merging of human mind and machine to 
created advanced artificial intelligence (AI+).99 AI+ combines the strengths of 
human intelligence with mechanical hardware’s processing power to create 
intelligence more powerful than anything currently existing. The creation of 
AI+ would most likely result in the law of accelerating returns applying to 
scientific and technological advancement. If this happens, then science and 
technology will increase exponentially and so too will our problem-solving 
power. If scientific and technological advancement is exponential, then 
Scientific Optimism becomes much more plausible. Furthermore, the 
objection that humankind is exceedingly likely to be wiped out by some 
disaster in the very distant future becomes correspondingly less convincing. 
Even if AI+ is impossible to create, and science and technology do not 
advance exponentially, all that is required for Scientific Optimism to have 
some credibility is that science and technology continue to advance quickly 
(something that seems overwhelmingly likely). Mere linear advancement of 
science and technology will be enough for us to avoid local disasters, such as 
                                                             
99 See Kurzweil’s The Singularity is Near (2005). 
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catastrophic climate change or the Earth being consumed by the sun as it 
turns into a red dwarf (assuming that we actually try to survive them). 
Furthermore, the predicted death of our observable universe is potentially 
trillions of years away, leaving plenty of time to find a method for enabling 
humankind to live on for infinity. If humans can progress the output of 
aeronautical science all the way from ‘jumping’ to ‘interplanetary travel’ in a 
hundred years or so, then we cannot sensibly claim to be able to imagine what 
we could achieve in a few trillion years. 
 
Taken individually, any specific theory about how scientific and technological 
progress might allow for us to meaningfully connect with the infinite seems 
(at least at this stage) very unlikely to be true. Indeed, firm belief that Kaku’s 
theory is the way that scientific advancement will allow for us to meaningfully 
connect with the infinite is not plausibly justifiable. To believe in the principle 
of Scientific Optimism only entails belief that scientific and technological 
progress will make it possible for humankind (or perhaps other forms of life) 
to live for infinity somehow. Perhaps Kaku’s theory will turn out to be true. Or, 
more plausibly, perhaps scientific advancement will allow humankind to live 
on for infinity in some other way. There are countless ways in which scientific 
and technological advancement might allow humankind to live on for 
infinity. Considering these myriad possibilities in combination with our 
continually-increasing ability to achieve things that seemed impossible only 
years before, belief in the plausibility of Scientific Optimism is plausibly 
rational (if perhaps a little optimistic). 
Critics might insist that Scientific Optimism is wildly implausible. They 
might claim that belief in Scientific Optimism is irrational because the 
likelihood of science and technology enabling humankind to live on for 
infinity is vanishingly small. But such critics should be wary. Coupled with 
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the fact that no one will ever be able to know if humankind does live on for 
infinity, belief in Scientific Optimism is quite similar to faith in a supernatural 
entity. Two points in response. First, it is not sensible for anyone to claim that 
a logically possible future of the universe is implausible because it is unlikely. 
Given that any number of advances, discoveries, and unexpected events can 
occur in just a few years, predicting the future of the universe contains too 
many unknown variables to be done with any accuracy. Second, given all the 
possible natural and supernatural theories about the meaning of life, belief in 
any one particular theory also requires a leap of faith. Since there are infinite 
possible mutually exclusive theories of the meaning of life, any one particular 
theory only has a vanishingly small chance of being true. Furthermore, unless 
a very surprising advance in philosophy is made, we will never have a way to 
verify if any particular theory of the meaning of life is actually true. 
Considering these two responses, there is no reason to think that Scientific 
Optimism is any less plausible than other logically possible theories of the 
meaning of life. 
If Scientific Optimism is plausible, however, it is reasonable to believe that 
one can resolve the Absurd and achieve a truly meaningful life by performing 
actions that one finds subjectively meaningful and expects to have infinite 
consequences. Belief in the plausibility of Scientific Optimism is required for 
an Optimistic Naturalist to properly resolve the vast difference between the 
meaning their life seems to have from the subjective and objective viewpoints. 
If an Optimistic Naturalist did not consider it plausible that scientific and 
technological advancement will enable humankind (or perhaps other forms of 
life) to live on for infinity, then they might not believe that their actions were 
objectively meaningful. Despite this lack of objective meaning, their actions 
might still seem meaningful to them from the subjective viewpoint, 
potentially leaving them in the grip of the Absurd.  
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4. How to Act in Light of Optimistic Naturalism 
Like Tolstoy did, many Naturalists find contemplation of the Absurd deeply 
distressing. The feeling that he might have been wrong about how 
meaningful his life was, and the worry that his life might have had no 
objective meaning at all, depressed Tolstoy to the point where he felt 
paralysed (2000, pp. 11–12). Any Naturalist who finds themselves worrying 
about the tension between how meaningful their life seems from the 
subjective and objective viewpoints should consider becoming an Optimistic 
Naturalist. If they can find subjective meaning in any actions that could have 
infinite consequences, and if they believe that having infinite consequences 
makes that action objectively meaningful, then they have a theoretical 
blueprint for a bridge that crosses the gap between the subjective and 
objective viewpoints. To resolve the Absurd, however, these Naturalists 
would also have to believe that scientific and technological progress will 
somehow allow humankind (or possibly other forms of life) to live on for 
infinity and thereby provide the materials necessary to make that theoretical 
blueprint a reality. Any Naturalist who takes on these two beliefs, Infinite 
Consequence and Scientific Optimism, becomes an Optimistic Naturalist. 
How then should these new Optimistic Naturalists live in order to achieve 
a truly meaningful life? There are many potential options for someone to 
achieve a truly meaningful life according to Optimistic Naturalism. All of 
these options, however, depend on the person purposefully performing an 
action that has infinite consequences.100 The most obvious options include 
trying to significantly influence the future of humankind for infinity. This 
could be achieved in a variety of ways, including by creating art, contributing 
to existing philosophical or scientific knowledge, and even lovingly raising 
                                                             
100 Again, there may be other options not discussed here because Optimistic Naturalism only 
sets out sufficient criteria for a truly meaningful life, not necessary criteria. 
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children with the aim that they will do the same. In order to achieve these 
infinite consequences, though, Optimistic Naturalists need it to be true that 
humankind will actually live on for infinity. Unfortunately, humankind’s 
infinite existence is something that they could not rationally be sure of. For 
this reason, it would be prudent for any Optimistic Naturalist who finds 
subjective meaning in actively progressing science and technology to focus 
their efforts on just that. Since the objective and true meaningfulness of 
Optimistic Naturalists’ lives depends on humankind living on for infinity, if 
they can help to increase the probability of that happening, then they 
probably should.  
There are many ways for Optimistic Naturalists with different tastes and 
capabilities to contribute to the advancement of science and technology. For 
some Optimistic Naturalists this might mean continuing their research in a 
specific sub-field of physics. For others it could mean focussing on their 
business enterprises and using the profits to establish scientific research 
centres. It may even mean raising children to have a keen interest in science. 
No matter what the style of contribution to the advancement of science and 
technology, all such actions could have infinite consequences by helping to 
enable humankind (or possibly other forms of life) to live on for infinity. 
Furthermore, these contributions to the advancement of science and 
technology could also enable other kinds of actions, such as creating an 
infinitely significant work of art, to confer true meaning on people’s lives. 
In addition to trying to advance science and technology as much as 
possible, Optimistic Naturalists should also consider pursuing other 
compatible Naturalist theories of the meaning of life. Consideration of other 
theories is possible because the principle of Infinite Consequence only 
provided sufficient conditions for true meaning; the conditions were not 
described as necessary or exhaustive. Any additional theories should not be in 
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tension with any of the principles of Optimistic Naturalism, however, and 
should also bridge the gap between the subjective and objective viewpoints 
characteristic of the Absurd. If the other theories do not bridge the gap 
between the subjective and objective viewpoints, then belief in them might 
exacerbate the tension of the Absurd.  
 
Not all Naturalists find contemplation of the Absurd causes them any 
distress, however. Naturalists who are unaffected by the Absurd tend to be 
satisfied with subjective meaning and often consider objective meaning to be 
illusory (e.g. Taylor 2000). Such strict subjective Naturalists should consider 
the arguments for Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism from above. 
If they find them convincing, then it would be rational to adopt Optimistic 
Naturalism in addition to any theories they currently use to guide their 
actions. If these subjective Naturalists do not find Infinite Consequence 
plausible, however, they at least have an idea of how far a theory might have 
to go to bridge the gap between the subjective and objective viewpoints and 
make a more meaningful life possible. 
The plausibility of Optimistic Naturalism will also be important to some 
nihilists. Some would-be Naturalists might have turned to Nihilism after 
contemplation of the Absurd. Like Tolstoy did during his depression, some 
Nihilists believe in the following two claims. First, actions can only be 
rationally considered as subjectively meaningful if they are also objectively 
meaningful. And second, Naturalist theories of the meaning of life cannot 
provide objective meaning. If such Nihilists are persuaded by the arguments 
for Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism, then they should become 
Optimistic Naturalists. If they are not persuaded, then they might find some 
epistemic comfort in the idea that they now have even more reason to think 
that life is meaningless. 
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The plausibility of Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism is also 
relevant to any Supernaturalist who criticises Naturalist theories for not 
offering accounts of a meaningful life that are meaningful enough. Tolstoy’s 
version of this criticism is that Naturalist theories are not truly meaningful 
because they cannot connect our finite lives with the infinite (2000, p. 17). The 
principle of Infinite Consequence reveals the theoretical blueprint for how 
purposeful actions with infinite consequences can in fact connect our finite 
lives with the infinite. Furthermore, the principle of Scientific Optimism 
describes why it is plausible to believe that the blueprint will somehow 
become a physical reality. If Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism are 
plausible, then Supernaturalists would have to cease with the criticism that 
Naturalist theories of the meaning of life do not offering truly meaningful 
lives (at least in the sense of ‘truly meaningful’ used in this chapter). 
 
5. The Infinite Utility Theory of Meaningfulness 
If Optimistic Naturalism is plausible, then other philosophical debates about 
the meaning of life are likely to be affected. For example, the plausibility of 
Optimistic Naturalism allows for an interesting new version of the Utilitarian 
Theory of Meaningfulness (UTM)—the Infinite Happiness Theory of 
Meaningfulness. I show that the Infinite Happiness Theory of Meaningfulness 
can adequately defend itself against Metz’s (2003a) currently unanswered 
counterexamples to UTM in interesting ways. 
In the only recent published discussion of the Utilitarian Theory of 
Meaningfulness (UTM) that I could find, Thaddeus Metz (2003a) presents 
several counterexamples to the utility-based theory. Metz (2003a, p. 54) 
describes the UTM as an objective theory, which claims: ‚A person’s life is 
meaningful just to the extent that she makes those in the world better off.‛ 
This description of the UTM implies that increasing well-being is the meaning 
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of life. Other remarks by Metz (2003a) also imply that, in line with traditional 
utilitarian thought, the UTM would understand happiness as constituting 
well-being. In this manner, the UTM provides an objective account of the 
meaning of life that might capture what some people mean when they claim 
that the meaning of life is happiness. 
It should be pointed out that no defender of UTM has replied to Metz’s 
(2003a) counterexamples. As may become clear, it seems that a direct defense 
of UTM along the lines familiar to normative ethicists—nuanced discussion of 
future consequences, possible definitions of utility, etc.—would be at least 
fairly successful. However, the Optimistic Naturalism-inspired version of 
UTM—Infinite Happiness Theory of Meaningfulness—deals with Metz’s 
(2003a) counter examples in more unusual and interesting ways. So, I will 
discuss how the Infinite Happiness Theory of Meaningfulness avoids Metz’s 
criticisms here. A full defense of the Infinite Happiness Theory of 
Meaningfulness will not be pursued, however, because the purpose of the 
discussion in this section is to highlight a potential use of Optimistic 
Naturalism by showing how its plausibility can affect other philosophical 
debates about the meaning of life. 
 
Infinite Happiness Theory of Meaningfulness: a life is truly meaningful if it 
includes a purposeful action with infinite positive consequences on people’s 
well-being and does not contain any actions with infinite negative 
consequences on people’s well-being (where a purposeful action is defined as 
an intentional action that is accompanied with the beliefs that the action is 
meaningful and that it will have an infinite consequence). 
 
There are several differences between the UTM and the Infinite Happiness 
Theory of Meaningfulness (IHTM), but both are clearly utilitarian in many 
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ways. Most importantly, both theories involve the maximisation of happiness 
or utility. However, the plausibility of Optimistic Naturalism makes 
maximising utility an entirely different endeavour. If Scientific Optimism is 
true, then continual scientific and technological advancement will allow our 
actions to have infinite consequences, including infinite positive and negative 
consequences on people’s well-being. Therefore, in some situations the truth 
of Scientific Optimism entails that maximising utility will require causing 
infinite positive consequences on people’s well-being!  
Metz (2003a, pp. 56–57) labels his first counterexample to the UTM as 
‘Bear’. In Bear a hungry grizzly bear approaches you and a friend. The bear 
will kill one of you. You are a much slower runner than your friend. Both you 
and your friend will have the same net impact on other people’s well-being, 
but if you survive you will enjoy slightly more well-being than your friend 
would if she survives.101 According to UTM, it would be more meaningful for 
you to trip your friend. Metz claims that this result is counter intuitive and so 
counts it as a reason to think that UTM is implausible. Applying the IHTM to 
Bear, however, we can see that it would only be more truly meaningful to trip 
your friend (than to die) if you would subsequently perform a purposeful 
action with infinite positive consequences on people’s well-being (and never 
perform an action with infinite negative consequences on people’s well-being) 
and your friend would not subsequently perform such an action. The result of 
applying the UTM seemed absurd because the gains from the immoral action 
were so limited, but the result of applying the IHTM seems plausible because 
the gains from the immoral act are quite the opposite—they are infinitely 
beneficial.  
                                                             
101 In order ‚to be complete‛, Metz (2003a, p. 57) also adds ‚the bear would find no difference 
in taste or nutrition between you and your friend.‛ 
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Metz (2003a, pp. 58–59) then presents a duo of counterexamples to the 
UTM—‘Humiliation’ and ‘Prostitution’. In Humiliation several people 
experience great utility from denigrating you. Given that you are fairly thick-
skinned and don’t have much else to do, you can maximise utility by allowing 
your humiliators to continue making jokes at your expense. In Prostitution, 
Metz (2003a, p. 59) claims that prostitutes often bring about considerable 
amounts of utility by selling sex and at least some of them must not suffer 
equivalent amounts of disutility. In Humiliation and Prostitution then, the 
UTM will claim that some people in some situations will be able to make their 
life most meaningful by allowing themselves to be humiliated or by selling 
sexual services. Metz (2003a) claims that Humiliation and Prostitution are 
counterexamples to the UTM because it seems that neither of these activities 
can ever make someone’s life more meaningful, let alone be the most 
meaningful action for them in certain circumstances. The IHTM better 
accommodates our intuitions about Humiliation and Prostitution because it 
deems the associated actions as conferring no objective, and therefore no true, 
meaning on a life. 
The ability of the IHTM to better accommodate Metz’s (2003a) currently 
unanswered counterexamples to the UTM, does not necessarily mean that the 
IHTM is a plausible theory of the meaning of life. What the foregoing 
discussion does show is that the plausibility of Optimistic Naturalism can 
affect other philosophical debates about the meaning of life. Furthermore, the 
IHTM warrants further investigation because, since the demise of the UTM, 
there has been no objective or hybrid theory of the meaning of life that has 
been able to satisfactorily resolve the problem of the Absurd while also 
making sense of a claim commonly made by laypeople—that the meaning of 
life is happiness. 
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6. Conclusion 
Optimistic Naturalism is the idea that scientific and technological 
advancement will allow us to meaningfully connect our finite lives with the 
infinite by having an infinite consequence. In this way, Optimistic Naturalism 
provides us with the chance to lead a truly meaningful life. Optimistic 
Naturalism is based on the principles of Naturalism, Infinite Consequence, 
and Scientific Optimism. Most of the arguments in this chapter were in 
support of Infinite Consequence and Scientific Optimism because both must 
be plausible for Optimistic Naturalism to be able to resolve the Absurd and 
refute the criticism that Naturalist theories do not provide accounts of the 
meaning of life that are meaningful enough.  
The principle of Infinite Consequence dictates that a purposeful action 
with infinite consequences can confer both subjective and objective meaning, 
the combination of which confers true meaning on a life. Most importantly, 
actions with infinite consequences were argued to be objectively meaningful 
because, after all subjective values are stripped away by adopting a more and 
more distant objective viewpoint, infinite consequences can still be seen to 
have effects on humankind (or perhaps other forms of life). 
The principle of Scientific Optimism holds that continual scientific and 
technological advancement will allow our actions to have infinite 
consequences, most likely enabling humankind (or perhaps other forms of 
life) to live on for infinity. The plausibility of Scientific Optimism was argued 
for using an example based on the theory of Eternal Inflation and a general 
argument about the unfathomable possibilities of future scientific and 
technological advances. In the end, however, belief in Scientific Optimism 
was argued to require a leap of faith, although not of the kind that would 
make Optimistic Naturalism implausible. 
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It was argued that Optimistic Naturalism refutes a general criticism of 
Naturalist theories of the meaning of life and also Tolstoy’s more specific 
version of this criticism. By explaining the importance and possibility of 
correctly aligning naturally derived subjective and objective meaning, 
Optimistic Naturalism refutes the general criticism that Naturalist theories do 
not provide accounts of the meaning of life that are meaningful enough. 
Furthermore, by explaining how it is plausible that we can perform actions 
with infinite effects, Optimistic Naturalism refutes Tolstoy’s criticism that 
Naturalist theories cannot connect our finite lives with the infinite.  
It was also argued that those who find themselves in the grip of the 
Absurd should adopt Optimistic Naturalism. This was argued on the basis 
that Optimistic Naturalism provides both the theoretical blueprint for, and 
the physical possibility of, bridging the vast divide between how meaningful 
our actions appear from the subjective and objective viewpoints. Advice was 
also given to readers about the implications of Optimistic Naturalism’s 
plausibility for their own beliefs and actions. Most importantly, Optimistic 
Naturalists were urged to focus their activity on the advancement of science 
and technology, assuming they find such activities subjectively meaningful. 
Finally, the assumption that Optimistic Naturalism is plausible allowed 
for the creation of the Infinite Happiness Theory of Meaningfulness, which 
affected a philosophical debate about the meaning of life. It was argued that 
the IHTM could easily accommodate Metz’s (2003) currently unanswered 
counterexamples to UTM and it was suggested that IHTM might deserve 
further investigation.  
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Chapter 7 
Happiness and Climate Change: How Should the 
Responsibilities of Adaptation and Mitigation be 
Shared? 
 
Chapter Summary 
This chapter argues that considerations of happiness lead to the conclusion 
that a sufficientarianism-based hybrid distributional principle is the most 
ethically suitable principle to guide the apportionment of responsibilities to 
deal with the harmful effects of climate change. The proposed principle is a 
hybrid of the Conditional Polluter Pays Principle and the Ability to Pay 
Principle. The hybrid principle is explained in enough detail to be useful to 
policymakers and is defended against potential objections. The sufficientarian 
justification for the hybrid principle proposed here also informs an ability to 
pay objection, which is argued to be problematic for any distribution principle 
that doesn’t prioritise the Ability to Pay Principle. 
 
1. Introduction102 
Without global collective action on climate change, the ominous threats posed 
by a rapidly changing climate are predicted to have catastrophic effects for all 
life on Earth (IPCC 2007). Despite all major governments acknowledging the 
                                                             
102 This chapter is the basis for Weijers, Eng, and Das (2010). 
200 
 
significant role of anthropogenic emissions in producing rapid global 
warming,103 relatively little has been done to reduce anthropogenic emissions. 
Perhaps the best hope for reaching an enduring and widely supported 
international agreement on tackling climate change is to base it on the widely 
agreed upon principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR), 
Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development. This 
principle encapsulates the international consensus that the on-going 
responsibility to protect the global commons is to be shared, though not 
necessarily evenly. In particular, the principle of CBDR highlights that 
industrialised states bear a greater responsibility to address the climate 
change problem because of the pressure they have put on the global 
environment and because of their financial and technological ability to take 
action more easily (Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
1992).104 Unfortunately, serious disagreements remain about how the principle 
of CBDR should be interpreted. If the solution to the looming climate change 
problem does not include an answer to the question, ‘what is the most just 
way to decide what should be done about rapid climate change and who 
should do it?’, then it is unlikely to be an enduring solution. Since justice is 
                                                             
103 In 1992, the United States and 171 other states, 108 represented by their head of state or 
government, participated in the Earth Summit at Rio de Janeiro (where the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development was discussed) and agreed that climate change was being 
affected by human activity (United Nations Department of Public Information 1997).  
104 Principle 7 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development provides the first 
formulation of the principle of CBDR: ‚In view of the different contributions to global 
environmental degradation, States have common but differentiated responsibilities. The 
developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the international 
pursuit of sustainable development in view of the pressures their societies place on the global 
environment and of the technologies and financial resources they command‛ (UNFCCC 
1992). 
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relevant to this problem, philosophers have an important role to play. This 
chapter is a contribution to the on-going philosophical debate about how the 
principle of CBDR can be interpreted in a way that is both fair and amenable 
to the formation of policy. This chapter also demonstrates how important 
real-world problems can be fruitfully analysed from the perspective of 
happiness. 
The extant literature on how to fairly divide the responsibilities of dealing 
with climate change includes several widely-discussed principles of justice.105 
The only current agreement on these principles of justice, however, is that 
none of them distribute responsibilities in a way that is fair to all relevant 
parties, at least when considered individually (Page 2008). This has 
encouraged recent attempts to solve the problem of fair distribution of 
responsibilities by combining the main principles of justice into hybrid 
accounts. The purpose of these hybrid accounts is to take into consideration 
all of the main morally relevant factors and distribute the responsibilities of 
dealing with climate change in a way that is fair to all parties and amenable to 
translation into international policy. 
This chapter follows the general approach just described. First the main 
principles of justice and the standard objections to them are discussed. Then I 
explain the hybrid account defended in this chapter. Motivated by 
considerations of happiness, the hybrid account is primarily based on the 
distributive principle of sufficientarianism. In the context of climate justice, I 
interpret sufficientarianism as the idea that each country should have the 
means to provide a minimally happy existence for each of its citizens. It is 
then argued that sufficientarian considerations give us good reason to think 
that the ‘ability to pay objection’ should be taken much more seriously in this 
                                                             
105 See, for example, Singer (2008), Caney (2005), Shue (1999), Neumayer (2000), Gardiner 
(2004), and Page (1999; 2008). 
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debate. After noting that the proposed hybrid account includes enough detail 
to be a useful starting point for policy makers, it is defended against some 
potential objections. 
 
2. Polluter Pays Principle 
The polluter pays principle (PPP) apportions the responsibility for paying the 
costs of dealing with climate change among the parties who caused the 
climate-changing pollution. On first inspection, the PPP is probably the most 
intuitive way of thinking about the ethics of climate change. The PPP is based 
on the ubiquitous idea that those who cause harm to others should be morally 
responsible for remedying that harm. The most appealing benefit of the PPP is 
that it has the ability to provide the appropriate incentive to prevent polluting 
by directly linking moral responsibility, and the resulting accountability, to 
the kinds of actions that should be discouraged. 
The climate-changing pollution, referred to above, should be taken to 
mean the emitting of greenhouse gases above some agreed upon quota. The 
quotas agreed upon (in the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and at the more-recent climate conference in 
Copenhagen) are all self-imposed and based on a reduction of state’s absolute 
per capita, or per gross national product, emissions relative to some past 
point in time.106 These arbitrary quotas are patently unfair because they fail to 
acknowledge that there is no good moral reason for any distribution of a 
common global good, like the atmosphere, other than an equal share for 
everyone (Singer 2008, p. 671). There is a much fairer method of creating a 
                                                             
106 Singer (2008 p. 671), references Claussen and McNeilly (1998) and says the targets agreed 
on at Kyoto ‚were arrived at through negotiations with government leaders, and they were 
not based on any general principles of fairness, nor much else that can be defended on any 
terms other than the need to get an agreement‛. 
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quota (and one that would do more to reduce the likely catastrophic effects of 
climate change). This method would see the annual amount of total emissions 
considered safe by current United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change (UNFCCC) estimates to be distributed to states based on 
their near-future population trajectory as compiled by the United Nations.107 
If this approach were adopted, then the per capita aspect of this method 
would plausibly result in current and future people receiving their fair share 
of the atmosphere. The use of near-future population trajectories instead of 
actual populations is meant to eliminate perverse incentives for population 
control. 
The PPP produces entirely appropriate results when applied to current 
and future polluting. However, when the PPP is applied to historical emitting 
a problem arises: past polluters, for the most part, were not aware that their 
actions would have harmful consequences. In response to this fact two 
versions of the PPP have emerged. The full liability PPP (FPPP) assigns moral 
responsibility to agents to redress all of the relevant harms they have caused 
even when they were unaware that their actions would lead to such harm. 
The other version, the conditional liability PPP (CPPP) is weaker; the CPPP 
assigns moral responsibility only to those who knowingly pollute or who 
should have known that their greenhouse gas emitting was likely to cause 
harm. Such polluting will be referred to as ‘culpable polluting’. Culpable 
polluting is to be distinguished from non-culpable polluting on the basis of 
whether the polluter can reasonably be held to have known that their 
polluting was likely to cause harm. The moral significance of this distinction 
                                                             
107 However, as Reisinger and Larsen (2010) argue, more thought needs to be given to what 
total amount of atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions is desirable because all amounts have 
different predicted outcomes for the various ecosystems and forms of life on Earth. The 
setting of the ‘safe’ level of total atmospheric greenhouse gas emissions is a moral task that 
deserves greater attention than it has received. 
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ultimately leads to the CPPP being incorporated in the hybrid account 
discussed here, instead of the FPPP. 
Applying the CPPP to the current climate change debate requires a 
method for discerning who can reasonably be held to have known that their 
polluting was likely to cause harm. The most conservative method for doing 
this would be to understand 1992 (when the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development was signed) as the date past which all states should be 
deemed as knowing that emitting excessive greenhouse gases is likely to 
cause harm. By using 1992 as the starting date for culpable polluting, the 
CPPP can satisfyingly deal with the problem of non-culpable polluting. 
However, Page (2008, p. 570) has criticised the use of this fairly recent date as 
the relevant starting point because he thinks it results in ‚harsh treatment for 
the newly industrialised populations and lax treatment of those residing in 
countries of transition‛. To move the starting date further back would 
decrease Page’s fairness concerns but would exacerbate the unfairness to 
polluters who were truly not aware of the consequences of their actions. The 
combination of these two concerns makes it difficult to specify a fair date after 
which states should be deemed as knowing that greenhouse gas emissions 
over a certain level are likely to cause harm.  
The foremost problem for the CPPP is that it fails to designate sufficient 
moral responsibility to adequately address the problem of climate change 
(Caney 2005). A large portion of the polluting was caused before 1992 and the 
CPPP cannot assign the responsibility to deal with that pollution to anyone. 
The resulting insufficient allocation of responsibility might influence some 
readers to favour the FPPP, but the FPPP suffers from the same problem 
(albeit to a lesser extent). Many unknowing and knowing polluters are dead 
and therefore cannot pay to mitigate damage that their polluting will help to 
bring about. The FPPP cannot assign the responsibility to deal with that 
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pollution to anyone else and so the FPPP also suffers from the insufficiency 
problem. 
A common response to this insufficiency problem has been to argue that 
individuals currently residing in states that are primarily responsible for 
climate change should be held morally responsible for pollution that was 
caused by the previous generations of those states. But this intergenerational 
transition of responsibility seems unfair; why should the mere fact that 
someone lives in a country whose previous citizens polluted make them 
responsible for the polluting?  
It might be argued that this intergenerational objection presupposes that 
the relevant moral agents are individuals as opposed to states. A collectivist 
approach to the PPP would view states as the relevant moral agent for the 
current climate change debate, considerably decreasing the significance of this 
intergenerational problem. A collectivist approach to the PPP has some 
intuitive plausibility given that any future agreement the UNFCCC reaches 
will distribute the responsibilities for dealing with climate change among 
states in the first instance.  
Applying this collectivist version of the PPP reveals that, because of their 
relatively long history of greenhouse gas emitting, the developed nations 
have the primary responsibility for mitigating and adapting to rapid climate 
change. These states should pay, on this collectivist version of the PPP, 
because they have caused, and will continue to cause, harms due to the high 
concentrations of greenhouse gases they have released into the atmosphere by 
their historic polluting. Caney (2005) has argued against a collectivist 
approach to the PPP on the grounds that it would be unfair to the current 
citizens of a historically polluting state to have to pay for damages done by 
their forebears. He asks, ‚individuals cannot inherit debts from parents or 
grandparents, so why should this be any different?‛ (Caney 2005, p. 760). 
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Caney is essentially restating the intergenerational problem from above, 
which fails to adequately engage with the rationale of collectivist views. 
As a part of a collective, an individual is usually entitled to some benefits, 
but those benefits come at the cost of certain responsibilities. The entitlements 
of new citizens of New Zealand, by birth or grant, include the benefits of 
social welfare, a public health system, and the freedom to live in a naturally 
beautiful country. However, these new citizens also accrue several 
responsibilities, including abiding by the law and paying taxes. As a rule, the 
responsibilities of being a part of a collective come ineluctably hand-in-hand 
with the benefits. Therefore, individuals who did not vote for the creation of 
the benefits that they are now enjoying (as a part of a collective) should 
understand that with those benefits come responsibilities, and that acceptance 
of the benefits entails acceptance of the whole package. Therefore, while 
citizens of industrialised countries are innocent of historic polluting, the 
collective of which they are a part is not. One may decide to opt out of the 
collective (of both the benefits and the responsibilities), but no one is entitled 
to opt out of the responsibilities only. In short, one can respond to Caney’s 
worries about the unfairness of collective versions of PPP as follows. If 
individuals born into rich countries can make the case that it is unfair to 
require them to pay for harms they did not cause, then individuals born into 
poor, non-polluting countries can make an even stronger case that it is unfair 
that they lack so many benefits enjoyed by individuals of rich countries solely 
because of accidents of birth. A collectivist PPP will not be pursued further, 
however, because both individual and collective versions of PPP are 
susceptible to a different objection (discussed later in the chapter): the ‘ability 
to pay objection’. 
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3. Beneficiary Pays Principle 
According to the beneficiary pays principle (BPP), agents who benefit from 
historic polluting should bear the moral responsibility for dealing with the 
problems caused by that polluting. The BPP easily avoids the 
intergenerational problem because it assigns moral responsibility to those 
who benefit from polluting, regardless of whether they have caused any. 
According to the BPP, the response to Caney’s innocent complainer should 
be, ‘I agree that you did not cause historic pollution, but you have benefited 
from it, and that is why you have the moral responsibility to deal with it’. 
The strongest ethical rationale for the BPP is based on the idea of 
minimising the unearned inequalities that have resulted from historical 
polluting. Unearned inequalities are differences in welfare between agents 
that have come about because of circumstances beyond the agents’ control. As 
it stands, historical polluting has had two main effects: it has damaged the 
global ecosystem, causing the climate to warm rapidly, and it has enabled the 
polluting states to industrialise quickly, causing their current citizens to enjoy 
a higher quality of life. The BPP answers the problem of who should pay the 
costs of mitigating and adapting to the effects of the rapid climate change 
caused by historic polluting, by arguing that it is fairer if agents pay in 
proportion to the extent that they have benefitted. Given that the most 
obvious alternative to this approach involves both rich (benefitting) and poor 
(non-benefitting) states paying equally to cover the costs of dealing with 
climate change, the BPP seems to capture an important moral distinction. 
Many philosophers have criticised the application of the BPP to historical 
polluting on different intergenerational grounds; namely, the non-identity 
problem (e.g. Caney 2005). The non-identity problem as applied to the BPP 
argues that it is impossible for anyone to benefit from historic polluting 
because if historic polluting had not occurred, then different people would 
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have been born (different to the current so-called benefiters). Some responses 
to the non-identity problem have been given (e.g. Page 2011, pp. 423–424), but 
their success is irrelevant to this chapter because (as argued below) the BPP, 
like the PPP, is better rejected on the grounds of the ‘ability to pay objection’. 
 
4. Ability to Pay Principle 
The ability to pay principle (APP) regards states’ per capita production 
capacity (or some other measure of welfare) as the only moral consideration 
in sharing the responsibilities of remedying the adverse effects of climate 
change. The APP requires that all and only those who can afford to pay for 
mitigating and adapting to climate change should pay, and that they should 
pay in proportion to their ability to pay. Adoption of the APP would result in 
the Annex I (developed) states paying for historic greenhouse gas 
emissions,108 which accords with the element of the principle of CBDR that 
calls on developed states to bear more responsibility for dealing with climate 
change because they have the ability to do so.109 
There are several ways to discern a state’s ability to pay and even more 
ways to justify the various methods. I believe that the most promising method 
for discerning a state’s ability to pay is morally justified by the notion of 
sufficientarianism. Sufficientarianism is a principle of distribution which 
holds that benefits and burdens should be shared in such a way that as many 
people as possible (including future people) have sufficient resources to 
                                                             
108 For a list of Annex I states, see UNFCCC (no date). 
109 ‚The developed countries acknowledge the responsibility that they bear in the 
international pursuit of sustainable development in view of the< technologies and financial 
resources they command‛ (UNFCCC 1992). 
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achieve a certain level of well-being (Page 2007).110 A sufficientarian would 
argue that a government’s primary moral responsibility is to ensure its 
citizens have a quality of life sufficient for a reasonable level of well-being. 
Defining a reasonable level of well-being is not a simple task, but 
considerations of happiness can help. 
The potentially catastrophic effects of climate change are not considered a 
problem because they prevent a few happy people from becoming very 
happy. Rather, agreement that action on climate change is required is usually 
motivated by concerns about the millions of people that appear likely to 
experience the opposite of happiness—suffering. These concerns reflect the 
widespread notion that suffering seems more harmful than an equivalent 
amount of happiness seems beneficial. Indeed, the larger disutility of losses 
compared to the utility of equivalent gains in many domains of life is well 
established in economics (e.g. Ding, Charoenwong, & Seetoh 2004). Reflected 
also is the idea that deprivation of the basic physical means for life makes 
happiness next to impossible; when hurricanes destroy homes in areas where 
citizens are uninsured and already on the brink of poverty, suffering becomes 
very likely and happiness becomes a dream for the distant future. People who 
                                                             
110 For more discussion of sufficientarianism, see Frankfurt (1987), Crisp (2003), Page (2008), 
and Shue (1992; 1999). Sufficientarianism might seem similar to egalitarianism and 
prioritarianism, but the three views are not the same. See Page’s (2007) elegant discussion on 
this. An egalitarian views states of affairs as being increasingly just as they make individuals’ 
well-being (or some other good) increasingly equal (and vice versa). A prioritarian sees 
changes in states of affairs as increasingly just as they increasingly prioritise the improvement 
of the well-being of those who are worst off at every iteration of redistribution. A 
sufficientarian views states of affairs as being increasingly just as fewer people reside below a 
sufficient level of well-being. Therefore, in a situation of many unequally rich (but all very 
rich) agents, egalitarians and prioritarians would recommend redistributing the wealth, but a 
sufficientarian would not. 
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have lost their homes, livelihoods, or loved ones score very badly on tests of 
happiness regardless of how happiness is measured.111  
With these considerations in mind, it seems that securing a sufficient level 
of happiness means securing the basic means for life, including housing, 
sustenance, and protecting people’s ability to work and connect with loved 
ones. For practical purposes, a state’s ability to provide these basics for its 
citizens should be measured by its per capita production. Although often 
considered anathema to the newer measures of happiness, measures of 
production have (at least currently) practical advantages over the newer 
measures of happiness; they are relatively easy to calculate and adequately 
reflect a state’s ability to provide most of the goods that increase its citizens’ 
well-being.112 Furthermore, when the happiness of the worst off is being 
considered, the basic physical means for life provide a very reliable proxy for 
happiness, and the traditional measures of production provide a good proxy 
for a state’s ability to provide these basics.  
For practical purposes, the level of per capita production considered 
sufficient to be able to provide these basic goods should be based on 
international agreement. However, the level of sufficient production should 
be far enough above the ‘poverty line’ that malnutrition and preventable 
diseases are not commonplace, and it should also not exceed the threshold 
where per capita real income begins to make little difference to subjective 
well-being.113 This is because further gains in happiness (and further 
                                                             
111 See Diener (2009), Frey (2008), and Graham (2009) for reviews. 
112 In the future, a state’s ability to provide a sufficient quality of life might include 
consideration of its natural and cultural resources, such as pristine wilderness and celebrated 
heritage. The current difficulty quantifying the effects of such non-commercial goods on well-
being prevents their inclusion in measures of sufficiency for now.  
113 Of course, estimating the exact threshold for sufficient well-being is so fraught with 
difficulties that it is probably impossible to get right (Casal 2007, pp. 312–18; c.f. Page 2008, 
211 
 
decreasing of suffering) past this point are no longer best achieved by 
continuing to increase productivity.114 Indeed, once this point is reached, there 
is good reason to believe that people are leading more than a sufficiently 
decent life (based on subjective well-being studies) and also that per capita 
production becomes a much worse proxy for happiness (since the correlations 
between happiness and income continue to weaken past this point). 
Henceforth, any use of ‘APP’ will mean ‘sufficientarian-supported ability to 
pay principle’, unless specified otherwise. 
When a state has a sufficient level of production to provide this level of 
well-being for its own citizens, a sufficientarian would then argue that the 
state has a moral responsibility to ensure citizens of other states, and future 
citizens of all states, can also reach this level of well-being. As noted by Shue 
(1999, p. 542), this responsibility could be either weak or strong, where the 
strong version calls for positive action to assist others below the level of 
sufficiency and the weak version requires only that states are not interfered 
with when attempting to reach the level of sufficiency. For the APP, the 
strong version applies; the ability to pay for preventing the damage that rapid 
climate change is likely to cause creates a moral responsibility to do so. I 
propose that a state’s ability to pay for helping other states deal with 
problems, such as climate change, be understood as the degree to which a 
state’s per capita production exceeds the agreed level of sufficient per capita 
production. Of course, it could be the case that the government of a very 
wealthy state distributes its plentiful goods in such a way that some or even 
many of its citizens are left without the resources required for a sufficiently 
                                                                                                                                                                              
p. 565). However, enough work has been done on this to create estimates that are well-
enough grounded to proceed with. For example, Baer et al. (2007) argue that the minimum 
should be US$9,000 (in 1995 dollars). 
114 Again, see Diener (2009), Frey (2008), and Graham (2009) for reviews. 
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good life. Although I do not wish to trivialise this issue, I set it aside here as a 
matter to be resolved between citizens and their governments. Thus, for 
present purposes, within-state distribution of income does not affect the 
objective assessment of whether a state has the ability to pay for protecting 
the global commons. 
Using the idea of sufficientarianism as the moral justification for the APP, 
it can be seen that if the citizens of a poor state do not have a decent standard 
of living, then that state has no obligation to pay for helping citizens of other 
states. In contrast, if a rich country has the ability to provide more than a 
minimally happy life for its citizens, it is obliged to help pay for the 
prevention of harm to citizens of less fortunate states. A consequence of this 
sufficientarian justification for the APP is that a very poor country, such as 
Bhutan, could start polluting now without incurring any moral responsibility 
to mitigate its greenhouse gas emissions or pay to help others adapt to the 
rapidly changing climate. In fact, this view advocates that Bhutan’s 
hypothetical polluting be paid for by all states that achieve above a certain 
level of production (and to the degree that their relative productions exceed 
this level). Although this consequence might seem unfair, and thereby pose a 
problem for the APP, it actually highlights a benefit of it. The current debate 
about climate change would never have come about if it were not for the 
potentially catastrophic consequences for humans, and the APP is designed to 
minimise the number of people living in appalling and thereby potentially 
catastrophic circumstances. The APP, as defined here, ensures that people 
who are most likely to suffer as a result of rapid climate change are the central 
concern of any agreement on dealing with climate change.115 Focusing on 
                                                             
115 This result nicely reflects several of the principles of the Rio Declaration on Environment 
and Development (UNFCCC 1992). Principle 1 states: ‚Human beings are at the centre of 
concern for sustainable development‛. Principle 5 states: ‚All States and all people shall 
cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable requirement for 
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those who are suffering in this way reflects the moral desire to have as few 
people as possible suffer from the existence of ‘radical inequalities’, which 
Nagel (1977) describes as situations in which there is enough of some good for 
everyone but some parties have much more than enough and others have less 
than enough. 
Although the APP captures one vital moral consideration, it fails to 
address another. In particular, the APP fails to assign fair distributions of 
moral responsibility in the case of rich states with an equal ability to pay but 
differing levels of culpable carbon-emitting. According to the APP, richer 
states’ ability to pay for the costs of mitigating and adapting to climate change 
justifies their doing so regardless of whether they knowingly contribute to the 
problem. The omission of this consideration departs from the original text of 
the principle of CBDR, which ties developed nations’ responsibilities for 
dealing with the costs of climate change to their greater role in producing it 
(as well as their greater ability to pay). More importantly, the failure to 
consider who knowingly created the climate-changing pollution creates 
unfair burdens on equally rich but non-polluting states. 
 
5. Ability to Pay Objection to the Polluter Pays Principle and Beneficiary 
Pays Principle 
Despite its weaknesses, considerations of a sufficientarianism-based ability to 
pay principle highlight an important problem for both the PPP and the BPP. 
                                                                                                                                                                              
sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of living and better 
meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world‛. Principle 6 states: ‚The special 
situation and needs of developing countries, particularly the least developed and those most 
environmentally vulnerable, shall be given special priority. International actions in the field 
of environment and development should also address the interests and needs of all 
countries‛.  
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The ability to pay objection has not been afforded much attention in the 
literature, especially as an objection to the BPP.116 I argue that the ability to 
pay objection reveals how the PPP can unfairly assign moral responsibility to 
some agents without the ability to pay for it and that the BPP can fail to assign 
moral responsibility to some agents that do have the ability to pay for it. 
If the notion of sufficientarianism is taken seriously, then very poor states 
should focus on their primary moral responsibility; the welfare of their 
citizens, and not the welfare of citizens belonging to other states. However, if 
the BPP, or either the individualist or collective version of the PPP, are taken 
seriously, then some currently polluting, but still very poor, states will be 
morally obliged to help much richer states deal with the deleterious effects of 
climate change. According to the PPP, even if a state lacks the resources to 
provide a minimally happy life for its citizens, it must pay for any polluting 
that it does. Indeed, this remains the case even if the polluting is the result of 
efforts to improve the abysmal living conditions of the state’s citizens. As a 
practical matter, no beneficent (or even slightly self-interested democratic) 
government would voluntarily deprive its own citizens of the basic goods of 
life to relieve some richer people from (what is to them) a tiny burden. And, 
more importantly, it would be unfair to obligate such a government to do so. 
Imagine a state that emits greenhouse gases above the accepted per capita 
quota in an attempt to rebuild its capacity to offer basic services to its citizens 
after being ravaged by famine and war. Even if it is currently polluting, it 
would be grossly unjust to require the government of such a state to give 
resources badly needed by its own citizens to some international fund so 
other citizens (most of whom already enjoy a happier life) do not have to 
contribute as much themselves. The injustice in this case arises because the 
                                                             
116 For example, Caney (2005) uses a weaker version of this objection to argue that the PPP 
needs to be supplemented with the APP, but he does not use this to object to the BPP. 
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plight of the very worst off is ignored so that those who are already better off 
can receive some benefit—a clear instance of exacerbating a Nagellian radical 
inequality. 
Another version of the ability to pay objection reveals how the BPP can 
also fail to assign moral responsibility to some agents that do have the ability 
to pay for it and seem equally culpable as other agents who are expected to 
pay. Imagine two states that have the same ability to pay, although one state 
has acquired its ability through historical non-polluting activities and the 
other from historical pollution-causing industrialisation. Let us further 
imagine that the latter state switched over to entirely renewable energy in the 
relatively recent past, and that none of its current citizens have ever produced 
any greenhouse gases. According to the BPP, the historically polluting state 
should bear moral responsibility for mitigating and adapting to climate 
change because it has benefited from greenhouse gas emitting, while the non-
polluting state should bear none. It might be argued that it is fair for citizens 
of such non-polluting states to bear no responsibility to deal with climate 
change because they have neither caused nor benefited from it. However, a 
comparison of these citizens with the citizens of the benefiting state reveals 
that both are equally innocent of polluting and both enjoy unearned benefits. 
In both cases, the polluting and non-polluting actions that led to the benefits 
were beyond the current citizens’ influence. So, in both cases, the benefits the 
current citizens enjoy are unearned. In the same way, neither generation of 
citizens caused the historic polluting (or non-polluting) that may have led to 
the current pollution, so they are equally (totally) innocent of causing the 
pollution. To assign more moral responsibility to the citizens of one state 
because the benefits that they have just happen to have come from historical 
greenhouse gas emitting, instead of some other non-polluting actions, is 
clearly unfair. Why should the citizens of a historically polluting state have to 
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pay more for their unearned benefits when they had an equal (total) lack of 
ability to affect how those benefits came about? 
The PPP and BPP both represent what appear to be important moral 
considerations for the climate change debate; both polluting and benefiting 
from polluting appear to create some moral responsibility to deal with the 
harmful consequences of that polluting. However, it has been argued here 
that the often-neglected ability to pay objection shows us two things.  
First, although polluting states should generally pay, in some 
circumstances they should not have to pay; specifically when they lack the 
ability to provide the material requirements for a minimally happy life to 
their citizens. As a result of this, if the PPP were used to explain the principle 
of CBDR by itself, then the consequent apportionment of moral responsibility 
to deal with climate change might be unfair.  
And second, having benefited from polluting (as opposed to any other 
historical actions of our forebears) is actually not an important moral 
consideration because the sources of our intergenerational benefits are always 
essentially out of our control. This finding reveals that, on the face of it, the 
plausible moral justification for the BPP—that those who benefit from polluting 
have more responsibility to deal with the resulting pollution—does not reflect 
our considered judgements about what is really important in deciding who 
should have to bear the responsibility to deal with climate change. 
 
6. The Hybrid Account 
So far, it has been argued that none of the three main principles of justice 
discussed in climate ethics are without major problems of unfairness. The 
most natural explanation for this is that more than one moral consideration is 
relevant to the issue of distributing the responsibilities of dealing with climate 
change. Thus, it is unsurprising that some authors have offered hybrid 
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accounts that reflect what they believe to be the relevant combination of 
moral considerations for this issue (e.g. Caney 2005; Page 2008). 
The hybrid account proposed here (henceforth the hybrid account) 
combines elements of the APP and conditional liability PPP (CPPP). By 
combining these principles, the hybrid account fits nicely with the dual 
rationale behind the principle of CBDR. Specifically, it matches the only two 
reasons given in the principle of CBDR for why developed states should bear 
the lion’s share of the responsibility to deal with climate change: developed 
states put greater pressure on the environment and they possess greater 
technological and financial abilities to facilitate the mitigation of and 
adaptation to rapid climate change. The hybrid account bears similarities to 
that of Caney (2005), but differs in specific details. Most importantly, the 
hybrid account is justified differently to Caney’s hybrid account. In contrast to 
Caney’s rights-based approach, the hybrid account is informed by 
considerations of happiness and is based on the distributive principle of 
sufficientarianism. Indeed, sufficientarianism is used as the underlying moral 
justification for the inclusion of the APP and the CPPP and for giving priority 
to the APP over the CPPP.  
The main potential problem of rapid climate change is the increased 
numbers of people who will likely lead miserable lives as a result. Bearing 
this in mind, the hybrid account appeals to the APP to ensure those who 
already lack a minimally happy life are not put under more pressure. For 
similar reasons, the hybrid account appeals to the CPPP to encourage much 
lower levels of emissions and, thereby, decrease the chances of catastrophic 
climatic changes that would plunge even more people (especially future 
people) into desperate poverty. 
The hybrid account is also potentially useful to policy makers. Specifically, 
it should be useful as an aid to the fair assignment of responsibilities in 
218 
 
current and possible future situations for both developed and developing 
states. To do this the moral agents to which the hybrid account applies need 
to be states. Although applying the hybrid account directly to individuals is 
theoretically unproblematic, it suffers from obvious practical problems. 
Suffice it to say that arriving at a global agreement on climate change is 
difficult enough when the negotiators are tens of states, let alone billions of 
individuals. 
Given that the relevant moral agents are states, I propose the following 
process for deciding how the responsibilities of dealing with climate change 
should be distributed. First, assess which states have the ability to pay. I 
propose that there should be three broad categories of ability to pay (no 
ability to pay, clear ability to pay, and unclear ability to pay) each of which 
corresponds to a state’s ability to provide a minimally decent quality of life 
for its current citizens.  
States with no ability to pay should not be assigned any moral 
responsibility to deal with climate change because of their overriding 
responsibility to raise the standard of living of their own citizens to a 
sufficient level.  
States that have a clear ability to pay should have to pay for their own 
greenhouse gas emissions above their quota and their share of any remaining 
costs (based on how many other states are in this category and how much 
each of these states exceeds the lower limit of the band).  
States that have an unclear ability to pay should have to pay for their own 
greenhouse gas emissions above their quota, but they should not have to help 
the rich states pay to deal with any outstanding pollution. I propose that 3,000 
international dollars of gross domestic product (purchasing power parity) per 
capita (GDP-PPP-PC) should be the upper limit of the no ability to pay band 
and 7,000 international dollars of GDP-PPP-PC should be the lower limit of 
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the clear ability to pay category.117 States with an unclear ability to pay would 
be those with 3,000–7,000 international dollars of GDP-PPP-PC. For 
perspective, in 2009, the United States’ GDP-PPP-PC was 46,433 international 
dollars, China’s was 6,546 international dollars, and India’s was 2,932 
international dollars (India’s projected GDP-PPP-PC for 2014 is 4,285 
international dollars).118 Although I have set these thresholds according to 
what I believe roughly corresponds to what it takes to provide a minimally 
decent quality of life, a complete justification of these suggested figures 
would require much more research than is available and is certainly beyond 
the scope of this chapter. 
After assessing which states have the ability to pay, the amount of existing 
pollution that has been ‘culpably caused’ (that is, caused after 1992) by each 
state with a ‘clear’ or an ‘unclear’ ability to pay should be gauged. Any agent 
with the ability to pay for dealing with the pollution it has caused must do so 
in full. Any remaining pollution that needs to be dealt with must have been 
created by past generations, the currently very poor, or rogue non-complying 
states. Since neither the dead people nor the poor states have the ability to pay 
for dealing with this pollution, and the rogue states refuse to pay, the 
question arises of who should have to pay for it. 
It might be suggested that no one should have the moral responsibility to 
pay for the outstanding pollution. However, if the precautionary principle 
and the right to development principle from the Rio Declaration on 
                                                             
117 International dollars is a hypothetical currency that has purchasing power equivalent to 
the US dollar at a particular time. A state’s purchasing power parity-adjusted annual gross 
domestic product is a measure of how many standardised baskets of goods that state could 
afford to buy at domestic prices if its total production output for the year were in money. 
Indexing this measure to international dollars allows for rough but meaningful across-state 
and across-time comparisons of how well a state can provide the basics of life. 
118 These figures are from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2009). 
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Environment and Development are adopted,119 it must be concluded that 
someone must pay for the outstanding pollution to avoid the risk of an 
environmental catastrophe that could have devastating effects for billions of 
future people. Assuming, then, that someone should bear the responsibility to 
pay for dealing with the outstanding pollution, a fair method for deciding who 
those bearers should be is required.  
Appealing once again to the idea of sufficientarianism, and more 
specifically to the idea that states that have fulfilled their responsibility to 
raise their own citizens’ welfare to an acceptable standard consequently have 
a responsibility to ensure that all people (including future people) can reach 
this level of welfare, the distribution should be on an ability to pay basis. 
Therefore, after those who can pay for the costs of their own polluting have 
done so, the remaining costs should be distributed between those who can 
afford to pay them (states with a ‘clear’ ability to pay) and apportioned based 
on each state’s degree of ability to pay. These costs should include the cost of 
creating institutions to encourage and, if necessary, enforce compliance of 
rogue states, as Caney (2005) recommends. This method of distribution is the 
fairest because any other method would result in the possibility of the 
governments of the worst-off states in the world having to forego their 
primary moral concern (their citizens’ welfare) for the sake of generally much 
wealthier people elsewhere and in the future (the ability to pay objection from 
above). 
                                                             
119 Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states: ‚In order to 
protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States 
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack 
of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation‛. Principle 3 states: ‚The right to development must be 
fulfilled so as to equitably meet developmental and environmental needs of present and 
future generations‛ (UNFCCC 1992). 
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In practical terms, the hybrid account results in the rich states paying for 
their own polluting and then sharing the costs associated with both the minor 
amounts of polluting caused by rogue states and very poor states and the 
historic pollution that was unknowingly caused by previous generations. The 
sufficiency-based hybrid account gives primacy to the APP over the CPPP. 
This results in the hybrid account deeming it morally permissible for 
undeveloped and developing states to knowingly pollute, but only if that 
pollution is likely to result in higher well-being for their citizens. Because 
undeveloped countries can justifiably prioritise meeting the basic needs of 
their own citizens over the less urgent needs of future people, they can 
knowingly pollute on the hybrid account without incurring the moral 
responsibility to deal with that pollution. 
Contrasting the hybrid account against those that prioritise the CPPP over 
the APP, the main difference between them is that the hybrid account goes 
further to eliminate radical inequalities in the essentials of life between the 
very rich and the very poor. On the CPPP prioritised-hybrid accounts, very 
poor states do not get to fast-track themselves to a minimally good quality life 
for their citizens through rapid industrialisation because that would entail 
polluting above their per capita quota for a time. This goes against Principle 5 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, which encapsulates 
the global agreement to try to eradicate poverty.120 More importantly, though, 
                                                             
120 Principle 5 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states: ‚All States and 
all people shall cooperate in the essential task of eradicating poverty as an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development, in order to decrease the disparities in standards of 
living and better meet the needs of the majority of the people of the world‛. However, 
Principle 2 would endorse a CPPP-APP hybrid account that prioritises CPPP over our 
account. Principle 2 states: ‚States have, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
and the principles of international law, the sovereign right to exploit their own resources 
pursuant to their own environmental and developmental policies, and the responsibility to 
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denying poor states the benefits of rapid industrialisation is unfair because it 
robs their citizens of the opportunity to catch up with citizens of developed 
states (which were not prevented from industrialising in the past). Without 
the chance to rapidly industrialise, undeveloped states will remain 
economically insignificant and continue to be forced to draw the short straw 
on international trade agreements. 
Furthermore, if the hybrid account is enacted, then developed states 
should help developing and undeveloped states adapt and develop so that 
they can meet the basic needs of their citizens without polluting. On the hybrid 
account, the wealthy countries have the responsibility for dealing with all 
outstanding emissions, such as those created by states without the ability to 
provide a minimally good life for their citizens. Therefore, it is in their best 
interest to ensure that they fulfil that responsibility by giving enough 
technology and training to developing countries to provide a strong incentive 
for them to industrialise in a way that creates minimal greenhouse gas 
emissions. This plausible way to fulfil the moral responsibility to deal with 
historical emissions will help to ensure that very poor countries still get the 
welfare benefits of industrialisation and that few if any extra problems are 
created for future people. 
 
7. Dealing with Some Potential Objections 
As discussed above, an implication of the hybrid account is that a very poor 
country could emit greenhouse gases above its per capita allowance and incur 
no moral responsibility to deal with the effects of that emitting. Shue warns 
that:  
                                                                                                                                                                              
ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the 
environment of other States or of areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction‛ (UNFCCC 
1992). 
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If whoever makes a mess receives the benefits and does not pay 
the costs, not only does he have no incentive to avoid making as 
many messes as he likes, but he is also unfair to whoever does 
pay the costs. (Shue 1999, p. 533) 
 
On the first point, the hybrid account allows poor states to make a mess only 
if it increases the well-being of their citizens and it encourages rich states to 
incentivise low pollution-causing industrialisation for the poor states through 
technology transfer. Furthermore, the following stipulation can be added in 
order to enhance both of the above points: ‘poor states are permitted to emit 
greenhouse gases over the per capita limit only if no other means is available 
to increase their well-being for a similar cost’. Most importantly, poor states 
are only permitted to pollute without incurring the responsibility to pay for 
the resulting damage for a limited time (until they can provide a minimally 
happy life for their citizens).  
On the second point, in the situations in which the rich pay for the 
pollution of the very poor they do so (and do so fairly) because of their moral 
responsibility to the people of the world who do not have access to the basics 
for a minimally happy life. This responsibility arises because the ability to 
secure the goods of a minimally happy life for ourselves and for others, which 
the citizens of rich states have, is mainly a product of chance, not 
deservedness. Moreover, these inequalities have been preserved and 
exacerbated to the further detriment of people who happen to be born into 
very poor countries. 
Also mentioned above, Page (2008) has criticised the use of 1992 as the 
year after which states should have known that greenhouse gas emissions 
over a certain level create standing harms. According to Page (2008, p. 570), 
using 1992 results in ‚harsh treatment for the newly industrialised 
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populations and lax treatment of those residing in countries of transition‛. 
Although this creates a problem for the PPP by itself, it is not a problem for 
the hybrid account. On the hybrid account, newly industrialised states are 
likely to have a low degree of ability to pay compared to states that 
industrialised over 100 years ago. So, newly industrialised states will only 
have the responsibility to pay for a fraction of what the more established 
developed states have to pay. Furthermore, if a newly industrialised state 
happens to be as wealthy as the states that industrialised long ago, then they 
should have to pay as much as the more established states because they are all 
lucky enough to enjoy the benefits of wealth that came to them through the 
actions of previous generations (which were completely outside of their 
control).  
As for the states in transition (those that are very close to the upper limit of 
not having the ability to pay), the hybrid account makes it morally 
permissible for them to pollute in order to complete the transition. However, 
they will incur the moral responsibility to pay for dealing with their own 
pollution as soon as they reach the threshold of sufficiency (when they will 
have an ‘unclear’ ability to pay—at 3,000 international dollars of GDP-PPP-
PC). With this in mind, states in transition would be better off accepting 
technological assistance from developed states so they can complete the 
transition in a low pollution-causing manner and not have to undergo a 
comprehensive and costly energy-production transition when they achieve 
the level of production that allows them to provide a minimally happy life for 
their citizens. Therefore, on the hybrid account, states in transition and very 
poor states are assigned less responsibility than developed states, because this 
distribution of responsibilities will help to reduce the most important 
inequalities between states, namely, the unequal distribution of the basic 
goods for a minimally happy life. 
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8. Conclusion 
In this chapter, it has been argued that a hybrid account made up of the APP 
and the CPPP is the best way to interpret the principle of CBDR. More 
specifically, the hybrid account provides the fairest guidance for sharing the 
responsibilities of dealing with climate change. The hybrid account is unusual 
in its prioritisation the APP over the CPPP. This prioritisation stems from a 
distinctive rationale for why the hybrid account on offer here should be 
preferred over each of the individual principles that have been discussed in 
the literature; that rationale was that the most important moral consideration 
in the debate over climate justice is that each government’s primary 
responsibility is to raise its own citizens’ welfare to a sufficient level for them 
to have a minimally happy life. This conclusion was reached after considering 
the importance of eliminating extreme and on-going unhappiness in people’s 
lives and what is required to bring this about. 
The most important practical implication of the hybrid account is that 
undeveloped and developing states can continue to pollute without incurring 
any moral responsibility to deal with the effects of that pollution, as that 
polluting is the best way to achieve the agreed upon level of welfare for their 
citizens. This result is grounded in the conviction that the fundamental 
purpose of the current climate justice debate is (and should continue to be) to 
ensure that a minimally acceptable level of happiness is and will continue to 
be attainable for all people.  
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Conclusion 
This thesis has discussed several distinct theoretical and applied happiness-
related questions and, in doing so, has demonstrated the potential breadth 
and depth of happiness-related areas of inquiry.  
Regarding theoretical happiness-related questions, the aims of this thesis 
have been to elucidate the multifarious definitions of hedonism and to show 
that (contrary to popular opinion amongst philosophers) the experience 
machine objection to hedonism should not be viewed as a convincing 
objection to internalist accounts of Prudential Hedonism or any other 
internalist mental state theories of well-being. 
Regarding the applied happiness-related questions, this thesis aimed to 
demonstrate that considerations of happiness can help us to better 
understand what we might do to pursue a truly meaningful life and to fairly 
distribute the burdens of climate change. Furthermore, in the Postscript for 
Policymakers that follows, philosophical considerations are used to guide 
policymakers in their use of the findings from the science of happiness. 
Taken together, the assorted chapters of this thesis also demonstrate that 
interdisciplinary analyses can help resolve some of the problems that can 
occur when research on an area of inquiry becomes insulated from other 
relevant disciplines. Although many philosophers have investigated research 
from related disciplines at some point, very few are currently making a point 
of taking a fully interdisciplinary approach whenever it is appropriate 
(Tiberius & Plakias 2009, p. 402).121 Particularly for research on happiness and 
well-being—where there is a wealth of relevant research being produced by 
                                                             
121 Dan Haybron, Valerie Tiberius, and Erik Angner are perhaps the only obvious exceptions 
(e.g. Angner 2011; Haybron 2007; 2008b; 2008c; Haybron & Tiberius 2012; Tiberius 2008; 
Tiberius & Plakias 2009). 
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researchers in other disciplines—this mono-disciplinary orthodoxy seems to 
be unfortunate at best and unproductive at worst.  
Part 1 of this thesis, for example, is a sustained analysis of how 
psychological insights and methods can challenge a received belief in 
philosophy that has held sway for nearly 40 years. Indeed, by the end of 
Chapter 5 the psychological insights and experimental methods that I employ 
hopefully make it clear that Nozick’s original experience machine thought 
experiment tends to elicit biased judgements. And this has serious 
implications for the widely-believed experience machine objection to 
hedonism.  
Chapter 6 also demonstrates the usefulness of interdisciplinary analysis. 
Scientific and technological theories from physics and related sciences are 
used to open up new possibilities in the old philosophical debate about the 
meaning of life. The fact that the scientific and technological theories are not 
entirely new gives some reason to suspect that philosophers working on the 
meaning of life might benefit from looking to other disciplines for inspiration 
to enliven their old debates. 
The opportunities for future research on happiness-related questions are 
clearly numerous. And the importance of investigating happiness-related 
questions has not diminished because happiness remains possibly the most 
plausible candidate for an ‚objective, non-instrumental, non-conditional 
good‛ (Moore & Crisp 1996, p. 606). In particular, the application of the 
science of happiness to public policy is an area that will benefit from the input 
of philosophers as well as academics from other disciplines. The Postscript for 
Policymakers includes a discussion of the role that philosophers should play 
in this very important happiness-related area of inquiry.  
One of the main difficulties for future research on these questions will be 
the ability to keep up to date not only with the philosophical work on 
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happiness but also with all of the other research that is relevant to the 
particular happiness-related question under investigation. Still, the 
importance of research on happiness-related questions is unquestionably 
worth the considerable effort required to stay abreast of the current research; 
knowledge about happiness remains both a valuable commodity and 
something that is intrinsically interesting to pursue. Indeed, unlike Darrin 
McMahon (2006, p. xi)—who claims that, at times while writing Happiness: A 
History, he was ‚forced to confront the irony that writing a book on happiness 
might make *him+ miserable‛—I have thoroughly enjoyed tackling happiness-
related questions and hope to continue doing so as long as I am able.  
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Postscript for Policymakers 
The Science of Happiness for Policymakers 
 
Postscript Summary 
With several national governments and multinational organisations 
investigating new measures of progress and well-being to inform 
policymaking, some researchers have called for measures of happiness to be 
among those investigated. This Postscript for Policymakers provides a high-
level tour of this debate. Some objections to the most promising measures of 
happiness are discussed. Given that the intended audience of this Postscript 
for Policymakers is policymakers, and given that this interdisciplinary debate 
is vast in scope, analysis of some of the objections is not nearly as fine-grained 
or thorough as the analyses in Chapters 2 to 7 of this thesis. 
After providing a brief high-level analysis of this debate, it is argued that 
measures of happiness should play an important role in policymaking. 
However, it is also noted that several important obstacles need to be 
overcome before any measure of happiness could play such a role. The 
problems are manifold and will require considerable interdisciplinary work to 
overcome. Nevertheless, it is clear that the importance of happiness should 
make this work a priority. 
 
1. Introduction122 
Traditional economic indicators of progress are widely seen to be insufficient 
as indicators of well-being (Michalos 2011; Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi 2009). Even 
                                                             
122 This chapter provides the basis for Turton (2009), Weijers (2010), and Weijers (2011d). 
Turton was my previous name. 
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if the traditional economic measures of per capita production, income, and 
wealth took all relevant production, income, and wealth into account (which 
they don’t), they would still fail to capture the value of our relationships, 
health, and happiness—all of which are typically viewed as important for 
well-being. Many alternate measures of well-being have been developed over 
the years to address this problem, and governments have slowly incorporated 
some of them into the policymaking process at various stages. Over the last 
few years, the debate about whether happiness should be measured and used 
as an indicator of progress, and to inform policymaking, has intensified. This 
chapter provides a high-level tour of this debate, includes an investigation 
into the severity of the problems of using measures of happiness for 
policymaking, and pays particular attention to measures of subjective well-
being (predominantly survey questions about how happy or satisfied 
respondents are with their lives). 
First, I discuss how we have arrived at the point where using measures of 
happiness is being seriously considered by policymakers. Then I explain the 
most promising methods for measuring happiness. Following this, I discuss 
several important criticisms of these measures. Some are found to be 
misguided, but others are found to be problems that need addressing before 
measures of happiness can usefully be employed by policymakers. The main 
criticisms addressed include: happiness data cannot tell us anything, we 
cannot know what measures of happiness are really measuring, and that the 
wrong kind of happiness is being measured. Finally, I provide 
recommendations for the role that suitably-improved measures of happiness 
could and should play in policymaking and what steps should be undertaken 
to suitably improve these measures. 
This chapter concludes that happiness should indeed be measured and 
used by governments and civil servants to inform policymaking. However, 
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much complex interdisciplinary and international research will be required 
before measures of happiness can fruitfully play such a role. 
 
1.1 Why Measure Happiness? 
The limits of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and Gross National Product 
(GNP) have been recognised by economists, politicians, and others for a long 
time (Michalos 2011). In particular, GDP and GNP have been criticised as 
measures of progress because of their myopic focus on production. These 
measures were never intended to be complete measures of progress, rather 
they were intended to reveal the rate at which the economy was growing or 
shrinking in a country (England 1998). However, the pursuit of economic 
growth has dominated the agendas of nearly all national governments and as 
a result GDP became the main indicator of progress almost by default. Some 
of the problems with GDP and GNP were emotively elucidated by Robert F. 
Kennedy in his famous speech at the University of Kansas in 1968: 
‚But even if we act to erase material poverty, there is another 
greater task; it is to confront the poverty of satisfaction—
purpose and dignity—that afflicts us all. Too much and for too 
long, we seemed to have surrendered personal excellence and 
community values in the mere accumulation of material things. 
Our Gross National Product, now, is over $800 billion dollars a 
year, but that Gross National Product—if we judge the United 
States of America by that—that Gross National Product counts 
air pollution and cigarette advertising and ambulances to clear 
our highways of carnage. It counts special locks for our doors 
and the jails for the people who break them. It counts the 
destruction of the redwood and the loss of our natural wonder 
in chaotic sprawl. It counts napalm and counts nuclear 
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warheads and armored cars for the police to fight the riots in 
our cities. It counts< the television programs, which glorify 
violence in order to sell toys to our children. Yet the gross 
national product does not allow for the health of our children, 
the quality of their education or the joy of their play. It does not 
include the beauty of our poetry or the strength of our 
marriages, the intelligence of our public debate or the integrity 
of our public officials. It measures neither our wit nor our 
courage, neither our wisdom nor our learning, neither our 
compassion nor our devotion to our country; it measures 
everything, in short, except that which makes life worthwhile. 
And it can tell us everything about America except why we are 
proud that we are Americans.‛123 
 
In response to these and other shortcomings of GDP and GNP, economists, 
national statisticians, and interested non-governmental organisations began to 
investigate and measure many other aspects related to progress. In addition 
to broadening and refining the existing range of economic measures, these 
initiatives also led to the collection of data related to individual well-being, 
quality of life, and even happiness. For many years now, academics from 
several disciplines and various countries, and even some civil servants, have 
been increasingly pushing for these new measures of well-being to play more 
important roles in policymaking. And, over the last few years, politicians 
have finally begun to listen. In 2008, French President Nicolas Sarkozy 
chartered the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 
                                                             
123 Transcript of Robert F. Kennedy’s speech is available from: 
http://www.glaserprogress.org/program_areas/pdf/Remarks_of_Robert_F_Kennedy.pdf  
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Social Progress. The Commission, headed by Nobel-winning economist 
Joseph Stiglitz, advised that their report is< 
< addressed, first of all, to political leaders. In this time of 
crises, when new political narratives are necessary to identify 
where our societies should go, the report advocates a shift of 
emphasis from a ‚production-oriented‛ measurement system to 
one focused on the well-being of current and future generations, 
i.e. toward broader measures of social progress. (Stiglitz, Sen, & 
Fitoussi 2009, p. 10)124 
 
The Commission mentions measures of subjective well-being briefly, but 
positively, encouraging national statistical offices to ‚incorporate questions to 
capture people’s life evaluations, hedonic experiences and priorities in their 
own surveys‛ because ‚*m+easures of subjective well-being provide key 
information about people’s quality of life.‛ (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi 2009, p. 
58). The commission’s report seems to have had the required effect on British 
Prime Minister David Cameron, who gave a speech announcing the 
investigation of and subsequent measurement of well-being (including 
subjective well-being) by the British government on 25 November 2010: 
*F+rom April next year, we’ll start measuring our progress as a 
country, not just by how our economy is growing, but by how 
our lives are improving; not just by our standard of living, but 
by our quality of life.125 
                                                             
124 The report is available from: http://www.stiglitz-sen-
fitoussi.fr/documents/rapport_anglais.pdf  
125 Nowhere in his speech does Cameron mention subjective well-being, but the questions, his 
responses, and the related media coverage of the speech reveal that the most important part 
of Cameron’s initiative (often referred to as his ‘happiness agenda’) is his request of the 
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Demonstrating that civil servants can also take the lead on incorporating new 
measures of well-being into policymaking, the Treasuries of Australia and 
New Zealand have independently developed a Wellbeing Framework and a 
Living Standards Framework, respectively (Australian Treasury 2006; 
Treasury 2011). Endowed with the vision of encouraging ‚higher living 
standards for New Zealanders‛ (Treasury 2010, p. 1) since its inception, the 
New Zealand Treasury finally produced the Living Standards Framework in 
2011 to provide guidance on what improving living standards actually 
amounts to (Treasury 2011). The Living Standards Framework outlines the 
importance of human, social, and natural capital in addition to traditional 
economic and physical capital for increasing living standards (Treasury 2011). 
The Living Standards Framework also sets out the role of subjective measures 
of well-being as providing a ‚cross-check of what is important to individuals‛ 
(Treasury 2011, p. 1).  
Surprisingly, supranational organisations may even end up leading the 
way on promoting the use of broader measures of well-being in 
policymaking. In April this year, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly 
will hold a high-level meeting on ‘Happiness and Wellbeing: Defining a New 
Economic Paradigm’. The agenda for this meeting includes the use of 
measures subjective well-being. Indeed, the World Happiness Report 
commissioned for the meeting contains a chapter on The State of World 
Happiness that relies exclusively on research using measures of subjective 
well-being because ‚they capture best how people rate the quality of their 
lives‛ (Helliwell & Wang forthcoming).  
                                                                                                                                                                              
United Kingdom’s Office of National Statistics to start measuring subjective well-being. The 
official transcript of David Cameron’s speech is available from: 
http://www.number10.gov.uk/news/pm-speech-on-well-being/ 
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Far ahead of the UN, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), has identified measures of subjective well-being as 
essential for a complete understanding of well-being: 
For over fifty years, the [OECD] has helped governments design 
better policies for better lives for their citizens< Ever since the 
OECD started out in 1961, GDP has been the main factor by 
which it has measured and understood economic and social 
progress. But it has failed to capture many of the factors that 
influence people's lives, such as security, leisure, income 
distribution and a clean environment< The OECD Better Life 
Initiative allows a better understanding of what drives the well-
being of people and nations and what needs to be done to 
achieve greater progress for all< *T+he OECD has identified 11 
dimensions as being essential to well-being, [including] overall 
satisfaction with life< (OECD 2012).126 
 
Lord Richard Layard is the most prominent proponent of the use of measures 
of subjective well-being, recommending that ‚quality of life, as people 
experience it, has got to be a key measure of progress and a central objective 
for any government‛ (Layard 2011, no page).127 Indeed, Layard has even 
argued that measures of subjective well-being should be the main yardstick 
for public policy because happiness is the most important goal in life for most 
of us (Layard 2005, pp. 224–225). Happiness, Layard claims, is ‚what people 
                                                             
126 The OECD Better Life Index Executive Summary is available here: 
http://oecdbetterlifeindex.org/wpsystem/wp-
content/uploads/2012/02/YourBetterLifeIndex_ExecutiveSummary3.pdf 
127 Similar positions are held by Derek Bok (2010), Ed Diener (2011), and Bruno Frey (2008), 
but none of these authors take the more extreme stance presented by Layard in his (2005) 
book Happiness: Lessons from a New Science. 
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want for their children and for their fellow citizens‛ and thereby concludes 
that ‚the greatest happiness of all‛ deserves to be the ultimate goal of 
governments and policymakers (Layard 2005, pp. 124–125). Layard 
understands happiness as meaning ‚feeling good—enjoying life and wanting 
the feeling to be maintained‛ and believes that the emerging field of 
happiness science has come far enough for us to be able to accurately measure 
this kind of happiness using subjective survey questions about happiness and 
satisfaction with life (2005, p. 12). According to Layard, and many others, we 
should measure happiness precisely because we should be using data from 
those measures to inform policymaking.128 
Given the reasonable assumptions that sustainably, justly, and equitably 
increasing the well-being of people should be at least a very important goal 
for public policy, and given that our subjective judgements about happiness 
are at least a fairly important part of our well-being, it is clear that 
policymakers should at least investigate the practicality of measuring 
subjective happiness. Furthermore, if the citizenry of a democratic state 
demand that its government includes happiness as one of its overarching 
goals, then there is overwhelming reason for policymakers to find a way to 
make measuring happiness feasible.  
David’s Cameron’s pronouncement that subjective well-being will be 
measured in the United Kingdom has been met with many negative and 
positive comments on blog sites, but the wider public seems to support the 
notion that happiness should be measured and the results of that 
                                                             
128 The use of subjective measures of happiness as the only or ultimate criterion to assess 
specific policies or progress in general has been criticised by philosophers and economists on 
many grounds, including most of the traditional philosophical objections to Prudential 
Hedonism (e.g. Hausman 2010; Diener & Scollon 2003; Frey & Stutzer 2007). But see also 
Veenhoven (2010) for a discussion of how the practice of maximising happiness may avoid 
many of these theoretical problems. 
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measurement should inform policymaking. In a 2005 BBC opinion poll, 1001 
participants were asked whether the government's main objective should be 
the "greatest happiness" or the "greatest wealth" and 81% thought that 
happiness should be the main goal (Easton 2006, no page).129 This result 
closely resembles that of a poll taken on The Economist’s website during a 
debate between Richard Layard and Paul Ormerod, in which the motion 
‚new measures of economic and social progress are needed for the 21st-
century economy‛ received 83% of the support from the online audience (of 
unspecified size).130 If these results are representative of popular opinion, 
then, in democracies at least, we should investigate the practicality of 
measuring happiness for policymaking. Furthermore, since happiness is 
ubiquitously understood as being a subjective state, then this means we 
should investigate the practicality of measuring subjective well-being for 
policymaking.  
 
1.2 The Basics of Measuring Subjective Well-Being 
Whether the use of measures of subjective well-being for policymaking 
should be pursued depends not only on how important happiness is to 
people, but also on whether happiness can actually be efficiently and 
effectively measured. Of all the potential methods of measuring happiness, 
only questions asking for survey respondents’ judgment about how happy or 
satisfied they are with their life, are practical on anything but a very small 
scale. I intend online and smartphone surveys to be included in this. And 
                                                             
129 The survey results are available here: 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/nol/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/29_03_06_happiness_gfkpoll.pdf  
130 The audience was well aware that measures of subjective well-being were the new 
measures in question, since that is all that the debaters and commentators discussed. See the 
results of the debate here: http://www.economist.com/debate/overview/204  
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indeed as these methods of surveying are becoming cheaper and more 
accessible, they are being used more and more. Collecting happiness data 
with behavioural measures, such as expert observations, or any of the 
neuroimaging techniques, would be prohibitively expensive. Furthermore, it 
is far from clear that any of these more objective measures are any better at 
capturing how happy someone is than simply asking them. Indeed, the 
success of neuroimaging measures of happiness is sometimes assessed by the 
size of their respective correlations with the participants’ responses to 
subjective well-being survey questions (e.g. Urry et al. 2004). 
Subjective measures of well-being can be global or domain-specific. Global 
measures aim to assess respondents’ judgments of their lives as a whole, 
while domain-specific measures target limited aspects of respondents’ lives, 
such as their work lives or their family lives. Although domain-specific 
measures undoubtedly have their uses, the focus here will be on global 
measures because they provide a better approximation of the term 
‘happiness’ as it is normally understood.  
There is a wide range of global subjective well-being questions, but most 
are subtle variants of general questions about happiness or satisfaction with 
life. For example, the United States’ General Social Survey asks: ‚Taken all 
together, how would you say things are these days? Would you say that you 
are very happy, pretty happy, or not too happy?‛ (Kahneman & Krueger 
2006, p. 6). The World Values Survey asks: ‚All things considered, how 
satisfied are you with your life as a whole these days?‛, and uses a response 
scale ranging from ‚1 (not at all satisfied)‛ to ‚10 (very satisfied)‛ (e.g. 
Inglehart et al. 2008). The subtle variations on these questions usually amount 
to changing the number of points on the response scale or slightly adjusting 
the wording of the question. For example, the World Values Survey also asks 
the following question about happiness: ‚Taking all things together, would 
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you say you are<‛ with a 4-point response scale: ‚Very happy< Rather 
happy< Not very happy< Not at all happy.‛131  
It is widely acknowledged that global subjective well-being questions elicit 
responses that are biased by contextual factors, the wording of questions, the 
order and type of preceding questions, and respondents’ current mood 
(Kahneman & Krueger 2006; Schwarz & Strack 1999). Experiments have 
shown, for example, that contextual factors, such as the weather (Schwarz & 
Clore 1983) and unexpectedly finding a dime (Schwarz 1987), significantly 
affect how satisfied participants reported being with their whole lives. 
Experiments on the variability of self-reported satisfaction with life within 
individuals have demonstrated that people’s reported satisfaction with life as 
a whole changes dramatically over a period of a few weeks. Kahneman and 
Krueger (2006, p. 7), for example, found that 218 women who were 
interviewed twice over two weeks reported life satisfaction scores that 
correlated only moderately with each other (0.59). Such large differences in 
how a lot of these women reported judging their life as whole imply that 
current mood and recent events probably affected their judgments 
considerably.  
Fortunately, large representative samples and careful survey creation can 
avoid most of these problems. Many of these potential biases can be avoided 
because they are random biases that tend to affect different people at different 
times. By conducting surveys on large representative samples, the impact of 
random bias on the usability of the results is considerably reduced. In this 
way, thorough sampling can eliminate the potential bias associated with 
personal variations in mood, and localised variation in important events 
                                                             
131 See the questions for the World Values Survey here:  
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs/articles/folder_published/survey_2005/files/WVSQu
est_RootVers.pdf  
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(sports teams winning etc.) and the weather. Variability caused by the 
weather can also be reduced by getting participants to acknowledge the 
weather before completing the survey (Schwarz & Clore 1983). The effects of 
recent events and participants’ current mood can also be reduced by using a 
battery of questions about satisfaction with life, instead of just one question 
(Lucas, Diener, & Suh 1996; Schimmack & Oishi 2005). In order to prevent the 
significant (but usually small) effect specific questions have on subsequent 
responses to the more important global questions, researchers usually put 
global questions first on their surveys (Schimmack & Oishi 2005). Finally, the 
different results that different wordings of subjective well-being questions 
produce is a complex issue that is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
2. Johns and Ormerod’s Criticisms of Using Measures of Subjective Well-
Being to Inform Policymaking 
Many criticisms have been levelled at the use of happiness science to inform 
policy and the most pertinent will be discussed here. In a recent article, Helen 
Johns and Paul Ormerod make the strong claim that ‚time series data on 
happiness tells us nothing‛ and that it should not be used to inform 
policymaking (Johns & Ormerod 2008, p. 140).132 Their argument is based on 
three main points: that statistically significant correlations between time series 
happiness data and other important socioeconomic indicators cannot be 
found, that the nature of happiness scales makes them insensitive and 
difficult to compare to most other economic data, and that using time series 
happiness data for policymaking creates several undesirable problems. These 
three criticisms are discussed in this section. 
 
                                                             
132 By ‘time series data’, Johns and Ormerod (2008) mean a collection of answers to the same 
set of happiness survey questions asked periodically over time. 
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2.1 Is There a Relationship Between Happiness and Other Variables that We Would 
Expect to Observe a Relationship Between? 
Johns and Ormerod (2008) begin by criticising the argument: ‘If there is no 
correlation between economic growth and happiness, then economic growth 
must not bring happiness’. Johns and Ormerod (2008) then point to six major 
social trends that should have affected average happiness through recent 
history, but (according to them) have not done so. Johns and Ormerod (2008) 
argue that happiness researchers should admit that either no government’s 
actions since World War Two have ever affected their citizens’ happiness or 
that time series happiness data is completely useless. Their implication is that 
the first option is untenable, leaving us no choice but to agree that the 
happiness data must be useless. 
Considering that some of the six social trends that Johns and Ormerod 
(2008) point out are expected to increase happiness, and the others decrease it, 
it is hardly surprising that relationships between any of these individual 
trends and average happiness over time are not obvious in correlative 
analyses that do not control for the other social trends! Most economists who 
study happiness do not make crude arguments like the one criticised by Johns 
and Ormerod (2008) above. Rather, unexpected findings are usually posed as 
questions inviting further investigation (e.g. ‘why does it appear that a 
considerable increase in real income has not made United States citizens any 
happier over the last 50 years?’). These investigations often use multivariate 
regression analyses and control for the other factors known to be, or 
suspected of being, related to happiness in order to isolate the effects of the 
variables that are being studied. When studies comparing societal trends to 
happiness are carried out in this manner, like those discussed below, 
statistically significant relationships are discovered. 
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Johns and Ormerod (2008) show evidence for a statistically insignificant 
relationship between income inequality and well-being in the United States 
over the last 30 years, but fail to mention the results that do show a significant 
relationship between income inequality (using the same measure) and 
happiness in Europe during the same time period. In Europe, rising income 
inequality significantly explains a small amount of the variation in reported 
happiness; income inequality generally made Europeans less happy (Alesina, 
Di Tella, & MacCulloch 2004). Why the difference between the results from 
Europe and the United States? Economist Bruno Frey (2008, pp. 57–58) puts it 
down to United States citizens’ greater belief in social mobility; they don’t 
mind the inequality because they (mostly mistakenly) believe that they will be 
one of the rich folk in the near future. 
Johns and Ormerod (2008) believe that the best explanation for the 
supposed lack of correlation between happiness and these socioeconomic 
indicators is that, in its current state, the happiness data is simply not worth 
the paper that it’s printed on. The fact of the matter is, however, that 
statistically significant relationships between reported happiness and many 
other socio-political factors have been discovered in careful studies that 
properly isolate the variables in question (Dolan, Peasgood, & White 2008; e.g. 
e.g. Frey 2008). Nevertheless, Johns and Ormerod’s two main criticisms of the 
construction of happiness scales (why they think the data is not worth 
anything) will now be addressed. 
 
2.2 Are Happiness Scales Insensitive and Too Hard to Compare with Other Economic 
Measures? 
There is some legitimacy to Johns and Ormerod’s (2008) claim that time series 
happiness data is insensitive, but much of their argument is misleading on 
245 
 
this point.133 Johns and Ormerod (2008) give the example of a 3-point scale 
and then proceed to discuss how insensitive scales with only three options 
are. First of all, many happiness scales have four or more options, like the 
example above from the World Values Survey, and many subjective well-
being scales have ten or eleven options.134  
Secondly, Johns and Ormerod (2008, p. 141) assert that to observe a 10% 
increase from 2.2 in average happiness on a 3-point scale, 22% (net) of a 
population would have to place themselves in a higher category, an increase 
that they consider ‚very difficult‛ to imagine occurring over ‚a few years‛.135 
Well, they are not the only ones. An enduring 10% increase in happiness is a 
lot to ask for in a few years, regardless of the scale used. On a 4-point scale 30% 
of respondents would have to judge themselves as a category happier and on 
a 10-point scale 90% would have to go up a category or 22.5% would have to 
go up four categories. Naturally, the gap between categories gets smaller as 
                                                             
133 A statistical measure of a dependant phenomenon can be said to be insensitive if its results 
do not demonstrate statistically significant changes in response to changes of input variables 
that we have good reason to believe should effect a statistically significant change in the 
dependant phenomenon. 
134 See, for example, the life satisfaction question from the World Values Survey (question 
V22). See <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/> for more information and access to the full 
data set. See also the well-being questions used in the Gallup World Poll (Gallup Inc. 2008, p. 
5). Gallup World Poll questions are available from: 
<http://media.gallup.com/dataviz/www/WP_Questions_WHITE.pdf>. 
135 It should be noted that another way to interpret the data suggests a smaller increase. It 
would take 22% of a population to change if a 10% increase in happiness meant multiplying 
the current average of 2.2 by 1.1 (which equals 2.42). But consider that the average comes 
from a scale limited to values between 1.0 and 3.0. The accessible part of the scale can be split 
into 10 equal portions of 0.2. This clearly indicates that a 10% movement on the scale would 
increase the average from 2.2 to 2.4, which would only require 20% of respondents to opt for 
a higher happiness category. 
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the number of them to choose between gets larger, but the proportion of 
respondents required to report higher happiness increases too. With 3-point 
scales, researchers simply have to pay more attention to smaller changes in 
the average value—thank goodness for decimal places! 
Despite being hard to imagine, a 10% increase in average reported 
happiness (on 4-point scales) has actually occurred in some countries over just 
a few years, including Lithuania (1997–1999), Mexico (1996–2000), and 
Slovenia (1992–1995). Furthermore, since 1980 at least 21 countries have 
reported a 10% or more increase in happiness over longer periods of time, 
including Johns and Ormerod’s home country of Great Britain (1998–2006) 
(Ingleheart et al. 2008). In light of these results, the claim that time-series 
happiness data is too insensitive to capture trends is totally unfounded. 
Having said this, the general consensus in the psychological community is 
that 3-point scales are not ideal for measuring well-being (Cummins & 
Gullone 2002). Fortunately, measures of happiness, and especially of 
subjective well-being more generally, are increasingly using much more 
precise and robust measures, such as the Subjective Well-Being construct used 
by Inglehart and colleagues, which combines a 4-point happiness scale and a 
10-point life satisfaction scale (Ingleheart et al.  2008), and the 4-question 
Satisfaction With Life Scale of Ed Diener and colleagues (Diener et al. 1985). 
Johns and Ormerod’s (2008) other criticism of happiness scales is that the 
type of data they produce is not easily comparable to most of the data that 
economists use because happiness scales are discrete and bounded. They are 
correct that data from discrete scales can be difficult to fruitfully compare 
with non-discrete data. This is because it is harder to find statistically 
significant results in such comparisons. However, this problem is one faced 
by data from many non-happiness-related domains, most of which are widely 
considered to contain useful information when studied carefully. 
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On the point of time series happiness data being bounded, Johns and 
Ormerod (2008) admit that short term trends in reported happiness data 
might exist, but correctly note that no trend in happiness data can continually 
persist using the present measuring technique. This is because if happiness 
increased until everyone rated themselves as happy as possible on a bounded 
scale, then they could not communicate any increase in happiness from that 
point. Of course this is true, but the chances of everyone reporting maximum 
happiness on any realistic scale do not seem high enough to warrant 
discontinuing the collection and analysis of subjective happiness data.  
Based on these arguments for the insensitivity of time series happiness 
data, Johns and Ormerod (2008) then make the misleading assertion that time 
series happiness data cannot show trends and are thereby useless for 
comparing to trend-showing traditional economic indicators.136 The problem 
here for Johns and Ormerod is that happiness data do in fact exhibit trends in 
many countries. Inglehart and colleagues’ recent study of reported happiness 
in 52 countries from 1981–2007 revealed that nearly all of them exhibit 
upwards trends in happiness (Ingleheart et al.  2008). They also suggest 
several reasons for why this trend might have been missed by some 
researchers. The oldest data on happiness come from the most developed 
countries, such as the United States, all of which had already passed the point 
of economic development where gains in happiness could be easily attained 
through economic growth. Furthermore, increases in tolerance and 
democratisation (which help increase a sense of freedom and happiness) have 
been relatively recent and do not always have significant effects on other 
measures of well-being (Ingleheart et al. 2008). 
 
 
                                                             
136 Their reasoning for why this is the case is discussed in the next subsection. 
248 
 
2.3 Is Time Series Happiness Data Useful for Policymaking? 
In addition to the claim that happiness measures are useless, Johns and 
Ormerod (2008, p. 142) also assert that happiness data should not be used in 
policymaking. Johns and Ormerod justify this claim by arguing that 
governments will inevitably ‚influence‛ the data, which is only possible 
because the data don’t contain any ‚real information‛. Presumably they mean 
that governments will ‘cook’ the happiness ‘books’, as opposed to create 
policies that make their citizens happier (thereby influencing them to report 
higher levels of happiness). Naturally, governments will attempt to present 
happiness data in the best light (for them at that time), just like corporate 
directors and governments now do with financial data. Without the actual 
falsification of the data, such unscrupulous behaviour cannot continue for 
long without being spotted. And, happiness data are just as open to 
falsification as financial data. However, if every set of happiness data 
contained as much information as a random set of numbers as Johns and 
Ormerod (2008) claim, then it would be somewhat more difficult to identify 
happiness ‘book cooking’ (mainly because no one would care about it). 
But is time series happiness data really indistinguishable from a purely 
random series of numbers like Johns and Ormerod (2008) allege? They claim 
that time series happiness data provide a flat autocorrelation137 and no 
statistically significant individual values, which make it impossible to create 
accurate forecasts from it. However, they just tested one set of happiness data 
from one country. Reported happiness in many countries exhibits clear trends 
over time, as discussed above, so implying that all time series happiness data 
provide a flat autocorrelation is very misleading. Furthermore, our ability to 
forecast time series happiness data is constantly increasing due to careful 
                                                             
137 Autocorrelations can reveal trends in a data series that are hidden by noise. A flat 
autocorrelation indicates that there is no trend over time in the data series. 
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comparisons of changes in reported happiness over time between different 
countries (or distinct groups within countries). By identifying changes in 
happiness that occur in some countries or groups, but not others experiencing 
very similar conditions, variables that might explain the variance in happiness 
can be isolated. The prevailing conditions in some of these comparisons even 
allow for the direction of causality to be assessed and thereby begin to 
provide useful information for predicting the effects on future reported 
happiness of some upcoming changes in circumstances.  
Economist David Dorn and his colleagues recently showed not only that 
the more democratic countries in their study had higher average reported 
happiness values, but also that as the countries in the study became more 
democratic, their average reported happiness values increased too (Dorn et al. 
2007). By observing how happiness and other variables interact within 
populations, and comparing that with the interactions observed under similar 
circumstances in other populations, we can gain valuable insight as to the 
direction of causality between reported happiness and the other variable. 
So, Johns and Ormerod (2008) have not yet provided any good reason for 
us to believe that happiness data contains no information or that happiness 
data could not be useful for informing policymaking. However, they go on to 
cite an unpublished mathematical paper, showing that the variation observed 
in time series happiness data can be completely explained by sampling error. 
What the paper actually shows is that some of the variation of happiness over 
time in one set of 3-point time series happiness data from one country could be 
explained by sampling error.138 Johns and Ormerod (2008) implicitly 
generalise this lone result to all time series happiness data. Since many other 
sets of time series happiness data are based on more sensitive scales, show 
                                                             
138 The unpublished paper is available on request from Helen Johns: 
general.hj@googlemail.com (Johns & Ormerod 2008, p. 142). 
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clear trends, and show more variation from year to year, generalising such a 
finding to all time series happiness data is very misleading.139 
Knowing that not all time series measures of happiness are as sensitive as 
they could be and that (as with many social science measures) some of the 
variation in the resulting data is probably due to sampling error, should time 
series happiness data ever be used for public policy? At most, combining 
these findings should result in the conclusion that some happiness studies 
should not be used to guide policy because their results should not inspire 
enough confidence. However, other time series happiness studies can be 
useful for policymaking in many ways (Frey 2008, Chap. 13). For example, by 
carefully comparing results from several populations in circumstances as 
similar as possible and implementing the policy change in only some of those 
populations, changes in reported happiness can be recorded and compared. If 
other variables are sufficiently controlled for and the changes in happiness are 
statistically significant, then useful information can be gained about how the 
policy might affect other populations in similar circumstances. 
 
3. Important Problems for Using Measures of Subjective Well-Being to 
Inform Policymaking 
Even though Johns and Omerod’s (2008) criticisms of measuring happiness 
are relatively easily dealt with, there are other more serious critiques that 
need to be addressed. First I turn to the problem of whether subjective well-
being surveys really measure happiness and then to the problem of which 
version of happiness we should be measuring. 
 
 
                                                             
139 I provide further criticism of Johns and Ormerod’s (2008) interpretation of Johns’ 
unpublished study in Turton (2009). 
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3.1 Do Measures of Happiness Really Measure Happiness? 
As discussed, there are currently a number of different methods that are 
claimed to be measures of well-being. These measures include brain scans, 
daily reports about how participants have been feeling, the opinions of 
participants’ friends or colleagues, the opinion of an expert, the amount 
participants smile and, most commonly, survey questions. The survey 
questions are often markedly different. They might ask about happiness, 
satisfaction with life, the degree to which one would choose to change one’s 
life and many other distinct notions. It is the findings produced by analyses of 
these surveys that are usually recommended as aids to inform policymaking. 
But should we trust that these surveys are actually measuring happiness or 
well-being and not something else entirely? And should we trust that one 
person’s happiness is the same as another’s? 
Kroll (2010), Layard (2003; 2005) and Bok (2010) all argue that we should 
have faith in answers to survey questions about well-being because they are 
significantly correlated with many other measures of well-being, both within 
and between large groups of people. Importantly, these researchers view the 
correlations found in (the unarguably objective) neuroimaging studies as 
adding considerable support to the idea that subjective measures of well-
being are assessing something that is real and that we all experience. Layard 
(2005, p. 17) states: 
Sceptics may still question whether happiness is really an 
objective feeling that can be properly compared between people. 
To reassure doubters, we can turn to modern brain physiology 
with its sensational new insights into what is happening when a 
person feels happy or unhappy. 
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Indeed, it is true that most of the diverse measures of well-being mentioned 
above are significantly correlated for most test participants. However, that 
truth does not indicate that any of the different measures are actually 
evaluating well-being or happiness. The important point that Kroll, Layard, 
and Bok ignore is that although most of the correlations in the neuroimaging 
studies are statistically significant, they are not particularly large. 
Furthermore, the neuroimaging studies that Layard (2005, pp. 17–19) and 
others cite usually compare neuroimaging results with various cues that are 
expected to create various feelings, including ‘approach’ or ‘withdrawal’, in 
their participants, not with measures of subjective well-being.  
In the only comprehensive study of correlations between neuroimaging 
and measurement of subjective well-being, several prominent subjective well-
being measures were compared with electroencephalogram data from 84 
right-handed adults aged 57–60. Correlating highest with the neuroimaging 
results were the results for a measure of psychological flourishing—Carol 
Ryff’s (1989) Scales of Psychological Well-Being. The correlation was highly 
significant (p < 0.01) and moderate in size (0.33) (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). 
Following close behind was Ed Diener and colleagues’ (1985) Satisfaction 
With Life Scale, which correlated with the neuroimaging results by 0.30 and 
was also highly significant (p < 0.01) (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). A smaller (0.21) 
and slightly less significant (p < 0.05) correlation was also found with the 
positive affect component of Watson, Clark, and Tellegen’s (1988) Positive 
and Negative Affect Schedule (Urry et al. 2004, p. 370). It should be noted that, 
unlike the questions that directly ask about happiness, none of the measures 
of subjective well-being used in Urry and colleagues’ (2004) study are 
equivalent to the folk notion of happiness (although the measure of positive 
affect would come the closest). 
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The significant, but relatively small, correlations between the 
neuroimaging results and these measures of subjective well-being tell us two 
things. First, the neuroimaging results and these measures of subjective well-
being are very likely to be tracking phenomena that are related in some 
positive way. This is shown by the fact that the correlation is positive and 
highly statistically significant. Second, the phenomena being tracked are 
clearly distinct. The high statistical significance of the results should make us 
confident that the various measures are not measuring exactly the same thing. 
If the size of the correlations were much higher, at least above 0.60,140 and the 
statistical significance remained very high, then we would expect to observe 
the phenomena measured by the different tests to covary more closely and, 
thereby, give the impression of being the same thing. Positive correlations of 
0.33 (roughly) mean that we should expect an increase in the results of the 
neuroimaging measure to be usually accompanied by a relatively smaller 
increase of the subjective well-being measure. This is the kind of relationship 
we expect from distinct but positively related variables, not from two 
different measures of the same phenomenon. 
Perhaps most telling of all on the question of what support neuroimaging 
provides for the objectivity of happiness is that the cognitive scientists who 
carry out neuroimaging studies rarely claim to be testing happiness or well-
being. Much more commonly they claim to be investigating the neural 
correlates of pleasure and pain or approach and withdrawal behaviour, as is 
the case with the neuroimaging study that Layard discusses the most 
(Davidson et al. 1990; c.f. Layard 2005). But even if experimental 
neuroimaging studies were carried out until a measure of neurological 
activity correlated very highly and statistically significantly with a subjective 
                                                             
140 0.60 is the level above which behavioural scientists usually deem results to be ‘highly 
related’ (Cohen 1988). 
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measure of happiness, it would be presumptuous to declare it the discovery 
of an objective measure of happiness. Rather, such a neurological measure 
should be understood as an objective measure of the propensity to report 
subjective happiness. Understood this way, it’s much less obvious how 
objective neuroimaging results are supposed to give us confidence that a 
measure of subjective well-being is accurately performing the task that we 
want it to.141 
Nevertheless, the confluence of the various correlations between measures 
of subjective well-being, aspects of bio-physical health, neuroimaging data, 
observers’ reports, and behavioural analyses points toward there being 
something tangible to measure (Layard 2010). Or, at least, a few closely 
related tangible things to measure.142 Frey and Stutzer (2002) also provide a 
(now dated but nonetheless excellent) summary of how measures of 
subjective well-being are reliable enough to provide useful economic and 
policy insights despite all of the potential problems discussed so far. Perhaps 
most encouraging in this regard is the study of Oswald and Wu (2010, p. 579), 
which reported a highly significant (p approximately = 0.0001) and relatively 
large (0.6) correlation between objective quality of life factors and subjective 
satisfaction with life in the United States of America. This careful study of 
over 1.3 million data points ‚suggests that subjective well-being data contain 
genuine information about the quality of people’s lives‛, which is exactly 
what policymakers should be interested in (Oswald & Wu 2010, p. 579). A 
further problem remains, however. None of the many existing measures of 
                                                             
141 A similar presentation of this issue appears in Weijers & Jarden (2011, pp. 56–57) and 
Feldman 2010, chap. 13). 
142 Indeed, this is surely how these results are best understood. The fact that different 
measures of well-being actually measure different aspects of well-being is not necessarily a 
drawback, as discussed below. 
255 
 
subjective well-being measure the same thing, so it is far from obvious which 
one or ones, if any, actually measure well-being.  
 
3.2 How Do We Know if We Are Measuring the Right Kind of Happiness? 
The fact that different questions in well-being surveys are not measuring the 
same phenomena is no revelation to many researchers. It’s an understatement 
to say that philosophers have been discussing the merits of various 
conceptions of well-being for a long time. To a philosopher, the different 
kinds of questions used in subjective well-being surveys often endorse one 
particular philosophical conception of well-being. It might be suggested that 
these philosophical differences are trifling distractions, since all of the 
measures are assessing something that is obviously good, but there is a 
serious problem with this suggestion. 
What should policymakers do when findings based on different measures 
of well-being imply different policies? This problem might be easily pushed 
aside if it were not for the fact that many subjective well-being surveys 
produce results that appear to contradict the existing findings of the science of 
well-being. For example, according to Kroll (2010) it is well established that 
increases in income have no effect on the overall self-reported well-being of 
countries with per capita GDP over 10,000 Euros. However, well-being 
researchers using different questions have found a positive significant 
relationship between income and self-reported well-being amongst both poor 
and rich countries (e.g. Deaton 2010). Since both of these findings are 
statistically significant, the ‘apparently’ very similar questions are the most 
likely cause of the divergent results. In this particular case, the findings that 
increasing income improves well-being well above 10,000 Euros are based on 
data from Gallup World Polls. The question about well-being in Gallup 
World Polls is worded in a way that is more likely to elicit comparisons with 
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all other people in the world, not just the respondents’ immediate reference 
group. Many studies have shown that our reported satisfaction with life is 
significantly affected by whatever reference group is most salient to us at the 
time of the survey (Graham & Pettinato 2002; Kahneman & Krueger 2006; e.g. 
Merton 1957). Therefore, it should come as no surprise that Gallup Word 
Polls’ wording of their subjective well-being question makes a difference in 
this way. 
Indeed, other researchers have good evidence that the more a measure of 
subjective well-being asks about the respondents’ emotional lives, and the less 
it encourages them to engage in cognitive deliberation about how satisfied 
they are with their life compared to what it might have been, then the smaller 
and less significant the relationship between increases in income and 
increases in subjective well-being becomes (Diener et al. 2010). When the 
science of well-being produces contradictory findings in this way, it creates a 
problem for policymakers. To prevent this from occurring, researchers 
analysing well-being survey data should never generalise findings from 
different questions unless those questions really are asking about the same 
phenomena. But what should policymakers intent on using the science of 
well-being do when the findings are contradictory? 
Policymakers should always investigate the original surveys to find out if 
the well-being findings are about one conception of well-being. Such an 
investigation might lead to the identification of different questions about 
well-being as the source of conflict. Discovery of such conflicts illuminates the 
fundamental problems policymakers intent on using the science of well-being 
face. Which question about subjective well-being is the most appropriate basis 
for policymaking? What exactly is well-being anyway? 
Despite thousands of years spent pondering these questions, philosophers 
have not yet come up with definitive answers. They have, however, identified 
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several main conceptions of well-being, along with their advantages and their 
disadvantages. This knowledge should be shared and discussed widely, with 
the public and with social scientists working on happiness and well-being.143 
With a greater awareness of these problems and a deeper understanding of 
what well-being might consist of, citizens can exercise their democratic rights 
and lobby their governments to adopt their preferred conception. When this 
occurs, governments can encourage the use of appropriate measures of well-
being. Only then can well-being researchers be confident that they are 
producing findings that are really relevant for policymaking. And only then 
can policymakers get the most out of the science of well-being. 
 
4. What Role Should Happiness Play in Policymaking? 
In any democratic society the (hopefully informed) citizens should decide 
what conceptions of happiness or well-being are important and the extent of 
the role any such conceptions should play in policymaking. But in order to 
educate citizens and encourage effective evidence-based policymaking, 
academics and top-level civil servants need to better clarify the various 
conceptions of happiness and well-being and whether we can accurately and 
efficiently measure them. After these issues have been clarified, how 
circumstances and policies affect happiness or well-being (as defined in each 
case) should also be investigated to help better understand where each 
concept of well-being fits in the economic landscape, and also to promote 
public debate on the relevant merits of certain kinds of happiness and other 
goods. Philosophers, psychologists, economists, statisticians and 
                                                             
143 Dan Haybron and Valerie Tiberius provide some excellent examples of how philosophers 
can engage with social scientists and policymakers to inform them about the philosophical 
theories and debates about well-being (Haybron 2008c; Haybron & Tiberius 2012; Tiberius 
2004; Tiberius & Hall 2010).  
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policymakers should work together on this in order to pool their collective 
expertise and progress most effectively. But what can governments and 
policymakers do to speed up this process? 
In a recent interview for the International Journal of Wellbeing, Nobel 
Laureate Daniel Kahneman has expressed fears that governments will insert 
only one of the widely-used subjective well-being questions in their censuses 
(e.g. How satisfied are you with your life as a whole? On a 1-5 Likert scale) 
(Jarden 2011). He worries that this kind of measure won’t be sensitive enough 
to reveal anything interesting, even in the face of dramatically changing 
traditional economic indicators. Kahneman’s main concern is that both 
politicians and the public will view the insensitivity of such measures as a 
reason to reject all future use of subjective measures of well-being. So, how 
can governments ensure that they ask the right question from the start? 
For starters, one question will simply not be enough. As Martin Seligman 
discusses in Flourish (2011) there is considerable evidence in favour of a 
‘dashboard’ approach because it seems that there are several distinct and 
roughly equally important dimensions of well-being. He outlines the 
following five aspects of well-being as being worthy of inclusion in a 
dashboard of subjective well-being indicators: positive emotion, engagement, 
meaning, positive relationships, and accomplishment (Forgeard et al. 2001). 
The United Kingdom’s Office for National Statistics (ONS) appears to have 
followed the dashboard approach to some extent, asking four subjective well-
being questions in its ONS Opinion Survey, each of which represents a 
different group of philosophical theories about well-being (Beaumont 2011). 
The ONS has not yet confirmed which questions will capture data on 
subjective well-being in the long-run, with consultation still ongoing. It seems 
very likely, though, that several subjective well-being questions will be 
chosen. This cautious approach is surely a good one. The truth of the matter is 
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that more research needs to be done to finalise both the list of distinct aspects 
of well-being and the most accurate and effective way to measure each of 
them with as few questions as possible. So, the question now becomes: how 
can governments ensure that they ask the right questions from the start? 
I propose a ten-year international collaborative effort to answer this 
question. The importance of this issue means that ten years should not be 
considered excessive. Governments in several countries in Europe and 
around the world already conduct longitudinal panel surveys and some of 
them even use these surveys to collect data on both economic and subjective 
well-being indicators. The best of these kinds of surveys for our purposes are 
those in which each respondent, and everyone else in their household, has to 
complete the survey every three months or so for at least three years. The 
number and types of questions would have to be expanded, however. The 
generic objective economic and demographic questions would need to be 
accompanied by subjective versions of the same questions, subjective 
questions about the events that have recently impacted their lives, and 
batteries of subjective well-being measures for each potentially important 
aspect of well-being.144  
Comparing the various measures of subjective well-being to the existing 
philosophical theories of well-being would be a useful way to assess whether 
the existing measures cover the scope of all possibly important conceptions of 
well-being. Such an assessment would have to be carried out carefully 
because of the profound differences between philosophical accounts of well-
being that are nonetheless grouped together. As discussed in Chapter 1, there 
is a variety of types of Prudential Hedonism. While a simple ‚How happy 
                                                             
144 Ed Diener’s (2006) ‘Guidelines for National indicators of Subjective Well-Being and Ill-
being’ is a good starting point for more specific guidance on the creation of such a collection 
of measures of subjective well-being. 
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have you been these days?‛ question might be thought to cover all hedonistic 
theories, other measures better capture the ideas behind specific hedonistic 
theories of well-being. For example, Kahneman and Krueger’s (2006) U-index 
(which asks about the proportion of time respondents spend in a negative 
emotional state) would be a fairly good measure of Epicurus’ pain-
minimising Prudential Hedonism, while Watson and colleagues’ (1988) 
Positive and Negative Affect Scale would better represent Bentham’s net-
pleasant-feelings-based Prudential Hedonism. 
If several governments around the world conducted this kind of survey 
(with the same questions) very useful information would result. Not only 
would we be able to assess how perceptions mediate the effect of objective 
economic changes on individuals and groups, we would also be able to see 
what kinds of objective economic and demographic factors affect the various 
aspects of well-being and whether these results are cross-culturally robust. 
The combination of surveying the same participants, and those they live with, 
over time provides more definitive information on how what happens to 
people and those around them affects their well-being.  
Furthermore, the measures of the components of well-being could be 
refined for accuracy and sensitivity during this process. The questions could 
be updated and improved with each new round of the surveys, until the ten 
years is up. At the end, individual governments could decide which of the 
measures of particular aspects of well-being are most relevant to their 
respective countries. They would know if the measures were already robust 
enough to be used as a question in the census, or if the questions needed 
further refinement, and could then act accordingly. 
Indeed, the OECD’s current work on creating guidelines for measuring 
subjective well-being combined with the political impetus created at the UN 
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meeting on Happiness and Wellbeing: Defining a New Economic Paradigm in 
April this year might result in such a widespread collaborative effort. 
If this kind of approach were adopted, and well-being dashboards were 
incorporated into censuses, then political parties of the not-too-distant future 
might even be able to differentiate themselves by giving precedence to the 
promotion of certain aspects of well-being over others. To better facilitate 
public debate on the merits of these various measures of well-being, 
philosophers, psychologists and economists should hold interdisciplinary 
public lectures and forums on different conceptions of well-being. Assuming 
that the public gain sufficient knowledge about the different aspects and 
conceptions of well-being being measured, the constant collecting of data on 
these well-being indicators could be a great way to measure a government’s 
effectiveness (comparing the net benefit to well-being indicators with the net 
cost to capital stocks, such as natural resources, infrastructure, etc.) (Weijers 
2012). In this way, measures of subjective well-being could be used to allow 
policymakers to consider the potential impacts of a policy on the happiness as 
well as the wealth of citizens. It will take a considerable amount of 
interdisciplinary work to reach this point but, once there, policymakers will 
have an incredibly useful set of tools at their disposal and citizens might just 
become happier because of it.  
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